



Escaping the Hunger Cycle Pathways to Resilience in the Sahel

Sahel Working Group

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The Sahel Working Group (SWG) is an informal inter-agency network, focusing mainly on Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. It was formed to identify and implement solutions to the chronic vulnerability and hunger of communities, as highlighted by the chronic food crises in 2005 and 2010. The SWG shares information, commissions research and coordinates programming and advocacy messages. The participating agencies that have jointly commissioned this report are: Christian Aid, CARE International UK, Concern Worldwide, Oxfam GB, CAFOD, Plan UK, Save the Children UK, Tearfund, and World Vision UK.

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Foreword

A Hausa proverb says: if the drumbeat changes, the dance must also change. In the Sahel, the number of people suffering from chronic food insecurity, high levels of poverty and vulnerability due to drought is increasing. Acute food crises, such as occurred in 2005, and again in 2010, are short term peaks, of an underlying trend of increasing chronic vulnerability. In 2010, severe food insecurity impacted more than 10 million people across the region. Niger – the world’s least developed country – was at the centre of the most recent food crisis. The food crisis affected over seven million people in Niger, which is almost 50% of the population. Two million people in Chad did not have enough to eat. An estimated total of one million people across Mali (600,000) Mauritania (300,000) and Burkina Faso (100,000) were affected, as well as an unknown number in northern Cameroon and northern Nigeria.

This is irrefutable evidence, if more were needed, that the drumbeat in the Sahel has changed. Food crises can no longer be treated as limited events, caused by occasional hazards like droughts or floods. Food and nutrition insecurity have become long-term, chronic problems. The growing level of poverty and inequality in the Sahel mean that there is no buffer when things go wrong. It only takes a small shock to send the system into disequilibrium. A perturbation in market prices, rainfall pattern or production figures that may not appear very serious, (and which could be missed by an imperfect early warning system) can start a chain of events that appear disproportionate to the initial trigger.¹

Food insecurity and poverty are so endemic, that one of their most visible manifestations, the appallingly high levels of Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) of children under five, is often considered as ‘normal for the Sahel’². The causes of high levels of malnutrition are often attributed to ‘cultural factors’ – including weaning practices, poor diet and lack of exclusive breast feeding for children under six months old. These factors are clearly important, but they fail to explain why there was a huge surge in the rate of malnutrition during the 2010 food crisis. In Niger alone, 313,000 children under the age of five, with Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) were treated through public health facilities supported by the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and non-government organizations (NGOs). These numbers represent one-fifth of all children treated for this condition in the world in 2010.³

Even in good years, many people in the Sahel struggle to survive. A third of the population of Chad is chronically undernourished - regardless of the rains or the size of the harvest. A World Bank study on food security in Niger in 2009 found that more than 50 % of the population suffer from chronic food insecurity, with 22% of the population extremely food insecure. An unacceptable number of the most vulnerable group, children under five, actually do not survive. According to the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 300,000 children under five years old, die of malnutrition related causes each year in the Sahel.⁴ A study by Save the Children UK (SCUK) on the causes of malnutrition in the Tessaoua district of Niger indicates that 85% of malnourished children came from poor households, and 50% from the poorest households.⁵ The causes of malnutrition are complex, but poverty is clearly a growing factor.

Although the overall humanitarian response to the food crisis of 2010 was significantly better than in 2005, the inescapable reality was that the international community failed to respond early enough, and at the scale required. ‘We managed to avoid the worst’ said Harouna Hamani, the

coordinator of Niger's Early Warning System (EWS), 'Even though the population is suffering and rates of malnutrition are very high, it could have been catastrophic without early interventions'.⁶ While the worst was averted, the late response tragically caused hundreds of thousands of households to lose their livelihoods and fall deeper into the hunger cycle, increasing the likelihood of future food crises.

Professor Alhousseini Bretaudeau, the Secretary-General of the Permanent Inter-State Committee for the Fight against Drought in the Sahel (CILSS)^a, made a statement in December 2009, just as the new food crisis was starting to affect households across the Sahel: 'The CILSS plays a key role within the RPCA (Food Crisis Prevention Network). In the past fifteen years, there have been no major food crises in West Africa. Why is that? I believe that one of the reasons is the quality and reliability of the information produced within the network. Today, food security in West Africa is very high. As the network has matured, we no longer see the type of famine epidemic that used to be common over thirty years ago'.⁷

CILSS is an influential institution in the Sahel for preventing and managing food crises. CILSS recognises that food security does not depend solely on agricultural production, but also on markets. Even in years of adequate rainfall, vulnerable populations that cannot produce enough are excluded from the market because of their low purchasing power. CILSS is slowly promoting reforms to strengthen capacity at the regional and national level, and addressing structural vulnerability.

Yet the remarks of Professor Bretaudeau, made after CILSS and the RPCA network had already assessed the early warning signs of the drought in 2009, suggest that CILSS and its partners should consider a different standard of how to assess a high level of food security in the Sahel. More effective early warning indicators and rapid response mechanisms are required to prevent the immense damage to livelihoods and the loss of productive assets by vulnerable households when an acute food crisis occurs. Other organisations, at the national, regional and international levels, need to consider setting a higher standard for food security. Chronic food insecurity and emergency levels of child malnutrition are definitely a major concern to these organisations. However, it appears that in the face of what appears to be an intractable problem, with no clear or easy solutions, the current situation is being treated almost as 'normal', with a combination of tolerance and resignation.

Fortunately, there is hope. Despite this dire situation, attitudes and actions are starting to change. 'Times of crisis can be creative times, times when new visions and new possibilities emerge, as the very dangers we face stimulate us to look deeper, seek alternatives, and take advantage of opportunities'.⁸ Many lessons are being learned and have started to be applied. Major improvements in the approach, tools, funding mechanisms, and coordination between agencies were apparent in the humanitarian response to the 2010 food crisis, particularly in Niger, but much less so in Chad. As documented in this report, many actors within civil society, governments, international NGOs, the United Nations and aid agencies are working creatively and strategically, to change the paradigm that divides humanitarian and development aid. They are striving to overcome barriers to the transformations required, in order to enable the people of the Sahel to move forward on the path to resilience. These efforts are having initial positive results. The dance is starting to change. If national governments, regional organizations and international donor agencies could be convinced that investing in resilience would significantly reduce the huge costs of emergency relief, this change could be accelerated.

The purpose of this research report is to support these actors to provide evidence of a new vision of an adapted aid approach. An approach that enables the people of the Sahel to escape the hunger cycle, regain their dignity and seize new possibilities leading them down the 'path to resilience'.

^a CILSS is the Permanent Inter-State Committee for the Fight against Drought in the Sahel. Its mandate is to promote food security and combat desertification. CILSS has developed a strategic framework for "creating the conditions for sustainable regional food security and reducing structurally poverty and inequalities in the Sahel".

List of abbreviations

ACF	Action Against Hunger	IPC	Integrated food security and humanitarian Phase Classification
AFD	French Development Agency	LRRD	Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development
AGRA	Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa	MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
BDRC	Building Disaster Resilient Communities	MSF	Medecins Sans Frontière
CAADP	Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme	OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
CaLP	Cash Learning Partnership	ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
CASAGC	Action Committee for Food Security and Disaster Management (Chad)	ODI	Overseas Development Institute
CCA	Food Crisis Coordination (Niger)	OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
CIDA	Canadian International Development Agency	OFDA	Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
CILSS	Permanent Inter-State Committee for the Fight against Drought in the Sahel	ONASA	National Food Security Office (Chad)
DFID	Department for International Development	OSV	Observatories for Monitoring Vulnerability
DNPGCA	Agency for the Prevention and Management of Food Crises	PRS	Poverty Reduction Strategy
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction	PVCA	Participatory Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment
ECB	Emergency Capacity Building: Network	RBM	Billital Maroobé Network
ECHO	European Commission for Humanitarian Aid department	RPCA	Food Crisis Prevention Network (West Africa)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	RUTF	Ready to Use Therapeutic Foods
ECOWAP	ECOWAS Agricultural Policy	SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
EWS	Early Warning System	SCAP-RU	Community Early Warning System, Emergency Response
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation	SCUK	Save the Children (UK)
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning Systems Network	SMART	Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition
FMAFS	Farmer Managed Agroforestry Farming System	SWAC	Sahel and West Africa Club
FMNR	Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration	USAID	United States Agency for International Development
GAM	Global Acute Malnutrition	WFP	World Food Programme
HEA	Household Economy Analysis		

Executive summary

This report is a detailed analysis of changes in policies and programs in the Sahel since 2005. It assesses to what extent lessons of the 2005 food crisis were applied during the crisis of 2010. Commissioned by the Sahel Working Group as a follow up to an earlier study *Beyond Any Drought*, the initial central question guiding this study was what lessons have been learned since 2005 about what has to change in the Sahel, so that every drought does not result in a new humanitarian crisis? *Beyond Any Drought* assessed the root causes of chronic vulnerability in the Sahel. The focus of this follow up study is to determine how aid can be more effectively reduce vulnerability in the Sahel. What can be learned from recent experience to guide decision making and improve the effectiveness of aid to prevent future food crises? The study draws from a review of literature, reports and documents, and interviews with over 70 people. Extensive field visits were carried out in the areas of Niger and Chad most affected by the 2010 crisis.

Structure of the report

The report is divided into five sections. The first gives a brief overview of the 2010 crisis. The second analyses the most promising changes since 2005 in addressing the root causes of vulnerability. The third highlights the failures of the 2010 response, the structural obstacles to change, and challenges for ending the chronic crisis of food and nutrition insecurity. The fourth section describes a conceptual framework 'the pathways to resilience' which, if followed, will arrest and reverse the alarming trend of deepening vulnerability in the Sahel. Drawing on evidence of positive changes already in motion, and new lessons learned, this framework is designed to guide major groups of actors (governments, CILSS, donors, UN agencies, international NGOs, and civil society) in decision-making, and setting priorities for overcoming the largely neglected chronic dimensions of the food and nutrition crisis. The fifth section contains the conclusions and detailed recommendations. This is followed by detailed annexes.

The underlying problem to overcome chronic vulnerability

During the course of the research, it became clear that an underlying problem contributing to the hunger cycle was manifest in the central research question itself. It is framed by the concept of a 'relief to development' continuum, which places 'crisis' at one end, and 'normality' at the other. Although it is changing, this paradigm still dominates the thinking and actions of many actors in the Sahel. 'Crisis' is still strongly associated with short, sharp, disasters such as drought. When good rains restore crop production and pastures, many consider the crisis to have passed, and life to have returned to normal. Many high level decision makers in the Sahel, within CILSS, national governments, the UN agencies and donor agencies, (aside from a few exceptions) do not appear to consider the current high level of food and nutrition insecurity as a 'crisis'. This widespread attitude undermines actions to reduce chronic vulnerability. This is the key problem. This must change.

The brutal, unpalatable reality is that a pervasive, on-going, structural food crisis exists in the Sahel. This report documents appallingly high level of Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM), far above the emergency threshold in many parts of the Sahel. UNICEF estimates that over 300,000 children die in the Sahel, every year, from malnutrition related causes. Evidence from Household Economy

Analysis (HEA) across the Sahel, and Cost of Diet studies, indicate that income poverty is a major cause. The poorest households, who constitute up to a third of the population in vulnerable rural areas, purchase roughly 60% of their food from the market. Many factors, not just drought, cause spikes in food prices in the market. Data presented in this report shows a striking correlation between increased food prices and a rise of Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) in children. In light of this, there can be no complacency, no sense of normalcy, no lessening of the sense of urgency, once the rains have returned and the acute dimension of the food crisis subsides. A major step in overcoming the root causes of vulnerability in the Sahel, and starting down the path to resiliency, is for the CILSS, governments, donors, the UN agencies and international agencies to unequivocally acknowledge that a chronic food and nutrition crisis exists, and that vigorous steps are required to prevent it from getting worse.

Evidence of progress made since 2005

Since 2005, there is evidence that attitudes of donors, UN agencies, international NGOs and governments are starting to shift. There is some initial progress. The way forward is becoming clearer. The architecture of aid is changing to more effectively address the crisis. In October 2010, during her visit to the Sahel, Valerie Amos, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs for the United Nations, noted 'Over the years, we have become very good at responding to immediate needs (sic). We now need to become good at building bridges between emergency relief and development'. Further evidence of learning comes from the European Commission for Humanitarian Aid department (ECHO). ECHO developed a comprehensive 'Sahel strategy'. Its fundamental objective is the efficient articulation of short and long term aid instruments to achieve sustainable reduction in malnutrition rates. Strategies include support for Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), and advocacy to give higher priority in integrating food and nutrition security into public policies.

The British Department for International Development (DFID) has provided considerable support for DRR. Until very recently, DFID also had the West African Humanitarian Relief Fund (WAHRF) in place to ensure a rapid response. The United Nations (UN) established the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) to rapidly assist people affected by natural disasters and conflicts. In 2010, CERF released funds for both Chad and Niger.

Interviews with staff of international NGOs at the headquarters, regional and national levels indicate that since 2005, significant steps have been taken to integrate their humanitarian and development strategies. They have also taken steps to improve their analysis of the root causes of food and nutrition insecurity, and engage in inter-agency learning and advocacy. This study documents successful NGO initiatives to strengthen the resilience of communities in the Sahel, including: HEAs which deepen understanding of livelihoods; operational research on how to treat and prevent Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM); promotion of agro-ecological agriculture techniques, supporting pastoralist livestock production, mainstreaming DRR and climate change adaptation (CCA), engaging communities in Early Warning Systems (EWS), and the use of innovative cash transfer programs for both humanitarian assistance and development.

Another promising initiative, which builds on the global evidence of the impact of cash transfer programs on nutrition and livelihoods, is the World Bank's recent support for a pilot social protection program in Niger. This is creating a possible model for institutionalising a permanent, government led approach to reducing vulnerability and promoting the livelihoods of the poorest.

Challenges to overcome on the path to resiliency

These recent positive changes point the way ahead on the path to resiliency in the Sahel. However, as this report analyses, there are many challenges and structural obstacles to overcome. The first is to strengthen the institutional capacity of governments and their partners to scale-up these initiatives to the national level. This requires significant, long-term efforts to strengthen governance and political leadership, particularly in fragile states, such as Chad, which currently could not effectively manage major increases in aid. This requires UN and donors to themselves make institutional changes. The first is to strengthen their staff capacity and leadership to apply international principles and guidelines for supporting fragile states. The second is to better integrate humanitarian and development aid to address the chronic, not just acute, dimensions of the crisis and the root causes, not just the symptoms.

However, the 2010 food crisis indicates that an equally fundamental challenge to promoting resilience is improving the capacity of governments, UN agencies and donors in mitigation and preparedness. Following an early warning alert, organisations should immediately undertake an early collective response, at an adequate scale, to protect the livelihoods of millions of vulnerable households. The humanitarian response in 2010 was better than in 2005. It saved lives. However, it failed to prevent massive loss of assets of the most vulnerable households, thereby reversing years of development work. A huge and costly effort is now required, over many years, to enable recovery. It is not certain that the current architecture of aid, despite the positive changes noted above, will provide sufficient, long-term, flexible funding for such a recovery. Even more uncertain is whether a full recovery could be accomplished before yet another crisis hits.

If the problem of achieving an early, adequate humanitarian response to prevent irreversible loss of assets and livelihoods is not solved, all other strategies and investments are in serious jeopardy. This study has found that DRR/CCA activities alone, even if undertaken before a crisis hits, are not sufficient to protect livelihoods and productive assets. This is because the resilience of the poorest 25% of households has been undermined by the huge level of underlying poverty. Major protective initiatives are also necessary.

Household Economy Analysis (HEA) indicates that structural forces are widening the gap between the better-off and poorer households. The poorest households often lack the means to engage in livelihood promotion activities required for resiliency. They are increasingly trapped in a downward spiral of debt, asset loss, and chronic food and nutrition insecurity. In rural areas, effective development initiatives to increase non-farm and off-farm income of the poorest households need to be designed to complement agriculture. Evidence from other regions of Africa indicate that targeted social protection programs, focussing on the very poorest households, and women in particular, have the potential to overcome the structural roots of chronic food and nutrition crises. Combining cash transfers with livelihood support can be effective in improving resilience of the poorest households.

The main challenge is that most governments in the Sahel, (with the exception of Niger) remain sceptical of investing scarce national resources in social protection, even if the governance and institutional capacity issues could be resolved.

Even if the poorest households could rely on a regular cash transfer, and related livelihood support, delivered through social protection programs, it would have little impact if local food prices doubled as they did in many parts of the Sahel in 2010. Another major challenge is the price volatility for basic grains, exacerbated by seasonal factors and regional market forces, and the failure of markets to distribute food to food deficit areas. A potential solution is significantly increasing food reserves and buffer stocks, at the regional and national level. This could be coupled with an

agreed regulatory framework to control market prices and overcome major market failures. However, applying this would require negotiating the support of donors and agreement of institutions such as the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation, who oppose measures that distort market forces.

A final conundrum: increasing aid while ensuring national ownership and capacity

These major initiatives in nutrition, DRR, promoting agro-ecology, and social protection will require significant increases in aid assistance. It is tempting to propose, as Frederick Mousseau does in his influential work "*Sahel: A Prisoner of Starvation?*" for a 'Marshall Plan'⁹ for the Sahel. However, discussions in the field made clear the huge challenges of governance, and weak institutional capacity at both national and decentralised levels of the state. There is a limited capacity to absorb significantly more aid while also engendering a sense of national ownership, in accordance to the Paris declaration of aid effectiveness. These are not trivial issues, particularly in fragile states. This final challenge cannot be brushed aside, even in the face of urgent need. Nor is the long-term solution to by-pass government.

While daunting, these challenges cannot become a reason for doing nothing, or very little to address the growing crisis of chronic food and nutrition insecurity. They require determined, extraordinary leadership, coordination and advocacy within the donor and UN community, by CILSS, governments and within civil society.

Priority recommendations for immediate action

In light of this conundrum, where is it best to start? What are the most realistic ways to move things forward along the path to resilience in the Sahel? What are the strategic entry points to achieve the greatest momentum for change? While this depends on the context of each country, this study proposes six immediate priorities for action, at the national and regional levels. Each recommendation requires different combinations of actors (including national governments, regional organisations, UN and donor agencies and NGOs) to work together:

- 1 Strengthen Preparedness and Early Response:** Apply the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié (CHB - being adopted by CILSS, which is based on the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) in the Sahel. At both the regional level (by CILSS) and national levels, define specific early alert triggers, which if reached, will generate an immediate strategic response, coordinated by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). Starting with multi-actor operational contingency planning, and mobilisation of resources. The standard of performance is to prevent or mitigate a livelihood crisis and loss of assets through early action.
- 2 Design national policies and implement programs for social protection that meet the needs of most vulnerable and poorest people:** Social protection measures can not only meet urgent humanitarian needs. Social protection also plays a part in strengthening resilience by enabling the very poor to acquire assets.
- 3 Boost rural livelihoods in marginal or degraded agricultural areas through sustainable intensification of food production using agro-ecological techniques, and in pastoral areas, through support for animal health, production and marketing:** New public investments in agro-ecological approaches and livestock production are essential for reducing chronic food insecurity, helping vulnerable households adapt to climate change, and regenerating the natural resource base. Consideration must also be given to strengthening the linkages between agriculture and nutrition. Non-farm and off-farm incomes of the poorest 25% of rural households need to be strengthened, as they do not benefit from improved agricultural techniques.

- 4 Develop and apply a regional DRR strategy in the Sahel:** Climate change, repeated drought, and other hazards in the Sahel pose great risks to the long term development of food and nutrition security. DRR needs to be better integrated into all relevant policies and programs, in accordance with the 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action and to achieve the MDGs.
- 5 Support coordinated, multi-sectoral investments to achieve sustainable reduction in level of child malnutrition:** Take measures to generate increased political will and compassion within governments and donors. Make changes in the aid paradigm in favour of longer term, flexible funding that bridges the humanitarian and development divide. Aid needs to address the multi-dimensional aspects of malnutrition which involves livelihood promotion, sustainable food production, improved child-care practices, social protection, DRR, health, water, hygiene and sanitation.
- 6 Address market failures and price volatility:** Take vigorous steps to define a regulatory framework for the development of a regional system of 'buffer stocks' or 'food security stocks' as provided for in the Regional Compact for Implementation of the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP) and ECOWAS Agricultural Policy (ECOWAP). This is essential to complement existing safety nets and food aid which are inadequate to cope with spikes in food prices caused by drought or international markets as in 2007-2008.

Detailed recommendations

Twenty four more detailed recommendations, proposing concrete longer-term actions to address structural roots of vulnerability and changes in institutions, policies and the architecture of aid, are presented at the end of this report. These recommendations address the major themes outlined below:

- **Change the vision of what is 'normal' and what is an 'emergency crisis' in the Sahel:** Stop using an uncritical conception of a relief-development continuum with 'crisis' at one end and 'normality' at the other. This artificially separates poverty, increasing vulnerability and chronic hunger.
- **Prevent, prepare and plan for crises better:** Develop unambiguous, clearly defined triggers which are specific to distinct livelihood systems (including pastoralism). When the trigger is reached, the contingency plan will be launched.
- **Rapidly speed up, and improve humanitarian responses:** Develop a more diversified approach (beyond food aid), to ensure more rapid, relevant and appropriate types of support for managing chronic and seasonal food insecurity. Despite their growing adoption, cash transfers and vouchers remain under-utilised, particularly by national agencies and WFP for preventing and managing food crises. Food aid remains firmly rooted as the main response. Cash gives poor people access to food and other essential basic goods and services while also supporting local producers.
- **Strengthen resilience and incomes:** Increase investment in agriculture with particular focus on agro-ecology and livestock production, DRR and social protection. Diversify income sources of the poorest households, through the promotion of non-farm and off-farm livelihood strategies.
- **Scale-up and broaden the scope of nutrition work:** Governments in the Sahel must seize the child malnutrition agenda, design more effective national strategies, assign top political leaders to oversee implementation and ensure a coordinated effort across line ministries.
- **Adapt donor policies and practices to the Sahel:** International and national agencies and donors must improve the quality, speed and appropriateness of emergency aid to support

vulnerable households. 'Preventing the significant loss of livelihood assets' is SPHERE standard practice, and must become a reality. Agencies must also apply international principles and guidelines for strengthening governance and working with fragile states.

- **Strengthen the capacity of regional and national and decentralised institutions to address food and nutrition insecurity:** Strengthen capacity to conduct needs assessment, planning, design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of cross-sectoral programs, as well as the use of analytical tools (HEA and SMART).
- **Strengthen the capacity of Civil Society, local NGOs, local government and communities for action at their level.** Support organisations to develop and manage programs to reduce risk, strengthen resilience, and advocate for supportive policies by national governments.

Assessing change in resilience: Using level of child malnutrition as a key indicator

This report proposes that 'nutrition security' be placed at the apex of the 'pathways to resilience'. Certainly, other indicators of resilience at the community and household level will need to be determined for different livelihood zones, in particular for pastoral areas. However, at the national level it is proposed that there is no better single indicator of resilience and resolving the chronic dimensions of the food insecurity than the level of child malnutrition, assessed using the Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition (SMART) survey. This report argues that in the Sahel, the most vulnerable households will have a strong level of resilience if a sustainable reduction in child malnutrition is achieved. Resilience that remains relatively unchanged even in the face of future droughts or other shocks.

Using the level of malnutrition as a key indicator of resilience (reduced vulnerability) is proposed firstly because it is already part of the Cadre Harmonisé Bonifié (CHB). Secondly, using malnutrition levels as a way to assess resilience will help keep resources focused on the poorest, most vulnerable households, which experience the highest levels of child malnutrition. This will overcome the inherent tendency of livelihood promotion and DRR programs to benefit the better off households. It would also help foster an approach to bridge humanitarian and development work at the program design stage. Finally, the advantage of malnutrition as a key indicator of resilience is that it will promote a stronger focus on addressing gender issues. Women bear the brunt of poverty. Their economic position and access to resources are vital to overcoming child malnutrition and improving resilience.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background to this study

The Sahel region experienced another severe food and nutritional crisis in 2010, with Niger, Chad, and parts of Mali and Burkina Faso among the most affected. It is estimated that ten million people have been affected, whether through loss of livelihoods or increasing levels of vulnerability and debt. This situation greatly aggravated the already alarming level of malnutrition of young children. The underlying and root causes of chronic vulnerability were explored by the Sahel Working Group's report *Beyond Any Drought* stimulated by the food crisis in Niger in 2004/05. This report assessed why, after all the efforts and investments made since the catastrophic droughts in the 1970s, people of the Sahel were still so vulnerable.

The purpose of this follow up report is to assess what lessons were learned and applied since 2005 or during the 2010 crisis. To what extent did they mitigate the crisis? What failed during the humanitarian response? To what extent were key recommendations from the *Beyond Any Drought* report (i.e. planning for drought as a normal condition, integration of humanitarian and development work and developing longer term, flexible programs) implemented? Based on this detailed analysis of programs and policies, the study proposes a conceptual framework which takes into account the specific vulnerabilities of the Sahel and the structural obstacles facing key players. These vulnerabilities and obstacles must be overcome to enable an approach to aid which is better adapted to the Sahel context.

This study took place in February and March 2011. This report is based on seventy interviews with humanitarian and development practitioners, researchers, donor representatives, government officials, members of research institutes and UN staff based in Dakar, Ouagadougou, Niamey, Bamako and N'Djaména, Brussels and London. Workshops designed to facilitate joint analysis on these issues were held in both Niamey and N'Djaména. Other workshops were held in rural areas directly affected by the food crisis. Over sixty rural people participated, including twenty women, representing twenty camps/villages in the Diffa region of Niger and Guéra region in Chad. This study also draws from a review of the existing documentation: analyses, assessments, reports, strategic documents, policy and program reviews, media reports, articles and press releases.

1.2. Structure of this report

There are four key chapters to this report, on which the executive summary is based:

Chapter 2 Successes since 2005: What worked better? Which lessons learnt from 2005 have been applied in longer term development programming and in the humanitarian response of 2009-10? To what extent does the application of these lessons show the pathways to strengthen resilience of vulnerable groups?

Chapter 3 What aspects of the approach to aid, (humanitarian action in 2010, and development practice since 2006) failed or were ineffective? Why? What are the challenges to overcome, and the structural obstacles to change for different actors?

Chapter 4 Description of a conceptual framework ‘the pathway to resilience’: Based on the lessons learned, how can the approach to aid be adapted to better integrate humanitarian and development practice and address the root causes of vulnerability in the Sahel context?

Chapter 5 A set of conclusions and recommendations.

This is followed by the annexes containing more detailed analyses and evidence to support the recommendations.

1.3 Overview of the 2009-10 food crisis in the Sahel

In 2010, more than ten million people in the Sahel suffered from an acute food crisis. To survive, the poorest families were forced to reduce their number of daily meals and sell their livestock, jewellery, tools, pots and pans and other possessions at derisory prices in order to buy grain at highly inflated prices.

In large parts of Niger and Chad, hundreds of thousands of men left their homes in a desperate search for food or income. Women were left to care for themselves, their children and the elderly. When their food stocks were exhausted, women were reduced to searching for food in the countryside, eating wild berries and leaves. As a result, they became weak and malnourished. In the Sahelian regions of Chad, thousands of women spent weeks digging out anthills searching for seeds and grains.

Women interviewed in Chad and Niger indicated that they eventually abandoned their villages and moved to towns with their children. In the worst affected communities, staff of international NGOs reported that 40% of the families had left their villages. Many of the more vulnerable households went deeper into debt, at very high interest rates, or mortgaged part of their land to get food. Aid workers and members of pastoral communities in Niger and Chad spoke of the carcasses of thousands of cattle littering the main routes of transhumance. Livestock prices fell dramatically, reducing pastoralists’ purchasing power. It has been reported that the early migration of women and children to urban centres drove down the cost of labour.

The food crisis struck people across the Sahel. However, contextual factors (including differing policies, capacities and conditions) caused the impact and the response to differ significantly from one country to another. To assess the lessons learned, and better identify the pathways to resilience in the Sahel, this report traced the evolution of the 2010 food crisis in four countries: Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso. More detailed information is presented in Annex A.

2 Progress on the path to resilience since 2005

Despite significant differences in context, a similar pattern emerges from this four country review. However, instead of asking only ‘what went wrong’, it is also important to identify and learn from positive changes. Specifically, how has the approach to aid in the Sahel evolved since 2005 in terms of new or improved services, processes, or a different paradigm for achieving resiliency?¹⁰ What creative and inventive solutions have emerged since 2005? To what extent has learning led to new attitudes, capacities and institutional changes?

Most of the positive changes and lessons learned since 2005 selected for in-depth analysis in this chapter emerged from numerous interviews and workshops which were held in Niamey and N’Djaména. The participants represented a cross section of actors from international and national NGOs, universities, UN agencies and the government. See Annex B11 for a summary of these perspectives.

2.1 Overcoming shallow analyses

Many aid initiatives in the Sahel prior to 2005 were ineffective because they were based on shallow analysis¹¹. The lack of good data collection and analysis is a weakness of many humanitarian and development programs. Since 2005, however, a number of organisations have started to apply a range of analytical tools. These have had a significant impact on improving understanding, monitoring and assessing food and nutrition insecurity.

2.1.1 Household Economy Analysis (HEA)

HEA is a form of livelihoods analysis which takes access to sufficient food as a basic reference point. HEA offers a strong, livelihoods-based approach to judging which people are vulnerable to shocks, and to what degree. The first HEA in the Sahel took place Niger in 2007, financed by ECHO and undertaken by SCUUK. Since 2007, nineteen additional HEA case studies have been conducted across the Sahel.¹² Eleven in agricultural zones, four in agro-pastoral zones, three in pastoral zones, and one in a peri-urban context. Most of assessments were financed by ECHO, and carried out by SCUUK, but also involved Oxfam GB and ACF.¹³

The HEA studies have provided highly relevant insights into a profound shift occurring in livelihoods. This shift has significant consequences for ensuring food security in the Sahel, as outlined in the box below, which is a case study from Niger:¹⁴

Study results: HEA in Niger

The vulnerability of households to food insecurity is highly variable even within the same communities. In agricultural zones, there is growing inequality in the distribution of productive assets (land, animals etc). Wealthier households generate 9 to 15 times the amount of revenue compared to poorer households. Wealthier households compose about 25% of the population (compared to 30% for the very poor), but possess 50% of the cultivated land, 65% of the sheep and goats, and more than 75% of the cattle. A similar process of growing inequality of income and wealth also exists in the pastoral and agro-pastoral zones, but there systems of social solidarity mitigate the ill effects.

The poorest households have great difficulty in meeting the basic food needs even in normal years. In most agricultural areas, the production of the poorest households contributes to less than a third of their food needs. Food deficits during the lean season are becoming increasingly acute. Diets are increasingly composed of cereal grain. Animal products such as milk and meat are almost absent in the diet, posing a serious risk to nutrition. In almost all study areas, poor households, even if they own land, are obliged to neglect their fields to work for wealthier families. Alternatively they migrate to other areas, to earn enough income to survive. This greatly reduces their agricultural production. In bad or crisis years, the problem becomes worse. Over generations, the poorest families lose part of their land to wealthier households, a process which is exacerbated in every new crisis.

Poor households, even in rural areas, buy most of their food on the local markets. For most poor households, food purchases take up more than half of their household expenses. This creates a high level of risk to price increases or volatile markets, because poorer households have little or no flexibility in their budgets to cope with higher prices. Any significant increase in food prices, therefore, often leads to a drastic decrease in the quantity and quality of food purchased, as well as reduction in other essential expenses in health and education.

The determining factor affecting the ability of poor households to survive and access sufficient, nutritious food is their purchasing power. Obtaining agricultural production data in the Sahel is not adequate. This indicator is best suited to the situation of the better off, not poorer households. Wealthy rural households in the agricultural and agro-pastoral areas obtain most of their food from their own agricultural production. Poor households depend primarily on the local market to buy their food. Food crises in the Sahel therefore are more and more crises of purchasing power and livelihoods, rather than availability of food. Increased food prices in the Sahel are no longer uniquely dependent on local or regional levels of production. Within increased regional and global market integration, food prices increasingly depend on wider market dynamics.

These insights from HEA studies have significant implications for adapting the approach to aid in the Sahel.

As articulated by Julius Holt,¹⁵ three related messages, each which has major ramifications, still need to be communicated to donors and decision-makers:

- The rural economy in the Sahel has become highly cash-oriented.
- Food security for the poor is highly market-dependent.
- Food security and livelihood security are all but indistinguishable.

Governments and agencies still assume that the solution to food insecurity is to increase people's food production for direct consumption. HEA studies clearly show it is not feasible to help the poorest people, comprising between 25% - 30% of the population to become self-sufficient in food production.

The application of the HEA framework in the Sahel, while not yet widespread, can contribute to the effective analysis of strengthening livelihoods, food security and resilience. Annex B1 provides more detail about the origins, background and limitations of this tool based on HEA studies undertaken in the Sahel.

2.1.2 The integrated food security and humanitarian phase classification (IPC)

IPC is a system for defining the severity of a situation, integrating food security, nutrition and livelihoods information. The two main elements of the IPC consist of a situation analysis and a response analysis. The value of IPC in the Sahel is that it:

- Broadens the scope of analysis beyond the traditional food availability-food access axis to include other causes of malnutrition and mortality, such as disease, access to water and conflict.

- Facilitates technical consensus between analysts, implementing agencies and donors, leading to more effective, coordinated and timely response. Its multi-stakeholder approach reduces the scope for political influence.
- Harmonises the way a crisis situation is classified, generating consistency in the form of response, source and scale of funding, planning timeframe and the organisational roles of different stakeholders.

The 'livelihood zone' is the IPC's core unit for spatial analysis which can be linked to the HEA. An analysis of each zone provides an understanding of how people within a given livelihood system source their income and food. Information from several zones is combined, to produce a district level picture of needs and the IPC food security classification. It has the potential for facilitating effective linkages between early warning data and early responses to address chronic food and nutrition insecurity in the Sahel.

In the Sahel, the IPC initiative is overseen by a Regional Technical Working Group. This team is supporting the Permanent Inter-State Committee for the fight against Drought in the Sahel (CILSS) to update and upgrade the CHB the standardized framework for food security analysis in the Sahel, using key elements from the IPC analytical approach. In 2009, this revised framework was tested with real data from Niger, Mauritania and Senegal. The mapping dimension of the IPC is currently being integrated into the CHB. In early 2011, training of Senegal's EWS staff on its application has started.

It is expected that this process-based approach will overcome many factors impeding early, rapid response in the Sahel, and eventually lead decision-makers to take action early (up to nine months ahead of the peak of a crisis).¹⁶ Annex B2 provides greater detail about the different food security phases, the responses for each phase, the rationale and potential benefits of IPC, and progress in applying the IPC approach in the Sahel.

2.1.3 SMART methodology

The Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transition (SMART) provides the basis for understanding the magnitude and severity of a humanitarian crisis. SMART provides an integrated method for assessing nutritional status and mortality rates. SMART is an interagency¹⁷ initiative to harmonize needs assessments. SMART can also help improve the monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian interventions.

SMART has an optional food security component, which uses a simplified version of HEA. It provides the context for nutrition and mortality data analysis. The HEA is good for predicting how an event, such as crop failure or price change, is likely to affect people's ability to access food.

Since 2005, SMART has been increasingly used by international agencies in the Sahel and is strongly supported by donors such as ECHO. SMART has helped make chronic and acute child nutrition and mortality, more central to the assessment of food crises. Annex B3 provides a more detailed explanation of SMART, and its relevance in providing better analysis to address chronic food and nutrition insecurity in the Sahel.

2.1.4 The Cost of Diet

There has been much debate in the Sahel about the root causes of shockingly high levels of child malnutrition and the interaction between transitory and chronic acute malnutrition, along with the most effective ways to address it.

SCUK calculated the cost of the cheapest healthy diet in Tessaoua district in Niger, based on the food available in the market, wider natural environment and produced by households. The study

found that two-thirds of all households – representing about half of the population – cannot afford a balanced diet, even when sufficient food is available locally.

These findings challenge current policies on malnutrition, which often do not sufficiently take into consideration the economic constraints facing poorer households. The main focus in the community is often on improving child-care and infant feeding practices such as early and exclusive breastfeeding. Using methodologies such as ‘positive deviance’ (PD Hearth). The Cost of the Diet work is particularly relevant given recent concerns about rising food prices. Annex B4 provides more detailed information of the SCUUK study and its conclusions.

2.2 Fighting under-nutrition¹⁸

UNICEF estimates that 300,000 children below five years of age die of under-nutrition in the Sahel every year¹⁹. Acute malnutrition remains an emergency issue in the Sahel sub-region of West Africa (see Figure 1). Food shortages and high rates of malnutrition have long been a reality in the Sahel, although the approach to malnutrition has started to change drastically. Before, the distinction between hunger and malnutrition was unclear. It was thought that malnutrition could be cured by providing enough food.

The 2005 food crisis in Niger, amplified by the media, drew attention to the reality of a hitherto forgotten, nutrition crisis in the Sahel. The first big change was a massive mobilisation of the humanitarian community in Niger to establish nutrition centres for treating SAM using ready to use therapeutic food (RUTF), like Plumpy’nut.²⁰ This enabled children without medical complications to be treated for SAM as outpatients, within their communities.

The crisis also caused the humanitarian community in the Sahel to rethink strategies to address malnutrition. Chronic malnutrition, affects nearly 50% of children under five. In 2007, ECHO made addressing child malnutrition and mortality of the most vulnerable populations a central objective²¹.

In this context, the reactive response in 2005 was considered insufficient in tackling the fundamental causes of acute malnutrition and infant mortality. It responded to the humanitarian mandate. It saved lives. But it did not deal with the root causes of child malnutrition. Levels of acute malnutrition are consistently above the emergency threshold level even in good years, hence a reactive response meant being locked into a long-term operation with no clear exit.

However, aid strategies for treating and preventing MAM in the Sahel have remained virtually unchanged for thirty years.²² Across the Sahel, over a million children suffer from MAM. They are highly prone to illness and vulnerable to the slightest shocks, and can easily slide in SAM.

FIGURE 1**Study Results****The Case for Long Term Emergency Action to Address Child Malnutrition in the Sahel**

In the Sahel, for over the past ten years, Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates have systematically exceeded the international World Health Organisation (WHO) and SPHERE emergency threshold of 10%.

Country	Total population	Population under 5 years of age	(%) GAM	(%) SAM	Children suffering from GAM	Children suffering from SAM
Burkina Faso (DHS 2003)	13,002,000	2,560,000	18.7	5.0	478,720	128,000
Chad (DHS 2004)	8,598,000	1,646,600	13.5	3.1	222,291	51,045
Mali (DHS 2003)	13,007,000	2,581,000	13.3	3.0	343,273	77,430
Mauritania (MICS 2007)	2,893,000	499,000	11.9	1.6	59,381	7,984
Niger (MICS 2006)	11,972,000	2,549,000	10.3	1.5	262,547	38,235
TOTAL	49,472,000	9,835,600			1,366,212	302,694

Source: ECHO (2007) Humanitarian Aid for vulnerable populations at risk in the Sahel Region of West Africa
GLOBAL PLAN

As indicated in Figure 1, it is currently estimated that of a population of around 50 million people in the western Sahel belt, 1,300,000 (14%) of the children below five years of age are in an acutely malnourished state. Of these 300,000 suffer from SAM. Reports indicate that structural levels of GAM have been increasing since the 1990s, and remain persistently over the emergency threshold. These factors provide a compelling argument in favour of taking effective long-term emergency action in the Sahel.

The GAM rate of children under five is one of the most important indicators in assessing a humanitarian crisis. Acute malnutrition is linked to an increased risk of disease. It provides information on the general condition of the most vulnerable populations, from which inferences can be made about access to food, coping mechanisms, the functioning of the public health system, and the state of water, hygiene and sanitation (WASH).


While preventing MAM has considerable costs, it can be a good investment. According to Jan Egeland, the former UN Humanitarian Coordinator, if early warnings had been followed, it would have cost \$1 a day per child to prevent acute malnutrition among children in October 2004. By July 2005, the cost of saving a malnourished child's life in an emergency response operation was \$80.10 per day per child.²³

Humanitarian and development workers and donor agencies discussed how they could work better together, in order to assist governments and civil society to reduce malnutrition and infant mortality. It was determined that a coordinated approach which articulated short-term, medium and long term aid instruments²⁴ was needed as well as operational research on how to treat and prevent MAM. With the support of ECHO and other agencies, the humanitarian community is undertaking an intensive, coordinated initiative to develop effective strategies to reach these children. Some of the most salient components are described below:

Treatment of MAM with supplementary RUTF: Emphasis is placed on treating moderately malnourished children before they slip into the severely malnourished category. Survival rates are ten times higher when treating MAM. The use of an adapted 'supplementary' version of RUTF and blanket feeding has started to show initial promising results.

Development of national protocols for treatment of acute malnutrition: Across the Sahel, much inter-agency work has been done to revise and improve national protocols for the treatment of Acute Malnutrition, and to strengthen the capacity of National Health Service staff to apply it.²⁵ For example, in Niger, a revised protocol was developed and validated in June 2009, using the new growth norms of the World Health Organisation (WHO), and the use of RUTF.²⁶

Exemption of user fees (through third party payment) for basic healthcare services for children under five years and lactating and pregnant women: Ensuring access to health care, particularly for poorer households, is a major factor in the fight against malnutrition. ECHO, three Regional Health Directorates, the NGOs Terre des Hommes and HELP²⁷ collaborated on a pilot research project in four health districts of Burkino Faso, where the cost of health facilities is low. In the project areas children under five and pregnant women were exempt from payment. This change in policy generated an immediate, dramatic increase in the number of consultations at all sites, compared to control groups.



Addressing the link between poverty and malnutrition: Experience in the Sahel since 2005 indicates that nutritional behaviours of primary caregivers are not only due to a lack of awareness of proper practices, but to local constraints in applying such practices, in particular poverty²⁸. Figure 2 indicates levels of child malnutrition are much higher in very poor households. An increasing number of households across the Sahel simply cannot afford to provide young children with nutritious food, particularly meat and dairy, which they need to grow and thrive. The HEA and Cost of Diet studies indicate that poverty is a strong causal factor for poor nutrition in the Sahel. This is starting to be addressed through pilot cash transfer programs to targeted households combined with research to determine which of the underlying causes of malnutrition are amenable to being resolved with cash.

Use of direct cash transfers to prevent malnutrition: UNICEF undertook its first ever emergency cash pilot in Niger in June 2010, working through CARE and SCUK. UNICEF was concerned that blanket feeding rations were being used to feed other household members. The aim of the cash transfers of 20,000 CFA francs per month per household was to protect the rations. A final evaluation indicated that the cash did improve the resilience of benefiting households. Cash improved their food security and increased exclusive use of blanket feeding rations to targeted children.²⁹ A study SCUK, based on only 100 households (see Annex B9) suggests that cash transfers may have a positive impact on poor households with malnourished children. However,

as noted above, more research is needed and is being undertaken by other agencies to better understand how cash transfers can influence nutritional outcomes.

An integrated, coordinated approach to preventing chronic and acute malnutrition: The current response to MAM is mostly focused mostly on curative actions rather than a more comprehensive approach. As put by a Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) staff member in West Africa, ‘most of the research is on therapeutic food, vitamin A, and other pills, while very little focus is placed on the relationship of nutrition with livelihoods, food production, or trade. Therapeutic products are important but insufficient to deal with malnutrition’.³⁰ For children from 6 to 24 months old, improving feeding practices (exclusive breastfeeding, weaning, complementary food quality) is essential for improving nutritional status. Although cultural factors influencing the application of such practices vary widely within the Sahel. Finally, nutrition initiatives tend to remain primarily in the hands of nutritionists for treatment, and agriculturists for food security and production. Linking both areas is a continuing challenge.

Some governments are starting to take positive steps forward. Niger, for example, has exempted mothers and children under five from health user fees, and made a commitment to tackle malnutrition by engaging in the Scaling up Nutrition initiative supported by the UN Standing Committee on Nutrition. There is also growing understanding that managing MAM requires addressing different behaviours, including improved feeding practices, livelihoods, water, hygiene and sanitation. However, other countries in the Sahel lag behind. In Chad, nutrition is not yet a national priority and there is no nutrition policy. The budget directly allocated to malnutrition prevention and rehabilitation is insignificant. The lead institution for nutrition, the Centre National de Nutrition et Technologie Alimentaire (CNNTA), lacks adequate leadership, human and financial resources to fulfil its mandate.³¹

In summary, many lessons have been learned since the nutrition crisis in 2005. Donors are becoming aware that MAM is a cross-cutting theme. MAM needs to be integrated into all programs, not just health, including: food security, agriculture, DRR, social protection, education and gender.³² Annex B10 provides evidence from other regions of Africa that social protection, including the regular provision of cash transfers, has the potential to improve the diets of pregnant women and young children, while addressing long term structural issues. There is growing recognition that while education on improved child-care practices remains very important, there is no single solution for preventing and treating MAM. However, it is too early to tell if the growing awareness and these initial steps will turn into more direct action by governments. Within governments in the Sahel, reducing malnutrition is still largely seen as the job of the Ministry of Health, rather than requiring a coordinated effort across line ministries. Also, for many donors, the integrated approach to address MAM does not fit easily into traditional funding mechanisms.

While the problem is huge and potentially growing, the broad outline of a solution to reduce MAM (and reach Millennium Development Goal 1) in the Sahel has become clearer. The key challenge now, is to identify strategic opportunities to make nutrition a top national and political priority. This entails overcoming the administrative and bureaucratic hurdles within government structures and policies (and within the aid system). It also requires changing the complacency within top political leadership, as well as in civil society, so that high rates of malnutrition will no longer be considered normal.

2.3 Agro-ecology, re-greening and the link to food and nutrition security

In light of the food crises of 2004-5, 2007-8³³ and 2009-10, what lessons can be learned about the role of agriculture in the Sahel, to improve food security and strengthen community resilience?

Agriculture plays a vital role in the economies of the Sahel. The majority of producers are small-scale farmers and pastoralists. The common view is that improvements in agricultural productivity hold great potential for poverty alleviation and improved food security.

Yields in the Sahel are generally low, particularly in Niger as shown in Figure 3. For example, the average yields of Niger's two principal grain crops, millet and sorghum, are by far the lowest, compared to its neighbouring countries in the Sahel.³⁴ Beyond low productivity, the food crisis of 2007 and the first half of 2008 (triggered by steep rise in global food prices, not drought) exposed the structural weaknesses of agricultural, trade and social protection policies. When violent protests occurred in capitals of some Sahelian countries,³⁵ concern about food security put agriculture back onto the development agenda, after years of neglect.³⁶

FIGURE 3
Study Data: Comparison of Cereal Yields

Average 2003 to 2007	Yields in Kg/ha	
	Millet	Sorghum
Niger	445	335
Mali	723	849
Chad	583	730
Burkina Faso	865	1041

As outlined in greater detail in Annex B6, there is still great controversy, however, about the model of agricultural development to follow for increased aid and investment. Despite repeated commitments by key donors and governments in the Sahel to support small-scale farmers,³⁷ policies and practices in the agricultural sector in the Sahel are still highly biased to export oriented commercial farming in more favourable areas. The alternative paradigm being promoted for addressing food security is called agro-ecological agriculture. It entails the sustainable intensification of small farming systems, using low external inputs, agro-ecological methods and crop diversification.

Definition: What is agro-ecological agriculture?

Agro-ecology is both a science and a set of practices. It was created by the convergence of two scientific disciplines: agronomy and ecology. The core principles of agro-ecology include recycling nutrients and energy on the farm, rather than introducing external inputs; integrating crops and livestock; diversifying species and genetic resources in agro-ecosystems over time and space; and focusing on interactions and productivity across the agricultural system, rather than focusing on individual species. Agro-ecology is highly knowledge-intensive, based on techniques that are not delivered top-down but developed on the basis of farmers' knowledge and experimentation.

Source: de Schutter, Olivier (Dec 2010) Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food. p.6

The most recent champion of agro-ecology is Olivier De Schutter,³⁸ the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food. Drawing on an extensive review of the scientific literature published in since 2005, the Special Rapporteur identified agro-ecology as the preferred mode of agricultural development to concretize the right to food, particularly for vulnerable groups.

In the Sahel, there are already many well documented examples of successful diversified and productive agro-ecological farming systems which integrate food production, trees and livestock.

The best documented techniques in the Sahel include zaï planting pits, rock bunds on the contour, half moons water catchments, farmer managed natural regeneration of trees (agro-forestry). With the 2009-10 food crisis, what can be learned about the potential and limits of agro-ecology in meeting the multiple objectives cited above? To what extent did the practice of agro-ecological systems, where practiced, mitigate severe food insecurity and child malnutrition?

Agro-ecology in the context of Niger

In Niger, desertification and soil degradation, low soil fertility, unreliable and erratic rainfall patterns, high levels of crop and livestock disease and pest attack make agricultural activities very risky. Despite these risks, most small-scale farmers and herders, who make up the majority of the population, rely on annual crops and grasses to meet their basic food needs. All too often, crop and grass growth are inadequate. For example, in many parts of Niger, even in good years, many poorer farm families do not produce enough food to meet their family's nutritional needs for more than three to six months.³⁹ Many different factors can contribute to low productivity, including reduced land area for farming (due to population growth, which reduces the ability of following to restore soil fertility), and poor production practices.

In some zones of Niger, up to 50% of the landmass is totally unproductive because land degradation and erosion has resulted in hardpan formation.⁴⁰ When it rains, water cannot infiltrate the hard soil. Extensive water runoff and flooding occur, destroying crops and increasing erosion. With limited tree cover, young sorghum and millet plants, particularly in sandy areas, are often blasted and buried by strong winds that also cause extreme evaporation and loss of moisture. Few farmer families have sufficient organic matter to maintain soil fertility. Fewer still can afford artificial fertilizers. Promoting resilience and food security through agriculture in such conditions is not feasible unless the productive resource base – the land and soil fertility - can be restored. Many technical solutions⁴¹ require labour, which is constrained because much of the male workforce are absent for 65% of the year, in search of income in the off-season.

Despite these problems, according to World Vision Niger,⁴² on farm research has shown that it is possible to enable farm families regenerate their resource base, produce enough to eat, or to trade, in order to meet basic needs, even under the harsh environmental conditions in the Niger. The key is to diversify production away from annual crops, particularly the monoculture of millet.

Case study

World Vision's experience- Dan Saga in Aguié department of Niger

Small scale farmers located in the Aguié Department of Niger recalled that their once heavily forested region had become nearly treeless by the 1980s. Sand dunes were beginning to form and crop productivity declined.

Through the adoption of Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration (FMNR) and with formation of 53 village committees, some 170 villages now sustainably manage their natural resource base. Over 130,000 hectares of farmland are now being managed under FMNR and once treeless fields are covered with 103 to 122 trees per hectare. A number of stakeholders including farmers, herders, men and women, researchers and Aguié Departmental and government services and International Fund for Agricultural Development project staff collaborate on these activities.

With increased confidence in their committees and the dramatic increase in wood available for home use and sale, villagers established rural wood markets, to increase local control and reduce exploitation by middlemen. Illegal tree cutting, which was an enormous challenge and threatened the success of the project initially, has practically ceased in the whole area. As knowledge and confidence have grown, community members have progressively adopted new practices, and engaged in experimentation especially with early maturing new annual crops.

The establishment of firm rules and regulations on natural resource management (particularly trees) along with

collaboration with the forestry department and a community based control system has resulted in enhanced and sustainable use of resources. Establishment of wood markets requiring membership and adherence to community endorsed regulations for wood harvesting has increased local incomes and helped reduce vulnerability to environmental shocks. This market helps people meet basic needs during the hunger months by providing income.


Source: World Vision (2008) Annexe 5 p.23-24

World Vision's work is an example of the wide-spread movement of agro-forestry in the Maradi region of Niger. This agro-ecological system is being touted as the cornerstone to farmer led efforts to increase agricultural productivity and improve food security.⁴³

This re-greening of much of southern Niger and many other parts of the West African Sahel has been well documented.⁴⁴ In just over two decades, the age old and destructive practice of clearing all trees and bushes from farmland has been replaced with agro-forestry, promoted by a farmer led movement called Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration (FMNR). In Niger, farmers in several densely populated regions protect and manage natural regeneration of trees and bushes on their farms⁴⁵. The process began in 1985 and has led to on-farm re-greening of about five million hectares: the largest scale environmental transformation to date in the Sahel and possibly in Africa. An informed writer on the environment, Mark Hertsgaard calls it 'one of the great success stories in the field of climate change and agriculture' and 'the single largest environmental transformation in Africa.'⁴⁶ 50% of Niger's once treeless farmland has experienced reforestation rates unprecedented elsewhere in Africa.

Because of the practice of FMNR (protecting and growing trees on their own land), small-scale farmers in Niger are producing an estimated additional 500,000 tons of cereals a year which helps feed about 2.5 million people.⁴⁷ The World Bank estimates the annual production value of the new trees is at least \$260m, which flows directly back to farm families, either as cash or as produce.⁴⁸ In the region of Maradi in Niger it is estimated that in 2008, 62,000 farm families practicing a full version of FMNR have generated an additional gross income of \$17 - 23m per year, contributing 900,000 to 1,000,000 new trees to the local environment.⁴⁹

FIGURE 4
Percentages of households reporting improvements in selected livelihood indicators since FMNR adoption



Source: Haglund E., et al (2009)

Many assessments indicate that in regions where FMNR has been practiced, degraded land has been restored, crop yields have increased and resilience to shocks has strengthened. Financial benefits through sales of tree products and increased grain and livestock production are estimated to be up to \$250 per hectare.⁵⁰ FMNR adoption appears to increase household gross income

by between 22,805 and 27,950 FCFA francs (or about \$46 and \$56) per capita, or by between 18% and 24%.⁵¹ These results are consistent with the impressions of farmers themselves, many of whom report improvements, in the availability of wood, soil fertility, crop yields, numbers of livestock, household revenues and food security⁵² (see Figure 4).

According to advocates of FMNR, trees better withstand climatic variability than annual crops and can be grown as an economically valuable crop species. Once established, trees produce valuable products year after year, require minimal maintenance and withstand drought. Having reliable income from sales of wood and other tree products enables farmers to buy food from other areas where rainfall is more reliable. The widespread adoption of FMNR is attributed to the fact that its benefits are obtainable at minimal costs to the farmer. There are no expenditures beyond additional labour⁵³. For these reasons FMNR is considered by its proponents as a cost effective, easily adopted means of enhancing food security and increasing resilience.

In addition to FMNR, World Vision Niger⁵⁴ has promoted a number of other agro-ecological innovations in its Area Development Programs (ADPs) to reduce risk and improve production. One is the Farmer Managed Agroforestry Farming System (FMAFS). World Vision describes this as an affordable, replicable approach to agricultural production. FMAFS gives small holder farmers a framework for assembling a range of plants and animals to minimize risks and optimize production under adverse environmental conditions. FMAFS represents an incremental gradation of the FMNR technique described above into a more complex and diversified farming system. The system makes multiple and integrated use of trees, crops and animals to enhance food security. Complementary methods to reduce risk include: village grain banks, improved cowpea storage, dry season gardening, microcredit for women and the provision of improved seed. World Vision claims that this integrated approach has produced a striking example of the potential of a farmer led agro-ecological approach.

Assessing the contribution of agro-ecological agriculture to food and nutrition security


Rigorous analyses and peer reviewed articles document that FMNR has been widely adopted by small-scale farmers in the Maradi region of Niger, showing impressive benefits, in terms of increased income, soil fertility, availability of wood products, and food security. Yet in 2010, Maradi was the epicentre of a severe food and malnutrition crisis. Of the total of 330, 448 children treated for SAM in Niger, an astonishing 135,163 came from the Maradi Region.⁵⁵ As noted earlier in this report, HEA studies in the Tessaoua district, in Maradi, indicated that acute malnutrition rates were much higher in poorer (about 30% of the population). What are the tentative lessons to be drawn about the role of agro-ecology in mitigating food and nutrition insecurity in the Sahel?

No data is available to disaggregate household adoption of FMNR by wealth group in Maradi. There is also no data assessing the extent to which the poorest and poor households have adopted FMNR. Even if these adoption rates were known, a second task would be to assess the magnitude of benefits (particularly in terms of income and food production). Were they sufficient to have a significant impact for the poorest households in reducing food insecurity and child malnutrition?

Two hypotheses can be suggested. The first is that few of the poorest 30% of households were adopting and benefiting from FMNR. The second is that if there was wide scale adoption by the poorest households, but the benefits were not significant enough to prevent severe coping strategies, and child malnutrition, during the 2010 food crisis. Programs promoting agro-ecological agriculture with small-scale farmers as a key strategy should systematically assess to what extent the most vulnerable households are adopting the methods, and if the benefits are adequate to help them escape from the vicious hunger cycle.

Programs need to monitor the impact of the agro-ecological system across wealth groups and different types of household economies. Without such monitoring, there is a risk that agro-ecology may help mostly the food secure middle and better off households, to become better off, widening the gap with poorer households. In the absence of accompanying measures to reduce barriers to adoption, agro-ecology may leave the poorer households vulnerable to hunger, when the next shock comes.

There is a tendency within the agro-ecology movement to consider all small-scale farmers in a village as homogenous, leading programs to fail to account for major socio-economic differences and the varied needs of households, social groups, and women and men. The graph (see Figure 5) from the HEA studies in Maradi shows how the food crops produced by typical households in each wealth group meet their basic food requirements. Very poor households produce an average of only 17% of their basic food needs. They must sell some of this food to repay debts and meet other obligations.



Even if agro-ecology enabled them to double, or triple their food production for their own consumption, they would still have to purchase at least 40% of their food from the market. This means poor households remain exposed to volatile market prices, and still need to purchase grain when prices rise in the lean season. In light of this, it is clear that development assistance should not be targeted only at food production. For the poorest households, the main aim should be to increase their cash income. One way to do this is to increase the cash value of their labour on their own land. The World Vision case study indicates a shift away from millet monoculture, and the use of intensive agro-forestry systems, i.e. sales of tree products. In addition, mechanisms such as 'warrantage' (see section 3.3) would enable poorer households to avoid the debt trap by being able to store their grain, in order to benefit when the value increases. Finally, given the clear limitations identified through the HEA studies, efforts to help poorer households achieve livelihood security must also increase earnings for off-farm and for non-farm activities. This involves improving the cash value and earning potential of labour expended in diverse livelihood activities, including migration.

In summary, the evidence from Niger suggests that agro-ecological techniques such as agro-forestry, integration of livestock, soil and water conservation have the potential to strengthen resilience, increase income and improve food security. However, they are likely to have significant limitations for poorer households. Agro-ecological agriculture, as a set of technical practices, is not sufficient to significantly reduce food and nutrition insecurity of the poorest households. Agro-ecology must be accompanied by complementary strategies to improve incomes, reduce risk, and protect livelihoods, and be undertaken to optimize linkages for improved nutrition.⁵⁶

2.4 Supporting pastoralism

Pastoral areas where animal husbandry is the main source of both food and income were severely affected in 2010. Many animals became weak due to lack of adequate pastures and water. This considerably reduced milk availability, a major contributor to pastoralist households' diet. Due to the poor physical state of animals, the price of livestock decreased, even as cereal prices were sharply rising. The drastic erosion in purchasing power increased food insecurity and malnutrition and led to severe coping strategies.

Réseau Billital Maroobé (RBM- a Network of Herders and Pastoralists in Africa) undertook an in-depth review of the response to the food crisis in pastoral areas. The review team conducted extensive interviews with pastoral communities in Chad, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. Their report outlines the effects of the food crisis on livelihoods, the various coping strategies used and the effectiveness of the response.⁵⁷

RBM concludes that, as in 2005, not enough attention was paid to the pastoral dimension of the crisis by national structures. The vulnerability indicators in pastoral areas were ineffective. There were no coherent criteria for targeting assistance. The aid response in pastoral areas was also inadequate in terms of requesting donor funding. The response came too late. In pastoral areas, even households who anticipated the crisis by selling off their animals in time only benefited from a few additional weeks' worth of food.

Factors that contributed to the lack of a timely effective response in affected pastoral zones included: a lack of available information, refusal to declare an emergency, the greater complexity of intervention in pastoral areas, security constraints for international staff and lower priority given to the pastoral zones by donors and governments. Little was done to restore livelihoods, through re-stocking programs. The lessons of 2005 were not learned.

The result has been a further undermining of the pastoral way of life in the Sahel. In western Chad, for example, recurrent drought and widespread animal mortality has made pastoralism decreasingly accessible for the rural poor. Prolonged droughts and underinvestment in the pastoral economy during the 1980s and 1990s have forced many to give up livestock breeding. Many poorer pastoralists increasingly rely on cultivation to compensate for a lack of income from herding. Agricultural production in the Sahelian zone of Chad, however, is even more vulnerable to dry spells than pastoralism, since the option of mobility to access areas with more favourable rain fall is lost.⁵⁸ Major reform of the aid system in support of pastoralism still needs to take place. However, since 2005, there is evidence of important changes that have started to strengthen the basis for progress.

Change in Attitudes: For many years, policies and aid mechanisms for the pastoralist communities were based on the attitude that pastoralism was irrational and outdated. Pastoralism was seen to be environmentally damaging, backward, and unproductive. Efforts were made to 'modernise' land tenure, privatize pasture land, establish ranches and settle pastoralists. These interventions undermined traditional systems for managing water, pasture and conflict, and weakened the central pillar of pastoralism: mobility.⁵⁹ This is the key to the productivity and resilience of pastoral livelihoods, when combined with effective collective management of natural resources of pasture and water.

A considerable body of evidence illustrates that pastoral livelihoods are superior in productivity to ranching⁶⁰ and are well-designed, risk-management and adaptation strategies. Data from Mali indicates that mobile herding obtains three times as much protein per hectare at a lower cost than modern ranching methods. In Niger, similar studies prove that sedentary forms of animal production are 20% less productive than mobile herding. Transhumant⁶¹ or nomadic herding

generates six times more total revenue than agriculture practiced in the same zones. Other evidence shows, compared to ranching, mobile forms of livestock-raising also reduce risk and have a better impact on the environment, since livestock are not concentrated for too long in one area.⁶²

Governments in the Sahel and donors are increasingly aware of the importance of livestock to the Gross National Production. Evidence of the importance of mobility to livestock production has shifted attitudes and is starting to be reflected in policies, laws and approaches to aid.

Improved EWS in pastoral areas through use of satellite images: The ‘surveillance pastorale’ of ACF in Mali uses satellite images to judge the state of pasture and water sources. These images have been used to alert stakeholders. With greater local organization and participation, pastoralists can move into areas where there are more pasture and water resources.

Pastoral Wells: One manifestation of the acceptance of mobility within the aid approach is the increased attention given to pastoral wells. Since 2000, CARE has made long term investments in pastoral wells in the Diffa region of Niger. Pastoral wells are a means to contribute to consolidating a fragile peace (caused by conflict over resources), strengthen resilience and improve food security through the Natural Resource Management-Peace program (GRN-PAIX). CARE has developed an effective model, including detailed guidelines of a highly consultative and deliberative process for establishing the site and management of new water sources in conflict prone pastoral zones. The government of Niger is adapting this experience to create national guidelines.⁶³

Case study

AFD-Chad’s experience with pastoral wells and passages for transhumance

Mobility is the core of the pastoral livelihood system, and crucial to managing risk in a harsh and unpredictable environment. The movement of livestock according to water and pasture availability allows pastoral communities to utilise large areas of rangeland which lack permanent sources of water. Recognizing this, in Chad, the Agence Française de Développement (AFD) since the 1990s has invested 50 million Euros in Chad to strengthen the traditional mobile system of pastoralists and reduce their risk. This investment has contributed to the rehabilitation or construction of over 1000 water access points and 500 kilometres of passage ways for transhumance.

By creating or improving water points, pastoralists were able to make use of huge areas of under-utilised pasture areas, where the limiting factor was water. Learning from the lessons of past experience, AFD developed a very complex, strategic and consultative process to identify sites for water points. All stakeholders in an area, particularly traditional structures for managing water resources, and clan leaders, were involved. The role of local government authorities was to ‘officialise’ locally made decisions. The programs involved far more than physical construction. Local structures were enabled to take responsibility for maintaining and managing the water points, and to arbitrate local conflicts. Unlike most aid projects, the funding and support cycle to ensure sustainability and long term impact was often 15 years (through renewal of five year programs). Evaluations indicate a significant increase in overall production and income for pastoralists, and lessening of risks (including that of sedentarisation and conflict).

Source: Jullien François (2006), « Nomadisme et transhumance, chronique d’une mort annoncée ou voie d’un développement porteur? » *Enjeux, défis et enseignements tirés de l’expérience des projets d’hydraulique pastorale au Tchad, Afrique contemporaine*, 2006/1 no 217, p. 55-75. DOI : 10.3917/afco.217.75

Pastoral Codes (National Legislation): Another sign of a shift in thinking and attitude is the formulation of pastoral codes (laws or charters) passed in several countries that formally recognise pastoralism. The pastoral codes provide an improved institutional framework for the management of the rangelands. Many of these laws recognise the fundamental importance of mobility to the pastoral way of life. For example, Mali’s pastoral charter devotes a whole chapter to it.⁶⁴ Niger’s revised pastoral code was prepared after a long participatory process involving all the pastoralist

associations. Fundamental points marking significant progress for pastoralists include an explicit acceptance of mobility, the right of free movement of animals and regulations preventing private appropriation of communal resources (See Annex B7 for details of the revised code). The pastoral codes are an important milestone, although there is still the challenge of increasing awareness and application of the pastoral code. The previous codes were not enforced. For example, herders were often required to compensate farmers for crop damage caused by their herds even beyond the set northern limit for farming.⁶⁵

Increased attention given to DRR approaches in pastoral areas: A number of local NGOs and pastoral associations have done long term DRR work with pastoral communities. A more detailed discussion of DRR follows in the next section of this report. Jeunesse En Mission Entraide et Développement (JEMED), a local organisation that supports pastoralists in the Abalak region in Niger, provides a good example of reducing risk in pastoral areas:

Case study

JEMED's experience in Niger supporting DRR with pastoral communities

In its long term work, supported by Tearfund, JEMED has undertaken the following activities to help pastoral communities reduce risks caused by climate change, the spread of the desert and increasing population. These activities have been proven to increase resilience significantly.

Fixation sites: In danger of losing their whole way of life if they did nothing, JEMED has helped the Tuareg people decide on making changes and adjustments to their traditions in order to reduce risk now and lose only some of their traditions, rather than do nothing and lose their whole way of life. Upon request, JEMED has been helping communities to establish 22 'fixation sites'. These fixation sites do not settle people permanently. Instead, they build upon a tradition that the Tuareg would spend part of each year camped in a particular place. They also enable communities to develop a social infrastructure and education, training, health and pasture management projects, while still keeping hold of their traditional pastoral ways.

Wells: Wells are very important to the fixation sites. JEMED has helped repair or dig over 30 wells so far. Once wells have water, a number of families are likely to take up residence at a fixation site.

Grain Banks: Food security has been improved at 18 sites by establishing grain banks. These reduce the cost of grain and make it more easily available. In some fixation sites, small shops have been established which sell basic household items (tea, sugar, matches).

Rainwater dykes: In 14 sites, JEMED has helped communities to conserve rainwater by building a low bank, bund or dyke of stones across a valley, usually about 120 metres in length. When the rains come, the stones slow the flowing streams, causing water to sink deeper into the soil. Behind the dykes, the water is retained.

Fodder Banks: Fodder is of huge importance to nomadic people whose livestock is often their only source of income. Nine enclosures have been built behind dykes to protect and improve pasture for livestock. Pasture management associations have been created at all sites. Loans to buy animals are available to both men and women at some sites along with a livestock vaccination program.

Early De-stocking when early warning signals increased risk: In 2008, a flux of grazers came into the area from outside with their livestock, and pastures were quickly being used up. JEMED staff noted the warning signs and advised people to sell their livestock, keeping only the best breeding stock. This was unheard of for nomadic people – they had never done this in the past. However, many people did sell their animals in time. The men took the remaining livestock to other areas and managed to keep their animals alive. As a result, people in the fixation sites lost a third less livestock during the drought than others in neighbouring areas. An evaluation of the Emergency Fodder Response conducted by JEMED in 2009 provided further evidence that pastoralists who had been part of the DRR program were significantly more able to withstand the pressure of another drought.

Sources: Woodke, Jeff. *The impact of climate change on nomadic people*

Niger DRR Consortium: (Aug 2010) *Niger Coordinated Disaster Risk Reduction Programme Phase2 Program Summary, p4*

Niger DRR Consortium (April 2009) *Atelier sur l'Apprentissage en matière de Résilience Avant-projet de Rapport de l'Atelier du 20-25 April p25-27*

In June 2009, at the UN/ISDR Global Platform for DRR, JEMED was awarded the United National Sasakawa Prize for its DRR work.⁶⁶

Strengthened Organizations representing Pastoralists: At the national and sub-regional levels, membership-based pastoral associations, including AREN and the network Bilitaal, have thousands of subscribing members. They have growing potential to combine representative legitimacy with increased political clout to overcome the marginalization of affected pastoral communities in the Sahel.

In summary, despite the poor record of emergency response for pastoralism in 2010, there is evidence of improved aid policies to support pastoralism in Niger, Burkina and Mali. This is buttressed at community level with the development of local associations that provide services to local communities, and who do rights based advocacy for services from the state.

2.5 Integrating DRR into humanitarian response and development

DRR is the broad range of humanitarian and development actions to reduce the risk posed by disasters to individuals and communities. It is humanitarian in that it helps to save lives, and developmental in increasing communities' resilience to hazards and shocks, as a prerequisite for sustainable development. It is more sustainable and dignified if vulnerable groups can be enabled to identify and tackle the risk of a disaster rather than simply waiting for disaster to strike.

In the Sahel, food insecurity triggered by drought tends to be a slow onset and recurrent. There is an urgent need for DRR strategies. Opportunities for action exist when the first early warning signs of widespread deteriorating livelihoods and nutrition appear. Where food insecurity is linked to a recurrent hazard, such as drought, early action to mitigate the effects can be a highly cost effective investment. Governments and donors can safeguard nutrition, livelihoods and assets of vulnerable households, by reducing the costs of emergency relief and recovery.

In the Sahel, a paradigm shift in disaster management theory and practice has started to gain momentum. An increasing number of international NGOs, with the support of donors such as DFID, have started to mainstream⁶⁷ DRR into their operations. This has included integrating DRR in the project cycle, supporting preparedness, undertaking vulnerability analysis, enhancing disaster management capacity, and closer integration with the ongoing development processes. (Annex B8 describes two field guides produced and cost benefit analysis of DRR). Food crises in the Sahel are now perceived less as an extreme event created entirely by drought and more as an unresolved but preventable problem of development and chronic vulnerability.

Since 2005, international NGOs working in the Sahel interviewed for this study made significant changes relating to DRR in terms of strategy, structure, staffing, policies, funding, advocacy and coordination. Progress in planning for drought and mainstreaming DRR, vary considerably and are influenced by funding sources, size and structure of the organisation, and other factors. Changes made by two organisations in the Sahel can illustrate how mainstreaming DRR is taking place within the international NGO community.

Tearfund was an early leader in developing closer links between its humanitarian and development programming with its partners in the Sahel, through the adoption of DRR. Tearfund's strategy to reduce vulnerability involves increasing the capacity of local communities and organisations to prevent, prepare for and respond to the effects of disasters. This strategy combines changes at the community level with advocacy for change at the national and international level. In 2007, Tearfund and its Sahelian civil society partners (in Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali) commissioned a report *Prepare to Live*⁶⁸ to better understand how communities achieve food security and to identify practical DRR approaches (see Annex B8).

Since 2005, Christian Aid has also made considerable progress in mainstreaming DRR in the Sahel. In the risk prone Sahel, Christian Aid considers that the benefits of its development programs would be unsustainable without a DRR component. Disasters can wipe out years of development work, waste resources and keep people trapped in poverty. Christian Aid estimates that every £1 spent on DRR can save £4 in emergency response costs.⁶⁹

In this perspective, from 2005 to 2010, Christian Aid undertook a global multi-country resilience program called Building Disaster Resilient Communities (BDRC). As part of this initiative Christian Aid supported pilot activities with five local partners in Mali and Burkina Faso. Supported by DFID, the BDRC program combined mitigation, livelihoods, policy and advocacy. It operated at three levels of intervention:

- Community (awareness raising, pilot projects, community strengthening).
- Partners (capacity-building plan, advocacy strategy).
- Christian Aid (links with Climate Change Adaptation and accountability).

The initial needs assessments consisted of community analysis of their own vulnerabilities through Participatory Vulnerability Capacity Assessments (PVCAs). This focused on communities' exposure to disaster and risk, and identified their available assets and capacities to mitigate them. PVCAs were effective not only in determining the choice of actions to take, but perhaps even more importantly of engendering local ownership by key stakeholders. Pilot projects selected through PVCAs were undertaken in each of the villages.

Christian Aid gradually broadened the scope of DRR by placing a greater focus on governance, advocacy, CCA and livelihoods. DRR has become integral to Christian Aid's livelihood frameworks (i.e. with a greater focus on strengthening local capacities) rather than emergency response and preparedness. Christian Aid has systematically undertaken capacity building of its own and partner staff to integrate DRR and CCA into development programs, as reflected in their country strategic plans.

In Niger, a number of international and national NGOs formed a DFID funded consortium to coordinate their work to promote DRR. Members of this consortium are CARE International (Consortium Lead), Action Against Hunger, Concern Worldwide, JEMED (supported by Tearfund) and MASNAT (supported by Relief International):

Case study **Coordinated NGO DRR work in Niger:**

In the aftermath of the 2005 food crisis, a group of NGOs in London applied to DFID to support a collective approach to DRR programming in Niger. This eventually led to the creation of the Niger DRR Consortium of international and national NGOs to reduce chronic vulnerability. Phase one of the consortium program aimed to sustainably improve the resilience of 14,000 vulnerable households in the Maradi and Tahoua regions to recurrent shocks, through introducing and strengthening of DRR strategies. The program also aimed at joint learning, identifying good practice, and building a solid evidence base upon which advocacy for a broader DRR initiatives could be built. In various communities, DRR strategies undertaken between 2007-2010 included:

- Distribution of seeds and fertiliser direct to households or through seed fairs
- Promotion of Market gardening, including improved water supply, to enable off-season production.
- Rehabilitation and drilling of wells.
- Training and cash support for women to undertake income generating activities
- Social reconstitution of Livestock for more vulnerable families.

- Tree planting and agro forestry.
- Support of Warrantage (or inventory credit) to help producers to manage the risk of fluctuating cereal prices, to be able to sell at more favourable prices and receive credit during lean periods.
- Establishment of cereal banks (similar to warrantage) to create community buffer stocks used so that collective grain can be sold at the best price and as insurance against lean periods
- Provision of cash transfers to extremely vulnerable households.
- 'Cash for Work' for activities such as the construction of cereal banks, rehabilitation of degraded land, aimed to benefit the wider community
- Establishment of Livestock Fodder Banks.
- Creation of vaccination parks to promote and improve animal health.
- Land protection for small-scale pasture: establishment of land committees to support efficient and sustainable communal management of land.

Some activities were unique to one partner agency or another, while others – namely reconstitution of livestock and cereal banks – were common to three or four. Partners focused on the long-term reinforcement of fragile livelihoods and protection of vital productive assets, as well as better early warning and response to crises. In addition to working directly with pastoralist and agro-pastoralist households, the program strengthened local community structures as well as links with local, regional and national government authorities.

Throughout the program's intervention zone, particularly in pastoral areas, cereal banks were particularly well received. One herder in an area where MASNAT is working reported: 'Before cereal banks were set up, we had to travel 100 kilometres to the nearest market to buy cereals and food. Now we can collect provisions daily or weekly, depending on our need, and we pay a much better price. This means that we sell fewer animals to buy our cereals'. The social reconstitution of livestock had a marked impact in improving the health, economic and social status of the poorest households. Cash transfer schemes enabled people, particularly women, to launch income generating activities and invest in natural capital (livestock) as insurance against future shocks. Many of the other activities listed above were linked to village savings and loans associations and to improved, decentralised technical and financial services.

Source: DRR Consortium Niger (2010) FINAL REPORT Coordinated Disaster Risk Reduction Responses in Niger July 2007 to March 2010, submitted to DFID

The reports of all these DRR related initiatives in the Sahel have several common elements:⁷⁰

- Clear impact of enabling vulnerable people to become more productive, diversify, protect their assets, strengthen support networks, and reinforce local coping mechanisms.
- Evidence of strengthened resilience of targeted individuals, households and communities to recurrent shocks. A separate evaluation of the Emergency Fodder Response conducted by JEMED and MASNAT in 2009 provided evidence that pastoralists who had been part of the DRR program were significantly more able to withstand the pressure of another drought particularly due to a greater willingness for early destocking.
- Higher level of community awareness of the key principles and concepts of DRR, and strengthened collective capacity to take action.
- Strengthened capacity of local partners for DRR through learning new practical concepts, skills and tools in applying disaster reduction principles.

Despite such positive benefits to individual families, there were a number of limitations to the work of the DRR Niger consortium:

- Overall levels of vulnerability remained high, as most vulnerable families were not yet at a point of surplus and would not be able to face a significant drought than the project periods to build capacities and establish workable local systems in each context.

- Ability to resist another crisis was felt to be low over most projects because in three or four years, people had not been able to build up physical assets, knowledge, skills and networks. In an evaluation, beneficiaries asked in early 2009 if they were in a position to face another crisis like 2005 without outside help, declared that they were not.
- For some DRR strategies, it was not clear that participating households and communities could sustain DRR activities and benefits without continuing external support. In one evaluation, grain banks, while popular, were the most at risk of not being sustainable in part due to unpredictable market conditions but also management problems. Low repayment rates on credit schemes for women were another concern.
- Advocacy efforts had limited impact to influence national governments into making DRR a stronger priority in preventing food crises. By 2010, the DRR Consortium had not developed a collective voice at national level, and made no progress in achieving the first priority of the Hyogo Framework for Action to establish DRR as an institutional priority at local and national levels.
- It was not clear to what extent the poorest and most vulnerable households benefited from DRR related initiatives. Few DRR reports indicate specific targeting in terms of increased resilience of different wealth groups. Economic barriers could be preventing the involvement of poorer households in activities such as cereal banks. Complementary initiatives to DRR, perhaps involving cash transfers, may be necessary to benefit the poorest households.

The reviews of DRR programs in Mali, Burkina and Niger strongly indicate that success in strengthening sustainable livelihoods required a longer-term engagement with communities to achieve the goal of significantly increased resilience, far beyond a normal three or even five year project cycle.⁷¹ One report proposed that a ten year time frame is required to build social and physical capital, as well as organisational capacity in communities, to effectively resist hazards.

In summary, NGO experience since 2005 demonstrated that humanitarian and development programs with a DRR perspective can deliver significant benefits to vulnerable households. However, progress towards reducing risk of food insecurity, requires a long term commitment. There is a need for strong DRR policy framework at a national level, coordinated across government ministries, coupled with decentralisation of budgets and decision-making to district and local levels. There also needs to be more effective partnerships between the government and civil society.

2.6 Community based early warning and response system

A fundamental weakness of most EWS in the Sahel is the lack of involvement of communities and local governments. The national level EWS generally obtain much of their data from the various technical services based in the districts. Very little or none of the information (for example about probable weather conditions, prices, likely food shortages) is transmitted back to communities for them to act on. Aside from their own local coping strategies, villages are often only the passive recipients of food aid when a crisis occurs.

Another major problem with the national EWS is that its data does not take into account the village level in determining the level of vulnerability. Data collection is conducted through a sample of villages across the country. The average vulnerability score given to a group of villages in each district is then used for all of the villages in that district. This methodology masked great disparities in the food security situation that often occur between villages within the same district, commune, or agro-ecological zone.

After the 2005 food crisis, CARE Niger, recognizing these weaknesses in the EWS undertook the APCAN project, with support of the European Union. The aim of APCAN was to improve and decentralise the operation of the DNP-GCA (National Prevention and Management of Food Crisis) by creating capacity for an EWS at the community and district levels.

Community level (Community based Early Warning and Response- SCAP-RU)

Building on an earlier pilot project, APCAN was an operational research project in three districts that lasted from 2006 to 2009. With the support of CRESA (a research institute at the Niamey University) and AGRHYMET (a CILSS related agency), the APCAN tested and adapted an approach to create community based structures called SCAP-RU with the capacity to prevent and manage disasters. Relying on their endogenous knowledge, villagers decided what their local indicators for early warning would be (i.e. animal migrations, drying of water sources). Villagers collected this information themselves. The local EWS information often proved just as reliable as more sophisticated systems.

CARE Niger learned that six key conditions often determine the degree of effectiveness of a SCAP-RU/community's local response to a crisis or a disaster alert.⁷² These conditions are:

- 1 The community's access to information and its ability to produce information itself (awareness of the necessity of such a system, identification of the indicators, defining the different warning levels and various types of responses, regular data collection and analysis, adequate use of information so as to inform the response and to minimize or mitigate the expected impact of the crisis).
- 2 Defining a range of actions to be implemented, depending on the type of potential crisis and the warning level.
- 3 Establishing institutional alliances and relationships at every possible level – village-level, departmental, regional, national and international.
- 4 Building the necessary capacities at the community level (internally) and at external levels for optimal implementation of the response.
- 5 Developing a strong linkage with the actors in the government's formal EWS through information exchanges.
- 6 Identifying as many types of potential crises as possible and taking appropriate and timely measures at the community level.

To be effective the SCAP-RU facilitates intra-community discussion for analyzing the data collected and for making decisions on mitigation measures. Representatives of several villages may also come together for inter-community coordination and to link with field agents and district level structures.

CARE Niger and its partners developed a guide in 2009 describing the steps to establishing a SCAP-RU, its objectives and mandate, the training of members, information management, tools for developing local indicators for early warning, and operations.⁷³

Local level: (Observatories for Monitoring Vulnerability OSV)

At the local (commune) level, APCAN strengthens the capacity of the mayor and his council to implement a methodology for monitoring vulnerability including information from the village level SCAP-RU. To achieve this, APCAN have helped establish OSVs in each commune of the program area, managed by the mayor and the council. These are new structures, and are designed to further decentralise the DNP-GCA from the regional and district levels to the community level.

The role of the OSV is to:⁷⁴

- Gather, analyse and share local information about food and nutrition insecurity.
- Undertake research to understand the root causes of vulnerability in the local context.
- Identify the villages at high risk.
- Identify the most vulnerable groups in the district, and target the households most affected by food insecurity in the villages.
- Communicate relevant data, including from the SCAP-RU, up to the national levels.
- Identify appropriate and effective actions suitable for the local context to mitigate the effects of food insecurity.
- Strengthen the capacity of local actors, particularly within the villages, in taking action to prevent and manage food crises, (rather than waiting assistance from the national level).
- Develop over the medium and long term a reference data base and systems to guide food security programs.
- Analyse the impact of emergency actions and food security programs.
- Manage commune level grain buffer stocks.

Finally, through APCAN, CARE strengthened not only the capacities of the SCAP-RUs and OSVs, but also of the relevant government technical services and local NGO partners. This ensured the sustainability of the SCAP-RUs and OSVs and the linkage with the national EWS. The capacity strengthening involved setting up community-based early warning and emergency response committees; identifying, analysing and reporting on data obtained by the OSVs and SCAP-RUs; methods for supporting various local initiatives (cereal banks, buffer stocks) to mitigate risks, and addressing the crucial issue of accountability of commune-level structures.

- An end of project evaluation indicated the need for continued capacity building at all levels, and issues with sustainability and impact. The most significant challenges were:
- Costs of the secretariats cannot be covered by the Communes (Maires) without outside support (which should eventually be provided by the national EWS).
- Focus tends to be on early warning but not sufficiently on quick response. This requires recognition and support by other 'response' stakeholders (the CCA of Niger, NGOs etc).
- SCAP-RU and OSV have yet to develop the credibility of their data and targeting abilities with other stakeholders. In 2010, many international NGOs responding to the food crisis didn't seek out or try to work with the SCAP-RU and OSV in their target areas.
- It is not yet clear, in face of these limitations, to what extent communities engaged in SCAP-RU succeeded in significantly increasing their resilience. Were households in these communities better able to cope with the food security crisis of 2009-10? During the research for this study, the data to assess this was not yet available.

Despite these challenges, the APCAN project was seen by all stakeholders as a significant success. The DNP-GCA is taking steps to extend the SCAP-RU and OSV concepts to other communes.⁷⁵

In summary, the SCAP-RU is an innovative approach, using a neglected resource - the knowledge, capacity and creativity of the rural communities. While strengthening the capacity of communities is an essential component of a long-term strategy to strengthen resilience, it is not adequate, without complementary measures to protect livelihoods.

2.7 Cash transfer programming

There is a growing recognition in the humanitarian sector that cash and voucher transfers can be an appropriate and effective tool to support populations affected by disasters. Using cash and vouchers can help maintain dignity and choice for beneficiaries while stimulating local economies and markets. Cash is increasingly being used as a complement or alternative to a range of in-kind assistance. Transfers are often targeted at the poorest households and the most vulnerable groups.

Case study

Increase in cash and voucher transfers used in Niger

The Cash Learning Partnership (CaLP) is a learning network of NGOs that aims to improve the quality of cash and voucher transfer programming across the humanitarian sector by influencing and interacting with key stakeholders through capacity building, evidence based research and communication of good practices and lessons learned. It is supported by ECHO (European Commission - Humanitarian Aid). In Niger, CaLP documented the following data in 2010:

- The total number of families served with cash or vouchers exceeded 165,000, or over 1 million people (7% of the population).
- Cash and voucher programming in response to the evolving crisis was made possible by sustained functioning of regional markets and commercial import of surplus food from non-drought affected regions elsewhere in West Africa.
- Approximately 15 different agencies used cash/ vouchers in response to the food and nutrition crisis which represents a rapid and exponential growth in cash operations.

Source: CaLP website

The use of cash, as opposed to in-kind assistance, however, remains a relatively new approach. Many aid agencies are at the early stages of developing guidelines,⁷⁶ policies and organisational capacity to implement cash projects. In Niger, to facilitate and accelerate this process, a number of NGOs have formed a CaLP, which promotes knowledge-sharing, learning and capacity building.

Annex B9 provides two detailed case studies showing how targeted cash transfers have the potential to address malnutrition as well as food insecurity. SCUK conducted a study in 2008, following 100 the households receiving cash transfers in Niger. The program shows how cash transfers help decrease the number of acutely malnourished children from the poorest families. Concern Worldwide integrated operational research into their 2010 hunger mitigation program in Niger, with some interesting and positive results. Annex B9 also describes how cash programming evolved.

There is extensive global evidence (and more recent data from the Sahel) on how cash transfers can be an effective tool in responding to food crises. Many studies show that cash transfers have the potential to address the structural factors underlying vulnerability to food and nutrition insecurity. This has generated considerable interest in cash transfers from both development and humanitarian actors in the Sahel.

In addition to cash transfers enabling adequate food consumption during the lean season, they have the potential to facilitate land rehabilitation and preparation during the off season through cash for work, thus preventing seasonal migration. Cash or vouchers have been a component of drought relief programs in other parts of Africa, enabling pastoralists to re-stock livestock. This could be a useful area of research in the Sahel. In particular more research into the ways in which cash transfers have the potential to address the underlying causes of malnutrition in the Sahel. Overall, however, it has become clear that cash transfer programming has a major potential role in helping bridge the divide between humanitarian and development action.

The emerging lessons are that for the poorest populations to build a long term and sustainable resilience to shocks and to lift themselves out of the hunger cycle, regular and predictable cash transfer support can play a vital role.

At the same time, the evidence shows that cash transfers are clearly not a panacea. Appropriate agricultural and rural development policies, malaria and diarrhoea control, improved child care and feeding practices, control of high levels of price volatility also need to be in place.

2.8 Social protection

Social protection is long term support for households to reduce, prevent and overcome hazards which adversely affect livelihoods. There is a growing recognition that everyone should be entitled to some form of assistance to help meet basic needs, including the right to food. Social protection implies the right to be protected and the responsibility of the state to fulfil this right.

Social protection in the Sahel has conventionally been dominated by humanitarian relief and food based safety nets. Safety nets are put in place to prevent individuals from falling below a given standard of living, and are usually short-term emergency measures. Typically in the Sahel, safety nets consist of public action taken by government, supported by donors and NGOs, in response to a level of deprivation deemed socially unacceptable.⁷⁷ It often takes the form of providing assistance (primarily food aid) to support people that fall chronically or temporarily below a threshold of food insecurity, or who are affected by other shocks. Safety nets were also advocated as responses to financial crises and adjustment.⁷⁸

Social protection thinking developed mostly as a result of the poor record of safety nets to fully reach intended target groups, and to be set in place fast enough to prevent a crisis. Interest has also developed because of a growing sense that conventional development interventions are not succeeding in reducing poverty because the poorest households cannot participate. Annex B10 provides a more in-depth overview of the rationale and evidence that has stimulated this interest.

The social protection debate has been much slower to start in the Sahel than elsewhere. There still seems to be little political will to engage seriously with social protection at this time.⁷⁹ Most governments in the Sahel continue to have strong reservations about introducing social protection mechanisms. Governments fear their cost, administration, and possible negative impacts on beneficiaries. There is a concern that beneficiaries will become dependent on grants, leading to the erosion of self-reliance and informal community support mechanisms.

In addition, the cash transfer agenda is often perceived as donor driven. Governments argue it is better to invest their very limited budgets in productive, growth promoting sectors, such as agriculture, industry, infrastructure, and trade. Health, water supply and education are also viewed as important sectors. Until recently, social cash transfers have been regarded as unaffordable and not the best use of resources.⁸⁰

These perceptions are starting to change. As indicated in Annex B10, there is growing evidence from other regions of Africa that well managed social protection interventions, can link social assistance and development objectives such as pro-poor economic growth and poverty reduction and other MDG goals. There is evidence that a social protection approach can make a strong contribution, (alongside other approaches), both towards preventing the slide into poverty during and immediately after a food crisis, and supporting long-term efforts to assist chronically poor people and their children to escape poverty.⁸¹

Other potential roles of social protection measures are to extend humanitarian approaches to recovery, especially by linking protection with risk reduction and livelihood promotion. Social protection can also facilitate vulnerable households' long-term adaptation to climate change.

Within the Sahel, Niger is one of the first countries to undertake a pilot social transfer project. Following the 2005 food crisis, the Niger government decided to establish this program, after realising the limits and costs of a succession of humanitarian responses. Niger's aim was to prevent food and nutrition insecurity by attacking the root causes of vulnerability and by promoting the livelihoods of

poorer households. The Niger government approached the World Bank to finance four studies to assess the modalities for institutionalising a permanent cash transfer program of 10,000 CFA a month directly to chronically poor households.⁸²

Case study

Government of Niger Social Protection (Projet Pilote des Filets Sociaux par le Cash Transfert)

Pilot project for social protection by cash transfer and accompanying measures supporting food security of 2,500 vulnerable households for 18 months at 10,000 a month in 8 communes of the regions of Tillabéry and Tahoua.

Aims and objectives:

- Improve in a significant way the well being and food consumption of chronically poor households using unconditional cash transfers.
- Facilitate investment in productive and human development by cash transfer and accompanying support to benefiting households.
- Test, document and learn from a program of unconditional cash transfer, particularly in terms of developing a transparent and consultative methodology for targeting the poorest households, and to effectively ensure distribution of cash to 2500 households.
- For follow up support, the program is providing awareness raising and education on nutrition, hygiene, diversification of income generation activities, tailored to each context.

Specific indicators for success include:

- Improved food consumption and nutrition.
- Reduced vulnerability to shocks through strengthened livelihoods; investment in productive assets; diversify income sources, and in human development (health, education and nutrition).

It is relevant to note that this innovative program was designed to build on the lessons and successes between 2005-2009 of CARE International, SCUK, and the British Red Cross. The NGOs undertook small-scale cash transfer programs, mostly during the lean season. A key aspect of this initiative in Niger is that it is government managed, and includes a strong learning component, to develop and adapt a model of social transfer based on the national context. This is significant because the pilot shows how to effect the transition from initially donor-funded, NGO-implemented delivery model to an institutionalised, permanent, government-run program. Several international agencies, however, while welcoming this initiative, do not consider the learning component to be adequate. Staff from the EC, SCUK, Oxfam and Concern Worldwide have all met with the management team and World Bank to improve it.⁸³

A major limitation to cash based social protection programs (as opposed to other modalities) is that they are highly susceptible to price inflation, which often is a key factor in food crises. This greatly undermines the purchasing power of recipients of the cash. The very high cereal prices in Niger in 2010 and during the recent surge in global grain prices demonstrate this risk. The lesson to be learned is that social protection must also be accompanied by appropriate measures to regulate markets and control food prices.

Because donor-supported cash transfer pilot projects attract substantial amounts of financial resources, and because of the intensive level of interactions with recipient households and communities, evaluations are often positive. There is still strong debate around how social protection programs can eventually become sustainable and how to scale-up coverage from the local (e.g. district) to the national level, given the huge need in Sahelian countries.

Despite these challenges, the pathways to resilience in the Sahel require appropriate forms of social protection.⁸⁴ International NGOs, donors, and one government have started adopting social protection as a means to better attack the root causes of chronic food and nutrition insecurity.

3 Challenges to overcome on the path to resilience

Participants of multi-stakeholder workshops organised in Niamey and N'Djaména also assessed the major obstacles and challenges to effectively address chronic food and nutrition insecurity. This information is presented in a table contained in Annex C6. What follows below is a more in-depth analysis of priority themes elicited from the participants.

3.1 Political leadership/governance

The 2010 food crisis in the Sahel illustrated, as if that were still needed, the supreme importance of the crisis being recognised by national authorities to enable a robust, early response that protects livelihoods and productive assets. There are many ways in which the international development and humanitarian community can improve their operational effectiveness. A larger issue, in developing an adapted aid approach, is to assess to what extent the donor community has succeeded in strengthening governance, particularly relating to prevention and management of humanitarian crises.

In the context of the Sahel improving governance is probably one of the most important challenges to address in order to strengthen resilience, and overcome the chronic dimensions of the ongoing food and nutrition crisis. The most striking example of poor governance is the lack of high level political engagement – and even in some cases acknowledgement – of recurrent food crises and the levels of chronic food insecurity and malnutrition.

In 2010, this lack of political engagement resulted in a lack of scale and urgency in the delivery of effective and appropriate assistance in all four countries reviewed for this report. Although EWS showed in 2009, with months of lead time, that a crisis was imminent, this technical data and indicators did not produce adequate action because politicians were not fully engaged. The absence of political leadership inhibited an urgent and sufficiently large scale response. The Sahel food crisis was below the political radar in the countries in the region (with the exception of Niger after the coup). Instead the emergency was principally dealt with at a technical level by governments, and by many international agencies and bodies.

Following the military coup in February 2010, the new Niger government publicly called for international aid and facilitated humanitarian activities on the ground. In other affected countries however, internal political concerns meant that governments were reluctant to create real public awareness (nationally and internationally) of the scale of the crisis and take the necessary actions.

These internal political concerns vary from one Sahelian country to another. Before the coup in Niger, President Tandja had decided to systematically deny the existence of any type of serious food crisis, or any type of child nutrition crisis in his country. He opposed launching an international appeal for assistance. Similarly, in Chad, the European Delegation had to prompt the government to recognize the crisis and made an appeal for assistance.

Why should high level politicians like President Tandja, and other leaders in the Sahel, feel reluctant to recognize an emergency? What are the underlying political factors for such egregious lack of concern for the acute distress of millions of fellow citizens? More importantly, how can external donors (who are a major stakeholder in terms of the costs of humanitarian assistance), improve governance?

In the case of Niger, a critical social observer, de Sardin⁸⁵ suggests the regime's denial was grounded in a sense of national pride, a sort of radical expression of sovereignty, and a wish to avoid sinking the country deeper into dependency on food aid, that did nothing to resolve the fundamental causes. De Sardin suggests that the elite wished to avoid yet another humiliating rolling coverage by the world's media. That such a view existed in elite circles in Niger is buttressed by Prime Minister Hama Amadou, who declared in November 2005, in his address to the opening of the World Food Program/Government of Niger (Review after Action) that he was not prepared to sell cheaply the dignity of the Nigerien people 'vendre la dignité du Peuple Nigérien à bon marché... cela, nous ne sommes pas prêt à l'accepter'.⁸⁶ The Prime Minister also accused NGO's of providing short-term solutions and that humanitarian interventions leave populations dependant '...dans un cadre d'assistance sans fin qui, à terme, ne peut que nuire à leur sens de responsabilités de Citoyens'.⁸⁷

Governments in the Sahel may also find it embarrassing to declare a food and nutrition crisis because it tacitly admits that long-term policies of economic growth, poverty reduction, CCA and food security are failing. A government may view the declaration of a crisis as a threat to its long-term, and much more lucrative, development commitments from the World Bank.

Regardless of the underlying reasons, governments' failure to adequately respond violates their responsibility to ensure its citizens' right to food.⁸⁸ The underlying political factors influencing a government's decision to declare a crisis and to allocate sufficient resources to EWS, DRR, and social protection programs varies in each Sahelian country. Donors who seek to promote good governance need to analyse the political context, not just policies, and engage in long term advocacy and strategies for change.

Good governance in addressing severe food insecurity extends far beyond the need for responding early and decisively when an alert of a looming crisis is sounded. However, when a national government fails to recognise the crisis (as was the case in 2010, particularly in Mali and Chad), the UN and donors needs to be far more pro-active in ensuring access to humanitarian assistance for the people and communities affected. Donors need to use strong diplomacy and advocacy to urge national authorities to recognize the crisis.

In summary, there has been some notable progress made to address governance issues related to chronic food insecurity and vulnerability in the Sahel. ECHO's Sahel strategy is a good example, as it addresses these governance issues. There is still a need to adapt the architecture of aid, so that it addresses good governance. Increased volumes of aid are not likely to have a sustainable effect without changes in governance. However, there are problems with the existing aid architecture which divides humanitarian and development aid. Humanitarian and development aid are based on different principles and are managed by different departments. The aid structure is still not adequately configured to address the needs of the Sahel, including promoting good governance.⁸⁹

3.2 Promoting resilience in fragile states: The example of Chad


State fragility is a significant challenge in preventing and managing food crises, and addressing the root causes of vulnerability in the Sahel. DFID defines a fragile state as one that 'cannot or will not deliver core functions to the majority of its people, including the poor'.⁹⁰ Core functions include reducing poverty as well as providing public services. Fragile states often face multiple challenges, including a limited capacity to absorb external funding.

Within the Sahel, a number of countries are judged to be fragile states. This report takes Chad as one example, in order to illustrate the challenges of fragility and security. Chad is considered a fragile state in respect to humanitarian and development cooperation because of major problems

linked to the Darfur crisis, internal conflicts, chronic food crises, and a general unstable political and security situation. A large and complicated country, Chad is composed of a patchwork of over 150 different ethnic groups, extending across many different regions and climatic zones. It is a fractured state because of its cultural, religious and social divisions. Chad is characterised by the presence of armed groups, who often resort to violence in settling disputes.

In such a volatile atmosphere, the Chadian state is very weak as a developmental force. The poorly developed infrastructure of roads, markets and basic services means that the Chadian state has a minimal presence on the ground – in terms of geographical reach and administrative capacity. There are few development actors in Chad. The numbers of NGOs working in Chad increased in response to the Darfur crisis in 2004, but are still well below the numbers active in other Sahelian countries.⁹¹

The 2009-10 food crisis in Chad highlighted a host of long term policy failures, including adapting to climate change and controlling volatile prices of food in the markets. A detailed analysis of these failures, linked to state fragility and governance, and the ineffectiveness of aid, is made in Annex C2. The 2010 crisis made visible the deep structural food and nutrition security problems that have persisted for decades. Most strikingly, the severe food deficit situation of households, combined with structural factors such as gender inequality and poor access to healthcare, have been generating catastrophic rates of child under-nutrition in the Sahelian zone of Chad for many years, as shown in Figure 6.



What does the evidence presented in the boxes in Annex C2 analysing state fragility reflect about the effectiveness of aid and strengthening of resilience in Chad?

- The chronic food crisis situation in the Sahel band of western Chad is a clear example of an ‘aid orphan’. This is a geographical area where only a few international actors are engaged, aid volumes are low, and where pastoralists and agro-pastoralists have been neglected for decades.
- Efforts over 20 years to strengthen the early warning system and the institutional capacity to prevent and manage disasters have not yet had a lasting impact.⁹²
- Many international agencies were not prepared for the onset of the food crisis. Despite the early warning signs, international agencies such as the WFP did not begin to mobilise its resources until late February. However, importing of food aid takes at least four months, arriving far too late to prevent extreme coping mechanisms and loss of assets of a huge number of food insecure households.


- A review of OCHA's data for expenditure by cluster for the crisis in 2010 indicates the continued dominance of food aid compared with longer-term agricultural/ livelihood assistance. A key lesson of how to make aid more effective in addressing the root causes of vulnerability is not being applied in Chad.
- Little progress has been made in strengthening of government institutions and providing basic services in western Sahel.
- International agencies do not seem to have developed a comprehensive whole government approach to reducing state fragility.

This situation highlights the difficult challenges for donors in fragile states. It is not easy to avoid dependency on constant external funding. There is a need to generate political will, strong state institutions, and good governance. This all takes time, but there is an immediate need to address the chronic vulnerability of much of the population, which is increasing precisely because of the lack of effective risk management and good governance.

In conclusion, the example of Chad indicates that in conditions of political instability, insecurity, and weak state, conditions which characterise many countries in the Sahel, most donors, international NGOs and UN agencies have not been able to address critical issues required for effective aid. The institutional capacity and strategies of donor and UN agencies are not sufficiently robust to address the long term, difficult challenge of addressing governance issues. International principles and guidelines of how to engage with fragile states are not being well applied.

3.3 The high cost of high prices and unregulated markets

The HEA data presented earlier in this report indicated a much higher level of malnutrition in poorer, as compared to better off households. Since many poorer households buy 60% or more of their food on the market, food prices are likely a factor influencing malnutrition levels. Data from Medecins Sans Frontière (MSF) from Niger (see Figure 7) show a startling correlation between millet prices and number of admissions of children with acute malnutrition. High food prices clearly reduce people's access to food, and directly trigger malnutrition, leading children to die.⁹³



In light of this brutal insight, what are the policy solutions for addressing the volatility of prices, particularly in the lean season in the Sahel?

^b CILSS is the Permanent Interstate Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (an intergovernmental organization composed of nine Sahelian member countries (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, and Chad)

In March 2005, at the opening session of the regional conference on the food and agricultural situation in the Sahel, the Executive Secretary of CILSS^b noted that, 'one must admit that the capacity of our States is limited. Apart from emergency measures, the State must let market forces, based on the law of supply and demand, deal with the situation'.⁹⁴

In the last few years, this perspective has started to shift. The food crisis of 2010 revealed the continuing ineffectiveness of emergency measures to meet the needs of a growing number of severely food insecure households throughout the Sahel. The global food crisis sparked by high prices in 2008 also exposed the major limitations of the market in dealing with the situation, as proposed by CILSS. The more recent experience of Chad provides revealing insights into the high risks of reliance on markets.

Price volatility and markets during the 2010 food crisis in Chad

Markets and volatile prices are major factors contributing to structural vulnerability for poor households in Chad. The National Study on Structural Causes of Vulnerability in Chad EVST of May 2009 indicated that poor rural households spend about 70% of their income for food purchased in the local markets.⁹⁵ The reliance on the market is particularly acute in the Sahelian band of Chad. For example, in 2009-2010, a survey by ACF and FAO indicated that most households in the region of Bahr el Ghazal (in the west Sahel region) generally do not produce enough grain to cover more than three months of their annual needs.⁹⁶

Such households are highly vulnerable to price increases. During the lean season of 2010, grain prices in the central and eastern regions of the Sahel zone experienced extreme price increases. Although millet prices were quite stable in the south, in the Sahel zone, they had increased from 80% to 93% over the five year average for July.⁹⁷

A study of the performance of Chad's market system indicated three major reasons for the huge price increase.⁹⁸ First, market infrastructure in terms of price information, access to credit, storage, and above all, transport facilities is very poorly developed in Chad. These factors prevented the market in Chad from functioning as a unified system. Instead, the market is highly fragmented, and influenced by external forces in neighbouring countries, as much as by internal factors.


In 2010, the very fragmented market system was not able to adequately shift food from surplus areas (in the south) to deficit areas (in the Sahel), to prevent the huge upward spike in prices^c. In addition, the low number of commercial traders in the Sahel regions of Chad reduced competition. Traders have a dominant position in setting local prices for buying grain after harvest. At this time, many households are obliged to sell, in order to raise money for migration, repay debts and cover other expenses. Traders are also in a strong position for selling grain back to households in the lean season. The lack of credit facilities, and poorly developed transport system inhibits more traders from entering into the grain transport market, and increasing the competition.

Another feature of the Chad market is that the eastern production zone is commercially closely linked to Sudan, and the western production areas to Cameroon (and Nigeria). Shortages in both these neighbouring countries generated attractive grain prices, which led to significant cross border flows of grain out of Chad, into Sudan and Cameroon. This further limited grain flows from the south of Chad to the north, to reach villages in the Sahelian belt. This increased local prices and made food access for vulnerable households even more limited.⁹⁹

^c Landlocked Chad is characterized by large distances between production areas and consumption areas. In 2008, CILSS estimated that Chad had only 1,000 km of paved roads. Transport costs on non paved roads increases from 60 to 75% between as the rainy season begins.

FIGURE 8

Theoretical levels of grain stocks managed by state agencies in the Sahel, 2010




Source: WFP, Afrique Verte (2010)

In response, the government of Chad attempted to impose price ceilings on grain and basic commodities, and ban the export of certain products, including pregnant animals. These policies could not be enforced, and reduced the activities of market traders. Grain prices remained high, and indeed appeared to rise because of increased transaction costs to evade the controls. Animal prices dropped lower, because of weakened demand with the barriers to export.

Despite its very poor market infrastructure and persistent recurrence of food crises, Chad's official quantity of emergency food reserves is the lowest of any country in the Sahel, as shown in Figure 8.¹⁰⁰ ONASA (the agency in charge of emergency food stocks with 22 warehouses across the country) sold less than 30,000 tonnes of grain at subsidised prices. This intervention did stop the rise of local prices- but only temporarily because ONASA's volume of grain was far too small to have a long term effect on market prices.

FIGURE 9

Price of a tonne of maize brought to N'Djamena: Regional, International and local cost (in US dollars, July 2010).



Source: WFP (2010)

A joint market assessment by the FAO, WFP and FEWS NET noted that the intervention of ONASA, however imperfect it was in terms of reaching the most vulnerable, was the only measure that succeeded in dampening prices. The study proposed that if ONASA were 'given a mandate to regulate markets, it could be a tool to limit excessive price changes, up or down. With sufficient

resources, ONASA could increase the volume of its intervention, and position itself as a buyer of last resort (in the Sudanian zone in the south, and as a supplier in the Sahel zone) and could also stimulate private sector participation in the grain trade'.¹⁰¹

The study also noted that the failure of local markets to shift surplus to areas of deficit within Chad increased the costs for food aid. Imported food is highly uncompetitive, because of the high cost of land transport. It is much more economical to buy locally than to import, including during the lean season, as shown in Figure 9. According to the regional WFP purchasing department, 'to buy local maize costs 40% less than an international procurement to be sent to Chad'.¹⁰² However ONASA and the WFP were unprepared, having low reserves when the food crisis began.

According to the joint study, local purchases of grain by ONASA, WFP and international NGOs could develop the national capacity to regulate prices, if complemented by improvements in the market information system. In addition, they proposed that a decentralised national system of grain reserves could support village level cereal banks. Many women's groups in Chad undertake small scale grain storage, which could be supported.¹⁰³ For improved resilience against future shocks, the joint study also recommended another type of local grain storage system at the village level, called warrantage.¹⁰⁴

BACKGROUND NOTE

What is Warrantage?

Warrantage is a credit transaction in which foodstuffs brought into a local storage facility serves as collateral for a loan requested by a farmer. The system allows small scale farmers to defer the sale of its agricultural production at harvest time, when prices are often very low, while obtaining the necessary credit for income generating activities, including the cost of migration, during the dry season. The price differential between harvest time and the lean season is often sufficient to pay for the interest and storage charges, while giving the farmer a higher price for his production. Because of market fluctuations, the price differential does not always cover the cost of the borrowing every agricultural season. A survey by Afrique Verte indicates that between 2001 and 2010, warrantage was not profitable for farmers in 29% of cases. Warrantage also has the potential to link farmers' organizations with microfinance institutions. Warrantage has grown significantly throughout the Sahel in the last decade, especially in Niger.

Source Afrique Verte (2010)

This review of the market dimensions of the 2010 food crisis in Chad made it clear that highly vulnerable households cannot depend on markets to ensure availability of food, or to prevent extremely high prices. Beyond food aid, other forms of public intervention are essential to control highly volatile prices and regulate markets. There are significant questions of cost, distribution, targeting, and governance to consider. A national system of food buffer stocks is an important instrument to consider in order to address market failures, ensure distribution and regulate prices.

Markets respond to demand, not to need. The example of Chad starkly demonstrates that markets, when they work, respond to demand, not to needs. Annex C3 provides a detailed analysis showing that relying on unregulated market forces can increase vulnerability and insecurity of poor households throughout the Sahel.

The role of food reserves. Food reserves can be a valuable tool for improving access and distribution of food and for stabilising prices. They can support small scale farmers by helping them to predict their markets, and by countering concentrated market power over grain sales and distribution. They can contribute to improved operation of local, national and regional markets, where resources in the private sector are lacking. Reserve stocks can compensate for shortfalls in foreign currency (that makes imports difficult), offset supply shocks or spikes in demand, and facilitate humanitarian response to food emergencies. Reserves can also help countries cope with climate change and its impact on food production and supply.¹⁰⁵

In the Sahel, food security reserves are already in place to increase availability and access to food to vulnerable households during food crises. Many of these reserves are insufficient in size even for emergencies, (particularly in Chad). What is lacking is an additional price stabilization reserve to buy foodstuffs when prices are low, in order to reduce supply and sell when prices are high to keep prices in check.¹⁰⁶ This can help protect farmers' incomes and mitigate the effect of steep price rises on consumers. However, as this type of storage involves regulating prices it is politically less acceptable than security reserves. Annex C3 explains why food buffer stocks for price stabilization were abandoned in the Sahel, starting in the 1980s.

Shifting Attitudes. Since the food price crisis of 2008, there has been a major shift in the debate on food security and the role of food reserves. Initially, the debate focussed on ideological standpoints (being for or against regulation). Now, the discourse recognises the need, and is concentrating on the technical, political and institutional feasibility of market regulation instruments, primarily food reserves.¹⁰⁷

Within the Sahel, there is increasing recognition that strategic food reserves could play an important role in regulating the market, in order to improve food security. The Sahel and West Africa Club (SWAC) has started discussions on security reserves, and organised a forum at the end of 2010 in West Africa on this subject. CILSS has established a food reserves information system for CILSS and ECOWAS states. The German Aid agency, GTZ organised a seminar in Africa in September on mechanisms to control price volatility, including regional, food reserves and insurance schemes.¹⁰⁸ What is lacking is a vision of how such a system could be structured, particularly in light of WTO rules.¹⁰⁹

A major lesson of 2010 is that as long as no mechanism for market regulation and control of price volatility is in place, the current national systems of prevention and mitigation of food crises in the Sahel will remain undersized and ineffective. In face of high prices and market failures, investments in DRR, and potential use of social protection mechanisms, will also be limited.

The potential limitations of food reserves to address price volatility in the Sahel need to be further analysed and tested at the regional, national and local levels. In the short term, capacity to promote food security could be significantly enhanced simply by maintaining much greater quantities of food in existing national reserves, for use when the next food crisis occurs.

3.4 What needs fixing with early warning systems

Although various EWS in the Sahel provided a timely warning of a potential food crisis in late 2009, the systems did not generate a quick response. This critical failing is addressed in section 3.5.2 below. However, in addition to a quick response, other significant issues need fixing, in order for EWS to be a more effective mechanism for reducing vulnerability.

An outdated model for prediction: A central function of the EWS is to predict if a food crisis will occur. However, it is impossible to predict a food crisis without an accurate model of what causes it. The vulnerability surveys of various EWS in the Sahel, for different livelihoods zones, are often heavily weighted in terms of amounts of cereals available per capita, as a way to estimate national food security. This bias in equating food security with cereal production fails to consider food access, or purchasing power of poor households, who buy 60% or more of their food on the market. Though total food availability is important, extrapolating the findings to the level of the individual assumes that a food crisis can be predicted on the basis of a deficit in food availability. HEA data strongly shows that purchasing power (i.e. access) is a more reliable model for prediction.

Weaknesses in the assessment of vulnerability: National EWS have developed composite vulnerability indices for targeting geographic zones at risk. The data collection tools and variables assessed are very broad (rainfall, results of the agricultural season, income, markets, health/nutrition). These factors are scored as part of an index, and the total gives the level of vulnerability in a given area. Weighing up the relative importance of the variables is not a precise process. It is often heavily weighted by the more easily measured level of cereal production. Most EWS have yet to incorporate indicators of purchasing power that relate to the poorest households (i.e. terms of trade for: daily wages for a cereal grain; firewood bundles for grain; a chicken for grain). Many agencies, including donors have limited confidence in the national systems assessment of vulnerability.

Inadequate differentiation between transitory crises and chronic food insecurity situations: In the Sahel, the typical response to a food crisis remains an emergency relief intervention. Still little is done to deal with the underlying causes. Existing EWS have yet to develop a more diversified set of responses to address both transitory and structural aspects of food insecurity, and clearly identify the households most at risk. Monitoring of vulnerability often fails to extend below the level of districts. The vulnerable zones therefore provide very little information on the situation at the local level (villages and nomad encampments). HEA show that there is an enormous disparity between the households at the village level (within a given village). The EWS data often does not make crucial distinctions in terms of the varying levels of vulnerability within a department, much less within a village. The lack of such data on the situation of chronically vulnerable is a major failing. Crisis response based mostly on food deficit information can miss whole categories of people, the poorest, in great need in areas where there is surplus production.

Inadequate monitoring and feedback system: In many countries in the Sahel, EWS lack a monitoring and feedback process to strengthen accountability, transparency, and enable key actors to learn from their experiences. There is little knowledge of the impact of the interventions on the food security of target groups, whether the coverage of the response met the full need, and what happened with groups that did not benefit from a response.

Multiple EWS may create ambiguous overall results that fail to build consensus, credibility and a timely response: One test of the EWS's efficacy is its ability to predict. However there are at least three different EWS in place in most countries (FEWS NET, WFP, FAO CILSS, and that of the national government). EWS results are often communicated in a difficult political environment, resulting in concerns about the reliability of data. The variables can be weighted differently by each system, leading to a range of different outcomes. An appeal for pre-emptive action may emerge, but without the kind of strong conviction that would persuade donors to react. Instead a 'wait-and-see' attitude tends to prevail, for donors to become more certain about the scope and depth of need. By the time the situation is clear, it is often too late for pre-emptive action. In the scenario where the early-warning indicators are showing ambiguous trends, it would be better to have triggers. These are indicators agreed in advance, that, if met, will put into action a rapid response before it is too late.

Assessing vulnerability for marginalised categories of people on the move: As a food crisis evolves, migration increases, starting often with pastoralists with their herds, then migrants seeking employment. If the situation becomes severe, women will leave their villages and move to the urban areas. The EWS in the Sahel have not yet developed effective methods for assessing vulnerability, and estimating needs that take into account highly mobile parts of the population.

Promoting a community based EWS dimension within the context of decentralization: Many Sahelian countries have initiated a process of transferring political, administrative, and fiscal responsibilities from the national level to sub-national structures. However, there is still a

need to enable EWS operations to be integrated into decentralized structures. It is easier and more effective to accurately identify the incidence and causes of food insecurity at the local level, working within a livelihoods framework. Working at the local level also enables identification and targeting of more diverse responses matched to community needs and capacities, both for short-term transitory interventions or longer-term actions for resilience.

Strengthening community level capacity and preparedness to act: For early warning to be effective, communities should receive early warning information and know how to react to warnings. This requires systematic education and preparedness programs. Few EWS actors appear to be supporting such programs at the community level. Currently, local leaders and communities threatened by hazards have not been enabled to act in order to reduce the loss of their livelihoods and assets.

3.5 Doing aid better

3.5.1 Positive changes in the approach to aid since 2005

Sahel Strategy of ECHO: The positive change within the aid system in the Sahel is the development of a comprehensive Sahel Strategy by ECHO in 2007. Learning the lessons from the 2005 crisis, ECHO's fundamental objective is the efficient articulation of short and long term aid instruments to achieve the goal of a sustainable reduction in malnutrition rates. The Sahel strategy is based on the three pillars of:

1. Improving the knowledge base.
2. Support to pilot, innovative and replicable action to reduce under-nutrition.
3. Advocacy to raise awareness in government and development partners on nutrition issues.

ECHO's funding is flexible enough to include support for post-crisis recovery, Water-Hygiene and Sanitation, cash transfer programming to the most vulnerable and DRR. ECHO has succeeded in convincing government and development partners in the region to give increased importance to food and nutrition security.¹¹⁰

Linking Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD): The EC, one of the largest donors in the Sahel, conceived linking relief, rehabilitation and development, as a strategic approach to aid. LRRD is designed to favour both short and long-term action, and harmonised responses based on joint analysis of chronic situations. While a welcome development, LRRD has no specific budget allocated to it. Instead LRRD must be funded from existing aid instruments, which each have different procedures and objectives. Achieving an articulation between them is a challenge. Humanitarian aid is project based and usually delivered through non government bodies. Development aid is program based and delivered through government. There remains a major cultural gap in reconciling the humanitarian principle of need with the development objective of sustainability. This gap inhibits the transitions within LRRD.

Another problem lies with the middle 'R'. It is clear who funds 'Relief'. It is clear who funds 'Development'. But 'Rehabilitation' remains mostly an orphan. Annex C4 provides a detailed analysis of LRRD, (rationale, progress, challenges, and ways forward).

WAHRF: DFID has provided considerable support for DRR, as a response to chronic situations. It has supported limited DRR pilot programs in the Sahel. Until very recently, DFID also had the West African Humanitarian Relief Fund (WAHRF) to help ensure a rapid response which is now scaling down. DFID has also ended its direct presence in the Sahel, after closing its Niger office.

CERF: (United Nations Central Emergency Response Fund) was established to rapidly provide resources to assist people affected by natural disasters and conflicts. In 2010, CERF released funds for both Chad and Niger.

Cash transfer programming by UNICEF: UNICEF undertook its first ever cash transfer project in selected departments in Niger in 2010 as an alternative to the protection ration distributions.

Shift in thinking by OCHA: On a visit to the region in April 2010, John Holmes, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, spoke of the importance of tackling the root causes of the recurring food crisis in the area. 'The current food crisis, five years after the last emergency, shows that without joint action between development and humanitarian actors in support of responsible governments to deal with the structural issues, it will become increasingly difficult to contain these recurrent crises, which do so much to undermine economic and social progress in the Sahel'.¹¹¹ This same perspective was echoed by his successor, Valerie Amos, who visited the Sahel in October 2010 and stated 'We now need to become good at building bridges between emergency relief and development'.¹¹² While welcome, OCHA has yet much to do to systematically apply these ideas into practice.

3.5.2 Crisis response in 2010: Too little, too late

Despite these positive changes, the overall response in the Sahel in 2010 was too little, too late. At an inter-agency meeting in Niamey in mid-January, the early warning risks were downplayed by many agencies whose primary mandate is rapid and appropriate response. The UN declared a crisis only in early March 2010. The WFP waited until July 2010 before launching its own Emergency Operation (EMOP). This slow response to mobilise adequate resources failed to meet the standard of protecting livelihoods and assets of vulnerable households.

In his article in the *Lancet*, Sam Loewenburg quoted aid officials who said that widespread human suffering and loss of assets could have been reduced, if international donors had heeded early warnings of the imminent crisis and sent more money earlier. The distributions of cash and supplementary food could have supported subsistence farmers and pastoralists through the poor rains and high food prices that precipitated the crisis. Loewenburg quotes Guido Cornale, the head of the UNICEF mission to Niger: 'Donors could have given early and in larger amounts, and the crisis would not have reached such a severe level as it has reached now'.¹¹³

According to Loewenburg, many of the same dynamics of 2005 were in play again. Just as in 2005, the hunger crisis in 2010 received almost no media coverage in its early stages. There was one article in *The New York Times* focused on the coup in Niger, one report in *The Independent* on the UN's expanded appeal, and a 96-word mention in *The Guardian*. Aid agencies noted that the lack of media attention directly affected the amount of focus, and funds, that rich governments put towards a crisis. 'Donors have reacted too slowly. Donors don't give to prevent. Donors wait to give until the disaster is already evident', stated Cornale of UNICEF.¹¹⁴

However, Loewenburg noted that donors, while late, did respond earlier than in 2005. The EC started raising awareness and mobilising support early on in the crisis. In late 2009, the EC made its first allocation of 10 million Euros to fund mitigation and preparedness activities. ECHO funding helped to ensure the large scale availability and distribution of special RUTF and facilitated large-scale use of direct cash transfers to the most vulnerable. In total the EC allocated 108.9 million Euros in humanitarian assistance to address the crisis.¹¹⁵ DFID gave around \$24m in assistance for Sahel countries. However, other major institutional donors such as Australia, Denmark, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden allocated relatively little, in light of their 'fair share'.

While donors such as DFID, ECHO, OFDA and Spain all eventually provided significant funding for the Sahel, mainly for Niger, mobilising funds for western Chad and northern Mali was much more difficult. Overall, in mid-July, the UN revised Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan for Niger, amounting to \$371m, was only 38% funded.¹¹⁶ Also in July, Mali had only received 23% of the funds requested.¹¹⁷ Lack of funding prevented aid agencies from engaging in widespread actions to stop the crisis worsening. Loewenburg estimates that the funding needed to contain the catastrophe in its later stages was nearly double of what it was when the crisis started.

There were also significant delays in getting food aid to many affected areas, particularly in Chad. In particular, the USA authorised \$50m in food aid for Niger. However, this was purchased from its domestic market, and took three to five months to arrive. Over one third of the food aid had not yet arrived by August. Across the region, WFP distributions were delayed by several months. Distributions that took place were often inadequate in terms of covering rising needs. In Chad, requests for additional food stocks were only placed in March. This meant that much of it only arrived by the end of July or the start of August, too late for many.

In summary, despite information available from EWSs, the international community repeated mistakes made in previous food crises. A slow response resulted in deterioration of the situation, unnecessary suffering, a loss of assets by poor households in both agricultural and pastoral areas, a huge increase in the level of need and a significant rise in costs.

3.5.3 Quality of aid

Reliance on in-kind food assistance: There was a continued over-reliance on in-kind food aid by the WFP and other donors in the Sahel. In 2010, food aid was still seen as the natural and automatic response to severe food insecurity. Despite the upsurge of cash based programming, many officials at both national and regional levels appeared unfamiliar with the concept of protecting livelihoods assets. In-kind food aid deliveries, whether shipped from abroad or purchased within the region, still resulted in considerable delays for the people in need.

Insufficient attention to needs of Pastoralists: As in 2005, not enough attention was paid to the pastoral dimension of the crisis. The response in pastoral areas only involved a small proportion of donor assistance, and the response came too late. This can be explained by the difference in timing (the crisis in pastoral areas starts and finishes earlier), lack of available information, greater complexity of intervention and an inadequate level of interest from governments and donors.

Targeting emergency aid: The amount of information and quality of analysis (such as gender disaggregated data and good market surveys) were not adequate to ensure resources were well targeted and sufficient. Household vulnerability assessments do not adequately take into account wealth categorisation through the use of HEA.

Weak coordination of aid delivery: The view of NGO staff consulted for this study was that coordination of aid in the Sahel did not operate effectively enough to ensure the most rapid and appropriate distribution. In particular, OCHA was responsible for identifying gaps and needs and coordinating government, UN and NGO efforts, but their staff capacity was considered inadequate in most of the affected countries, especially in Mali. In Niger, OCHA was present, but needed to reinforce its capacity in view of the crisis, to play a full and effective coordination role. In Chad, coordination mechanisms and resources were overwhelmingly concentrated in the east of the country. There was not sufficient additional capacity for addressing needs in western and central Chad.

Continued difficulties to integrate humanitarian and development work: In 2010, there was a lack of co-ordination between the government structures responsible for agricultural and pastoral

policies and those responsible for emergency interventions. A mechanism did not exist to enable these actors to work together toward same goals, in a context of structural, recurring crisis. Often, the same institutions participated in both long-term development and emergency coordination bodies but not necessarily with the same representatives.

Linking long, medium and short term responses: The international humanitarian community has not sufficiently reformed its aid approach in order to respond to acute food needs in the context of chronic and long-term vulnerability. The linkages between short-term response and medium and longer-term measures to strengthen resilience to future shocks, while starting to change, remain inadequate. Currently, the aid system in the Sahel remains narrowly designed to only focus on immediate needs, not long term risk reduction. Key instruments such as EWSs, national grain reserves and the Food Aid Charter are all geared primarily toward emergency responses. The aid structure continues to support governments with post-crisis interventions that help people to cope after disaster, rather than prevention and mitigation measures to help people build resilience to a future crisis. There is still a humanitarian-development divide and a need to make safety net (social protection) programming more developmental rather than only just humanitarian.

Insufficient focus on DRR: A major example of this inadequate linkage is that the EU, the world's largest aid donor, until 2009 lacked a strategic framework, and a common voice, to guide its DRR aid support to the Sahel. Until recently, EU action on DRR was assessed as non-strategic as it mainly followed an ad hoc project/program approach and was often uncoordinated and inadequate. While the Hyogo Framework provides harmonised DRR guidance, it is not readily usable for development cooperation purposes. EU's approach also insufficiently linked DRR and climate change. The benefits and synergies of linking DRR and adaptation were not systematically identified and capitalised upon.¹¹⁸ While the EU now has a DRR policy, much must be done to apply it.

Urban dimensions of vulnerability and hunger: The aid response was not adequate for addressing emergency needs in the urban setting. Actors in the Sahel do not focus enough on urban areas, yet, many people moved from rural to urban setting in 2008 and again in 2010.

Generating a sense of ownership of aid supported programs: A number of programs have been proposed by funders, but there is a lack a true commitment by governments. This causes difficulties in effective implementation. The challenge for improving the quality of aid is how to integrate the current short term project approach to longer term five year programs within the budget support mechanism, and ensure accountability for results by better monitoring and tracking what is given to budget support. There is a need to better identify and support 'champions' within the government structure with the political clout to take forward innovative approaches.

Inadequate support for strengthening the administrative and institutional capacity of government: Lack of support for decentralisation affects the quality and sustainability of aid programs.


Continued focus of aid for Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) on general economic growth: The existing national Poverty Reduction Strategies (PRS) in the Sahel are heavily influenced by the neo-liberal development aid paradigm. They have changed little since critically reviewed in *Beyond Any Drought*. Niger's PRS failed to prevent poverty levels from increasing. Niger's new 2008-2012 PRS has some significant changes relating to malnutrition, climate change adaptation; reducing the gap between the rich and poor for more equitable development; improving identification of most vulnerable population categories; social protection for the most vulnerable families, and getting population growth under control. However, the PRS still is weak in providing concrete and comprehensive strategies for how to address vulnerability and achieve these goals.¹¹⁹ The PRS is still essentially oriented to neo-liberal principles of competitive advantage, and modernising production in favoured areas, generating exports, in order to generate 6% annual economic growth.

3.5.4 Volume or quantity of aid in the Sahel

Figure 10 shows the trends in Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) per capita for Niger, Mali, Burkina and Chad. It also enables comparison with the per capita assistance to Ethiopia (which has a major social protection program) and Kenya.

The overall trend is one of increasing per capital aid to all countries, except for a significant reduction in Niger after 2008. Mali and Burkina have the highest rates of per capita aid, at \$77.72m and \$68.70m respectively. Chad has significantly less per capital aid at \$50.08m, which is a major concern, because most aid finances the major crisis in the Eastern part of Chad. Aid flow data is often complex because of emergencies, and debt relief. This data has not been assessed in depth but shows the major trends. The comparison with Ethiopia and Kenya suggests that aid flows per capita to the Sahel are within a similar range to what other African countries receive.

Despite modest increases in ODA per capita, Martin Leach, Head of Africa Conflict and Humanitarian Unit at DFID, acknowledges that long-term development and agricultural assistance to the Sahel region is still paltry.¹²⁰ In addition, funding for DRR and nutrition is also inadequate.



Lack of Dedicated funding for DRR: This inadequacy of aid funding is particularly evident for DRR. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), just 0.14% of total overseas aid globally went specifically to DRR in 2007. DRR remains small scale in the Sahel. Long-term policies and programs as yet provide no coordinated support for contingency planning to reduce risk, and disaster prevention. Existing programs demonstrate the value of DRR, but these generally remain pilot schemes, supported by NGOs.

Generally, donor support in the Sahel is split between two pots. The first is for emergency funding which is short-term in implementation and impact. The second pot is longer-term development. This often is used for government services such as education, health, and infrastructure development. DRR falls between the two. This is a problem not unique to the Sahel. Worldwide, 7.5% of all aid goes to humanitarian relief. Of this, less than 2% goes to DRR. Without dedicated funding for DRR, the money has to be squeezed out of the emergency pot. This has a number

of consequences. Firstly, disaster response and DRR are too often not linked with development projects, even when humanitarian needs and chronic poverty are intertwined. Secondly, agencies are reluctant to invest in DRR with only the short-term funding that humanitarian donors provide.

Nutrition is underfunded: A similar problem exists for nutrition. Conventionally, funding for the treatment of acute malnutrition during crises comes out of the humanitarian pot, which tends to be short term. Development funding related to nutrition often goes only to the Ministry of Health, where nutrition is often a low priority. There is often no dedicated funding in national budgets for addressing malnutrition. With ECHO's Sahel strategy, this is starting to change, but the fundamental issue of how to fund a multi-sectoral, comprehensive integrated approach to nutrition is a major flaw in the current architecture of aid in the Sahel.

Agro-ecological agriculture is another underfunded theme: Only 14% of the projects supported by the EU's 1bn commitment on food security projects for vulnerable farmers in 2009 included an agro-ecological component, while 51% included agro-chemicals.¹²¹ Donors currently spend twice as much on emergency response efforts as they do on agriculture. However, preventing crop failure via proactive agricultural investment is estimated to cost about one-fifteenth as much per person as sending food aid to hungry people, once local farm production collapses.¹²² Farmers living on marginal lands have been largely neglected, as have sustainable agriculture strategies.

Finally, according to many people interviewed for this study, another challenge relates to the absorptive capacity of national governments, and how to engender a true sense of national ownership of major new initiatives, in accordance to the Paris declaration of aid effectiveness. This is coupled with the issues of effective governance, and weak institutional capacity at both national and decentralised levels of government. While it is tempting to propose, as Frederick Mousseau does in *"Sahel: A Prisoner of Starvation?"* for a 'Marshall Plan' for the Sahel, the issues related to governance, ownership and absorptive capacity cannot be put aside, despite the urgent need.

3.6 Long term challenges: Population, conflict, and security

3.6.1 Population growth

There is a complex relationship between population growth, and vulnerability to food and nutrition insecurity. A number of analysts support the position of Ester Boserup, who was one of the first to argue that population pressure is a general pre-condition for agricultural progress, and can be a useful economic stimulus to technical innovation.¹²³ Certainly, it would be misleading to attribute the growing food insecurity in the Sahel to high levels of population growth alone, and the answer as promotion of family planning. The World Bank's 1986 report *Poverty and Hunger*, for example stresses the importance of purchasing power rather than population growth outstripping food supplies as the causal mechanism of hunger and poverty.

However, while neo Malthusian arguments are greatly criticised by Boserup and others, this does not mean there is no relationship at all between population increase and vulnerability to hunger and food insecurity. Almost any analysis of poverty and vulnerability in the Sahel quotes the effect of the decline in land area per household, and reduction in soil-fertility levels and crop yields in relation to the fast-growing population. Annex C5 expands on the controversy about the relationship between population growth, agricultural production, and food insecurity.

Most agencies working in the Sahel appear to agree however, that efforts to reduce chronic food and nutrition insecurity will have only temporary results if extraordinarily high population growth rates continue. One informant said 'I personally see it as one of those killer assumptions found on the right hand side of log frames, like 'no drought' (cited as an external factor that cannot

be addressed). People interviewed for this report, including organisations that promote family planning, acknowledge that little is being done to develop effective programs to support family planning and birth spacing services in the Sahel. However, the need is very great. Women are often the very ones who request family planning services to prevent unwanted pregnancies. This is true in Niger, where the total fertility rate is 7.1 children per woman. The contraceptive prevalence rate is only 6.6%.¹²⁴

A glaring weakness in the development aid approach to addressing chronic food and nutrition insecurity is the low level of support for integrated reproductive and maternal health programs. These are programs that tackle the cultural and economic constraints that make family planning a highly challenging issue. While the demand for family planning will likely increase, in line with rising numbers of women and men of reproductive age, funding for such programs has declined over the past decade, to 2.6% of total aid for health in 2009.

In Niger, CARE UK is one of the few international organisations that has gradually developed an innovative long term, rights-based model to integrate reproductive health, counselling, family planning services, and women's empowerment into economic activities (women's group savings and credit). CARE UK also explicitly seeks to change attitudes of men by raising their awareness women's rights, and encouraging improved couple communication about sexual and reproductive health.¹²⁵

The lack of attention of both government and international agencies to population issues is an enormous challenge. Increased funding and operational research is required to develop effective programs that bring about changes in cultural attitudes and practices.

For reasons too complex to explore here, the poorest households often continue to have large families as a protection against risk. Children are a form of risk insurance. In other words, rapid population growth itself may not be the causes of food insecurity, but it is the persistence of hunger and poverty that encourages high population growth. Generally, family planning policies seem to have limited success until livelihoods improve to the point that chronic hunger is no longer a threat.¹²⁶ Programs that integrate family planning, improve women's livelihoods and education, and reduce vulnerability are the path to creating incentives to limit family size. Empowering women is key.

3.6.2 Security

A major challenge is that many areas across the Sahel have become less and less accessible for aid agencies, due to increasing security incidents (i.e. in parts of Mali, Niger, Mauritania, and Chad). Aid intervention modes need to be adapted to this changing environment in order to continue intervening in these food insecure areas, in order to help those most at risk. Closing offices for security reasons in such areas seriously affects the capacity for effective operations.

3.6.3 The cyclical effects of chronic food insecurity, conflict/violence and state fragility

The shocks that accompany emergencies may often act as a precursor to political upheaval and violence, which further undermine the ability of the state to provide the necessary safety nets to break the cycle of chronic food insecurity. In several Sahelian countries, the factors of chronic food insecurity, state fragility and conflict/violence often reinforce one another.

4 Pathways to Resilience: An adapted approach to aid for the Sahel

The review since 2005 of positive changes and continuing challenges in the Sahel in overcoming chronic food and nutrition insecurity show the pathways to resilience. But what precisely is resilience and how is it relevant to a conceptual framework for overcoming the root causes of vulnerability?

Although people intuitively know that resilience has to do with resisting or coming back from harm, the term is quite abstract. It is applied in different ways. An early use of the resilience concept is within the field of ecology, where it often meant 'a return to a previous state'. More recently, in the literature on ecosystems and societies (and increasingly at the household and community levels), resilience indicates the potential of successfully adapting to changed circumstances by developing a new state. Thus, a more robust concept of resilience, when applied to social systems, includes resistance to a shock, recovery, but also an element of adaptation and transformational change.

In contrast to early warning and vulnerability, resilience is a positive concept. Early warning seeks to predict the occurrence of a crisis, and vulnerability seeks only to identify which households are least able to cope with adverse effects. The focus is on the susceptibility to harm. Resilience, on the other hand, accommodates the concept of people's positive adaptive capacity. It better facilitates analysis and prescription of action on how to address the root causes of vulnerability.

Resilience is decreased when an individual's or household's entitlements are diminished. This can occur in several ways:

- Reduction in what is owned (i.e. crops fail, livestock die).
- An adverse shift in terms of exchange (food prices increase, wages fall, asset prices fall).
- A reduction in transfer of resources (remittances, gifts, social transfers).
- As resilience declines, a progressively smaller external event can cause a crisis. Low resilience households may seem to maintain an ability to generate resources required for food security. However, a very minor shock will often cause the livelihood system to exceed a critical threshold and fall into food insecurity.

Resilience can be increased by adaptive livelihood strategies that strengthen or diversify entitlements through expansion of the range of productive assets, or by improving the terms of exchange, or by increasing the transfer of resources. To address food and nutrition security, resilience helps illuminate key issues such as how to improve access to food (i.e. purchasing power) by poorer households, how to reduce risk, and the role of transfer of resources (including humanitarian aid, social transfers) in an integrated system.

In summary, strengthening resilience requires assessing the capacity and mechanisms that vulnerable households use to adapt to the new conditions generated by a crisis, in order to maintain their food security.¹²⁷ Assessing resilience and adaptive capacity provides guidance on how to direct resources to build on existing strengths, (or open new areas of support), to prevent and mitigate shocks, and to sustain improved well being. Resilience, therefore, makes safety net programming both developmental and humanitarian.¹²⁸ This can be illustrated in Figure 11:

5 Conclusions and recommendations

5.1 Conclusions

5.1.1 Change is happening but outdated paradigms continue to influence action

Many high level decision makers in the Sahel, within CILSS, governments and some donor agencies (with a few exceptions) still consider chronic high levels of food and nutrition insecurity in the Sahel as normal and somehow acceptable. There is an implicit lack of recognition that the Sahel is in the throes of a chronic, but silent emergency. This undermines the vigorous steps needed to address it.

The conceptual framework of the relief to development continuum, which places crisis at one end and normality at the other, while changing, still dominates in the Sahel. This artificially separates the acute/temporary dimensions of food crises from the chronic structural dimensions. The tools and actions of humanitarian assistance are still heavily influenced by rapid onset types of disasters. There is progress, but changes in developing flexible, fully resourced, and integrated funding instruments to address chronic food and nutrition are inadequate. The LRRD approach of the EC is a positive step, but is still has very far to go to effectively integrate humanitarian and development assistance.

5.1.2 Early warning systems still focused mostly on food availability and fail to generate action

EWSs in the Sahel, despite major limitations and weaknesses, did sound the alarm late in 2009 in all countries reviewed. For various reasons, linked to both political factors and concerns about the reliability of the data, these alerts did not mobilise an early response. Communities themselves are not yet directly engaged in a decentralised version of the early warning system. The dominant focus of existing EWS is still on food availability, although evidence show that access is much more relevant for management. EWS have yet to fully integrate criteria to monitor the purchasing power of vulnerable households, particularly for pastoralists and urban migrants.

5.1.3 Failure to protect livelihoods and assets

The response from governments, most donors, UN agencies and NGOs in 2010, while improved, was collectively too late and inadequate to deal with the scale of the crisis. ECHO was one of the few donors who mobilised significant resources in late 2009, and ensured the large scale availability and distribution of special RUTF to support a wide-spread campaign of effective treatment of SAM. This saved tens of thousands of children's lives. However, there is no escaping the sombre conclusion that the collective humanitarian effort, by not acting earlier with greater resources, failed to prevent enormous human suffering. Many vulnerable households, men and women lost most of their productive assets, went into debt, and slipped further down into the downward spiral of chronic hunger. An enormous, long term (and expensive) aid effort was required for recovery, and to address the needs of the greater numbers of people who have become chronically food insecure. The level of preparedness for the crisis of 2009-2010 was inadequate, particularly in Chad.

5.1.4 Waiting for certainty

There is a continued major failing within the humanitarian system to develop a failsafe mechanism linking early warning with a clear, strategic response, that leads to immediate multi-actor contingency planning and the mobilisation of resources. The concern on the part of both government, the UN and many donors to 'be more certain' about the scope and depth of a looming food crisis, based on perhaps unreliable 'probable' early warning data, before taking responsibility for mobilising significant resources, is a major flaw in the system. This clearly shifts the risks and consequences of inaction on millions of the poorest people in the Sahel, who can ill afford more risk. The calculus of 'certainty' must change. A clear early warning should trigger an immediate response. Growing clarity and certainty, over time, would play a role not in deciding whether to act, but in adjusting the response, as more information becomes available. The need to get an early response mechanism working properly is one of the most urgent changes that required. Failing this, most of the investment made in recovery and longer term development efforts to strengthen livelihoods, and reduce risk will be lost when the next major shock occurs.

5.1.5 Shift to cash based programming gathering momentum, but still insufficient

Despite significant progress, cash transfers and vouchers were under-utilised. In-kind food aid deliveries, whether shipped from abroad or purchased within the region, resulted in considerable delays for the people in need, because of poor infrastructure and logistical problems. The many examples of cash transfer programming provide evidence of the potential in the Sahel to be an effective tool in responding to food crises. This method can also address the structural factors underlying poverty and vulnerability to food and nutrition insecurity. For the poorest households, regular and predictable cash transfers have been shown to play a vital role in building a long term and sustainable level of resilience to face shocks, and to escape the hunger and poverty trap. Yet, the humanitarian response, particularly the WFP and governments, relied mostly on in-kind food aid.

5.1.6 Agro-ecological agriculture the key to resilience for small scale farming in marginal areas


Agro-ecology is clearly the appropriate paradigm for small scale agricultural production in risk prone areas of the Sahel. There is extensively documented evidence in the Sahel, that agro-ecological techniques such as agro-forestry (FMNR), integration of livestock, soil and water conservation, if judiciously combined, and applied in a way that supports women, including control over productive assets, can achieving multiple benefits. These include strengthened resilience of livelihoods, sustainable increases in yields, regeneration of the natural resource base, increased income and improved household food security. Complementary techniques that also reduce risk are improved storage, dry season gardening, microcredit (for women), and provision of improved short cycle seeds.

5.1.7 Limits of agriculture to address food insecurity of poorer households

The evidence in Niger suggests that agro-ecological techniques may be limited in enabling the poorest households, (who may constitute a third of the population, depending on the context) to improve their food and nutrition security. A well designed needs assessment that takes into account significant differences in livelihoods strategies and productive assets between different socioeconomic categories of households is essential to determine to what extent agro-ecological agriculture can benefit poorer households, or if alternative, targeted support for livelihood strategies of the poorest is indicated.

5.1.8 Dual track strategies essential to support livelihoods and resilience

The HEAs across the Sahel indicate a striking and growing difference in productive assets and wealth between the poorer and better off households. This has enormous implications both for targeting during humanitarian responses and for design of DRR and livelihood promotion (development) programs, (whether through agro-ecology or other initiatives to diversify and strengthen off farm and non-farm livelihood strategies) and for strengthening overall resilience. This is shown in Figure 12:



Differential livelihood support strategies are needed to support households with lower resilience. Social protection programs will likely be needed for the most chronically food insecure households. In the absence of a much more informed analysis, and a differentiated process of supporting livelihoods, there is a high risk of benefitting the better off households only, and leaving the poorest households as chronically food insecure as before.

5.1.9 Progress in promoting DRR but challenge to mainstream nationally

Considerable progress has been made in developing DRR programming in the Sahel since 2005, most initiated by international agencies, at the community level. DFID has been a significant donor in support for DRR. The evidence suggests that DRR can generate considerable benefits enabling vulnerable households to become more resilient, diversify and protect their assets, strengthen their support networks, reinforce local coping mechanisms, and avoid the need to resort to negative coping strategies such as debt and early sale of grain to get cash. Despite these positive benefits, most vulnerable families were not yet at a point of sufficient resilience to face the 2010 crisis without external support. There had not been time to build up sufficient physical assets, knowledge, skills and networks. The conclusion is that DRR, if limited at the community level, is insufficient to reduce high levels of vulnerability. Overcoming chronic food insecurity requires strong DRR policy frameworks at a national level, coordinated across government ministries, coupled with decentralisation to district and local levels, as well as more effective partnerships between the government and civil society. Above all, DRR must help ensure early effective response at all levels to protect livelihoods and assets if there is a crisis alert.

5.1.10 Social Protection essential for overcoming chronic food insecurity

Since 2005, there is increasing interest in social protection in the Sahel. This is reflected in the existence of a number of pilot schemes involving mostly cash transfers. A growing proportion of chronically food insecure households are trapped in a downward spiral of debt and loss of assets. The existing growth oriented development policies, reflected in the national poverty reduction strategies completely by-pass them. Large scale development interventions are not 'a rising tide that lifts all boats'. Instead, the numbers of chronically food insecure households is increasing, and vulnerable to the slightest ripple. Global evidence, including data from other parts of Africa and more recently in the Sahel through small scale cash transfer pilots by NGOs during the lean season indicate that national social protection schemes have the potential to enable vulnerable households to recover from shocks, and increase resilience. In addition, it appears social protection can also promote livelihoods and reduce poverty. Without social protection, highly vulnerable households cannot escape the hunger trap. The chronic food insecurity crisis will continue.

5.1.11 RUTF to the rescue, but enormous challenges to end the crisis of child malnutrition

A brutal indicator of the chronic food insecurity crisis in the Sahel is the appallingly high levels of acute child malnutrition. Over 300,000 children die in the Sahel, every year, from malnutrition related causes. A concerted campaign, consisting of a major integrated humanitarian/development response, is essential to build on existing efforts to confront the chronic underpinnings of this nutritional crisis. It is difficult to imagine the scale of human tragedy if the use of RUTF had not become accepted and widely available after 2004. It has enabled the treatment of children with severe acute malnutrition since 2005, including 313,000 children in Niger alone in 2010, and an average of 300,000 children in Burkina, Mali, Niger and Chad every year. Operational research is finding ways to prevent and treat MAM and stunting. However, the technical knowledge of what is necessary to end child under-nutrition is already clear. What is most needed is strengthened strategic leadership, and determination, to make nutrition an inter-ministerial, high level national priority throughout the Sahel. The HEA and Cost of Diet studies show the high correlation between poverty and child malnutrition. If a campaign to end the nutrition crisis could succeed, it is likely that the chronic food insecurity would also be resolved.

5.1.12 The approach to aid in the Sahel

The aid architecture and funding mechanisms in the Sahel have improved since 2005. Despite this progress, the reforms and innovations in the aid approach in 2010 proved inadequate in preventing or mitigating the food crisis. All across the Sahel, millions of vulnerable households lost productive assets, and fell deeper into debt. The livelihoods of many have been irretrievably damaged. Recovery will be an immense challenge, requiring long term, flexible funding. But this investment, even if made, will largely be lost if a new food crisis, perhaps this time sparked by high prices, hits the Sahel before significant recovery is achieved. The overarching priority (aside from nutrition) is to dramatically increase the capacity and mechanisms for early, adequate response, for when the next crisis hits. Without this, other efforts will be wasted or ineffective, and the hunger cycle will continue.

5.1.13 Good governance and absorptive capacity for increased aid

Staff members of donor and UN agencies interviewed for this report were highly committed and informed individuals. They face major challenges, particularly in fragile states such as Chad, where major governance issues constrain the capacity of the state to absorb much higher levels of funding effectively. And yet, resolving the current food insecurity crisis in the Sahel requires major new funding for nutrition, DRR, Social Protection, Agro-ecological agriculture, food reserves, and strengthening state institutions. To meet this challenge, the donor and UN agencies themselves need additional staff and leadership capacity. This is particularly true for OCHA, which has a pivotal coordination role to play, but is understaffed within the region, and not fully present in Mali. Realistically, it will take time to negotiate changes in policies and priorities, in keeping with the Paris declaration on aid effectiveness, while ensuring a sense of ownership by government. The short term priority for donors is to ensure that credible government proposals to reduce malnutrition, mainstream DRR, or initiate social protection receive funding.

5.1.14 Market failures and price volatility

The review of the 2010 food crisis, particularly in Chad, but also in Mali and Niger indicated that cash based safety nets and food aid were not sufficient to address escalating food prices, particularly in remote areas. The lack of infrastructure, minimum purchasing power and other factors impeded markets from ensuring food is available. In Chad, national level food reserves were highly inadequate, even to meet the emergency needs. The poorest households did not have access to subsidized food. Until donors, the UN agencies, CILSS and governments in the Sahel are able to define a new, acceptable regulatory mechanism to control price volatility and address major market failures, it is difficult to envisage an end to the chronic crisis of food insecurity in the Sahel.

5.2 Six priorities for immediate action

In light of these conclusions, what are the strategic entry points or pathways to resiliency in the Sahel? While this depends on the context of each country, this study proposes the six priorities for immediate action at the national and regional levels. These priority recommendations are described in the Executive Summary, and are also presented at the bottom of the Figure 13, A conceptual framework: Pathways to Household Resilience in the Sahel.

This diagram provides a more comprehensive conceptual framework of what is required to address the structural roots of vulnerability. The focus is on the household level and on the various assets (physical, natural resources, social, financial, human) used in developing livelihoods strategies. The pathways to resilience include providing direct support through social protection measures to ensure adequate income to meet basic needs, while also providing support for DRR, the development of productive sectors such as agriculture and pastoralism for livelihood promotion, and for the poorest households, off-farm diversification of livelihoods.




Figure 13 indicates that the more diversified and greater the assets, the stronger the adaptive capacity (and resilience) of the household. This framework places 'nutrition security' at the apex of the pathways to resilience because reducing malnutrition requires positive changes in livelihoods, assets, production, income, women's access to productive resources, health services, social protection, reduction of risk, and water, sanitation and hygiene. Certainly, other indicators of resilience at the community and household level will also need to be determined, for different livelihood zones, particular for pastoral areas.

As indicated in the diagram, longer-term actions are also required to achieve resilience. Particularly to find ways to address population growth, control price volatility of food, correct market failures, support food sovereignty, and improve education. All of these initiatives have major implications for architecture of aid, funding mechanisms, institutional capacity, policies, governance, and the role of civil society.

5.3 Detailed recommendations

The root causes of food and nutrition insecurity in the Sahel are structural. The pathways to resilience require changing attitudes, and a different vision of how to effectively prioritize, allocate and use resources. This is a prerequisite for enabling poor and vulnerable households to escape from the vicious hunger cycle in which they are trapped. The experience of 2010 starkly reveals that the current dominant paradigm and aid approach is not succeeding in improving food and nutrition security.

However, a new vision is taking shape. The paths leading to resilience are becoming clear. Important changes have started, as documented in this report. All actors and their respective institutions need to take bold, decisive action. They need to provide political leadership, in order to build on, improve and apply at a larger scale what is known to work. Much of the progress made since 2005 is as a result of improved data collection and analysis, through tools such as the HEA, particularly in terms of identifying the specific needs of the poorest 25% of the most vulnerable households. This progress underlies many of the following recommendations.

Change the concept and vision of what is ‘normal’ and what is an ‘emergency crisis’ in the Sahel

1 Recognize chronically food-insecure populations and malnourished children in the Sahel as vulnerable groups needing priority political consideration at the national and international levels

Chronic food insecurity is ‘a long-term or persistent inability to meet minimum food consumption requirements’. The chronically food insecure do not die in massive numbers. They do not benefit from media attention or an outpouring of compassion. However, the chronically food insecure do not have the means or cannot engage in full scale productive livelihood activities required for resilience, without prolonged external assistance. The common conception of ‘crisis’ remains overly associated with saving lives, neglecting the chronic dimensions. This contributes to the people who are chronically food insecure continuing to suffer and remaining highly vulnerable to even greater peril when the next shock comes.

- Help all actors understand that it is no longer appropriate in the Sahel to equate humanitarian emergencies with short, sharp disasters such as drought. Instead promote the concept that a chronic food and nutrition emergency, (according to most agreed indicators of human suffering).
- Provide long-term humanitarian assistance to address the on-going livelihoods crisis while preparing for early response to scale up interventions at the first sign of a new shock, to prevent escalation of the chronic crisis into a full blown crisis.

2 Stop the tendency to use an uncritical conception of a relief-development continuum with ‘crisis’ at one end and ‘normality’ at the other. This artificially separates poverty, increasing vulnerability and chronic hunger.

When the livelihoods of the most vulnerable households repeatedly fail to regain full resilience after repeated drought, smaller and smaller shocks can quickly push them back into an acute level of humanitarian crisis. This is as a result of the cumulative impacts, as well as ongoing structural factors. This results in a vicious downward spiral into chronic food insecurity. In this context, distinguishing between acute (emergency) and chronic needs becomes artificial and counter-productive. Both need to be addressed in a coordinated way. However, the concepts and tools of humanitarian operations are still highly shaped to rapid onset disasters, and not to the needs of chronic, long term emergencies.

- Recognize that chronic food insecurity cannot be addressed with ‘quick fixes’ provided by conventional humanitarian, institutional and funding arrangements. Neither can it be addressed solely by development programs.
- Replace the concept of a linear sequential progression from relief to recovery to development with an alternative concept in which activities occur simultaneously. Working in an integrated, coherent and mutually reinforcing way, and address the specific needs of different categories of households.

Prevent, prepare and plan for crises better

3 Improve EWS at the regional CILSS and national levels

EWS in 2009-2010 succeeded in providing an alert of an impending crisis. Vulnerability analysis systems exist in some form in many countries. However, the EWS are not effective in communicating the right information, in the right way. Key improvements required to address this challenge are:

- Adapt the CHB adapted from the Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC) across the Sahel in order to harmonise the analysis and greatly improve the linkage to a quick, well defined strategic response.
- Integrate the comprehensive use of HEA to identify better targeted and tailored emergency and long-term interventions for vulnerable households in each livelihood zone.
- Integrate and prioritize indicators of purchasing power to better analyse and prevent food and nutrition insecurity of poor households.
- Adapt EWS to better assess the vulnerability to food insecurity in pastoral and for migrants in urban contexts
- Improve needs assessment and targeting (using the IPC framework).

4 Strengthen preparedness

Initiate operational contingency planning for drought and other shocks. Clear early warning signs, should lead to a rapid, well coordinated response. Areas with a high likelihood of an annual food crisis need to plan key interventions in advance. The standard is to prevent or mitigate a livelihood crisis and loss of assets through actions such as increasing reserves of cereal or fodder banks, de-stocking, and cash transfer programming.

- Strengthen preparedness for early response through multi-actor contingency planning, including communications and information management, at the national and district levels for emerging or anticipated crises (OCHA).
- Pre-position food stocks in isolated areas known to be highly vulnerable to food insecurity, where roads and markets infrastructure are poorly developed (WFP).
- Develop a humanitarian ‘surge’ capacity for large scale effective action including needs assessment, logistics, funding, communications, and coordination with other actors (OCHA).
- In the contingency planning, apply the IPC principle of using the ‘crisis as opportunity’ to redress underlying structural causes. The 2008 UN policy mandates a twin-track approach of handling immediate needs while building long-term resilience against hunger.

5 Develop unambiguous, clearly defined triggers specific to distinct livelihood systems (including pastoralism) that if reached, will cause contingency planning for early response to be launched.

A major reason for delays in responding to slow onset emergencies is the difficulty determining if and when a situation becomes a crisis. In order to initiate the contingency plan at the correct time, all stakeholders need to agree upon specific triggers.

- Undertake a process with relevant government structures, Ministries, UN agencies, NGOs and civil society actors to analyse and define specific triggers.
- Ensure information relating to the triggers is reliable and precise enough to reduce the risk of undue political influence initiating contingency planning.

Rapidly speed up, and improve humanitarian responses

6 Develop multi-stakeholder strategy of strong diplomacy and advocacy, led by UN, CILSS, other regional bodies, and donors, in case national authorities are reluctant to recognize and act upon an emergency alert.

- Ensure a transparent, multi-stakeholder process to apply the Cadre Harmonisé/IPC system and identified triggers, to prevent political influence over the statement of results and linked strategic response.

7 Develop a more diversified approach (beyond food aid), to ensure more rapid, relevant and appropriate types of support for managing chronic and seasonal food insecurity.

Despite its growing adoption, cash transfers and vouchers remain under-utilised, particularly by national agencies for preventing and managing food crises and by the WFP. Food aid remains firmly-rooted as the main response. Cash gives poor people access to food while also supporting local producers.

- Make greater use of cash transfers and vouchers when food is available in the markets. They are a cost effective and quick way to protect against malnutrition, food insecurity and vulnerability. Cash and voucher initiatives can be aligned with the medium and long-term policies and programs.
- Ensure the transfer of assets and support is targeted at individuals, families and communities to protect livelihoods before conditions become critical. Support is also needed after crises to facilitate recovery (i.e. seeds, cash, livestock, and training).

8 Improve targeting, monitoring and assessment of humanitarian assistance.

- Base humanitarian responses on detailed studies of the need, including where different households source their food. It is important to look at households in different wealth categories, rather than conducting a homogenous response for all households in a zone.
- Improve coordination and modalities of targeting and distribution during contingency planning, as well as monitoring adherence to the key SPHERE (2004) standard of protecting livelihoods and preserving productive assets (Food Security cluster).
- Systematically assess impact of interventions on livelihoods and resilience (Food Security cluster).

9 Apply the new Charter for food security developed by CILSS and the SWAC.

This revised charter which provides a code of conduct for food crisis prevention, coordination and management that shifts from food availability to a much strong livelihoods/nutrition perspective.

Strengthen resilience and incomes

10 Increase investment in agriculture to reach the 10% level of national budgets (Maputo Declaration) in alignment with the Regional Compact for the implementation of ECOWAS Agricultural Policy of 2009.

Agriculture and the rural economy are key sectors for supporting livelihoods in the Sahel. Despite improvements in 2008, the share of food and agriculture in national budgets as well as in international aid is still low.

- Increase the pace of implementation of ECOWAP and the National Agricultural Investment Programs (NAIPs) to improve the incomes of the rural population, and reduce food dependency of the ECOWAS Member States, within a perspective of food sovereignty.
- Undertake policy reforms to adjust the Common External Tariff (CET) to ensure an appropriate level of protection of agriculture at the borders.
- Target public investments in food security and agriculture, in order to fill the gaps left by the private sector. Focus investments in food security and adaptation to climate change in marginal areas where investors find few profitable opportunities, yet where most vulnerable rural households (farmers and pastoralists) are concentrated.
- Significantly increase support to the livestock sector through improved veterinary services, provision of feed supplements, management of movement of herds among countries, prevention/regulation of conflicts in the use of natural resources; and improved marketing of animal products.

11 Boost household food production and livelihoods through sustainable intensification using agro-ecological techniques and for the poorest households, through support for increasing labour income through diversification of livelihoods in off-farm work.

New public investments in agriculture emphasizing agro-ecological approaches are essential to improving food security, help vulnerable farmers adapt to climate change, and regenerate the natural resource base.

- Invest more wisely in agriculture to accomplish multiple goals, rather than focussing on maximizing production using agro-industrial techniques. These techniques require high levels of external inputs, which small-scale farmers cannot afford.
- Prioritize public investment to small-scale farmers working on marginal and degraded agricultural land.
- Adapt the implementation of agricultural support to the poorest rural households, and women farmers. Take into account the difficulties these groups face in accessing productive assets, land, credit, technical services, appropriate seeds, tools, and inputs.
- Promote agro-ecological agriculture by intensive support for farmer-to-farmer learning and exchange.
- For poorest households, promote diversification of livelihoods designed to increase income for labour for off-farm or non-farm activities.

12 Develop apply and significantly increase funding in development (not only humanitarian budgets) to support a regional DRR strategy in the Sahel.

Given the risk that climate change, repeated drought, and other hazards in the Sahel pose to long term development programs, food and nutrition security, DRR needs to be better integrated into all relevant policies and programs, in accordance with 2005 Hyogo Framework for Action. DRR activities will support countries to achieve the MDGs, while reducing the high costs of humanitarian emergency assistance.

- CILSS should bring together all relevant actors, including national governments, civil society and donors, to lead a co-ordinated, ambitious approach to disasters risk reduction, including climate change that targets the households who are most vulnerable to food and nutrition insecurity.
- Systematically integrate DRR and climate change at the core of relevant policy debates (such as agricultural policy, development strategies, public health).
- Promote awareness and political commitment to make DRR a priority at the regional, national and local levels by increasing its visibility and demonstrating its benefits.

13 Take steps to actively implement the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA)

The primary responsibility for the implementation of DRR policies and practices and the HFA lies with national governments. However, the key to increasing disaster resilience is a coordinated and coherent approach to DRR by all actors – from the community to the national level, and across all relevant ministries.

- Use the vehicle of a National Platform for DRR, engaging all relevant stakeholders, to facilitate integration of DRR into institutional frameworks for food security as well as policies and programs of all relevant sectoral, poverty reduction, rural development and national CCA agencies.
- Develop DRR capacity in all relevant ministries. Systematically include contingency planning in the development of medium to long-term programs in order to reduce the risk of a disaster and its impact.
- Better integrate DRR into development cooperation, humanitarian response and recovery programming, planning and policies.
- Ensure DRR programs are based on thorough analysis and understanding of the priority risks, including structural factors (not just droughts and pests) affecting the most vulnerable households. DRR should also build on existing coping strategies.

14 Design national policies and implement programs for social protection that meet the needs of most vulnerable people, especially those of poorer households (Governments in the Sahel and donors).

Social protection is increasingly recognised by international donors and national governments as an appropriate response to address long-term poverty and to reduce vulnerabilities of the poorest households and communities. This reflects the Livingstone Call for Action, and provisions within ECOWAP for targeted safety nets. Social protection measures can not only meet urgent humanitarian needs but play a part in strengthening resilience, by enabling the very poor to acquire assets.

- Develop test and apply national social protection strategies to support the livelihood strategies of the most vulnerable households trapped in chronic food and nutrition insecurity.
- Use short-term emergency or seasonal safety nets in rural areas to ensure household food security and prevent the sale of vital livelihood assets.

Scale-up and broaden the scope of nutrition work

15 Governments in the Sahel must seize the child malnutrition agenda, design more effective national strategies, assign top political leaders to oversee implementation and ensure that a coordinated effort across line ministries is achieved.

Child malnutrition rates far above the WHO emergency thresholds are the most urgent and visible indication of a chronic humanitarian crisis in the Sahel. Malnutrition reduction will never be achieved if it is seen solely as the job of the ministry of health. A comprehensive, multi-sectoral approach, including livelihoods, education, water hygiene and sanitation, health and social protection is required. For this reason, malnutrition rates can be an objective measure of progress not just in development, but an indicator of whether the situation of the poorest households is being improved.

- Develop advocacy initiatives to build national political momentum in the fight against hunger and malnutrition in children, in order to create an environment in which institutional change and resource mobilisation is possible.
- Address malnutrition in a more integrated manner in development programs, DRR, and social protection programs and policies.
- Undertake SMART surveys and related studies to understand the principal causes of malnutrition in different contexts, and to monitor changes in nutritional status.
- Given the need for an integrated, multi-sectoral approach to achieve impact, use the rate of acute malnutrition as a key indicator to assess programs not just in health, but also: food security, agriculture, water sanitation and hygiene, poverty reduction and good governance.

16 Prevent and treat MAM

- Give priority to treatment of MAM within public policy. Provide access to ready to use fortified foods.
- Improve quality and access to health facilities. Exempt children and women who are pregnant or breastfeeding from paying user fees.
- Promote improved practices affecting child nutrition: exclusive breastfeeding, correct weaning practices, potable water, sanitation and hygiene, micronutrient supplementation and de-worming
- Integrate prevention and risk-reduction into treatment programs, guaranteeing that so that underlying causes, including malaria and diarrhoea are addressed.
- Use appropriate social protection measures, including livelihoods protection, cash transfers to prevent income poverty-related causes of malnutrition, focused on women.

Adapt Donor Policies and Practices to the Sahel

17 International and national agencies and donors must improve the quality, speed and appropriateness of emergency aid to support vulnerable households. Preventing the significant loss of livelihood assets, is a SPHERE standard of practice, must become a reality.

- The international response to humanitarian crises should be determined by need, not influenced by level of media coverage or other factors.
- Donors should expand existing pre-allocated funding mechanisms, such as DFIDs former West Africa Humanitarian Response Fund (WAHRF) and the UN Central Emergency Response Fund- CERF, to ensure funds reach humanitarian agencies in the field quickly.
- Donors should create additional innovative financial mechanisms, such as pooled and direct channels), or 'catastrophe (CAT) bonds' or insurance contracts that provide predictable and pre-allocated funds when early warning indicators are triggered.
- OCHA to urgently advocate for donor support for a funding mechanism (such as a relatively small pooled funds developed on a national or Sahel wide basis) for early responses based on contingency plans.
- OCHA must help bridge the gap between long-term DRR and short-term emergency response through improved coordination between all stakeholders.

18 Bilateral and multilateral donors must prioritise and scale up funding for a number of linked key initiatives to address the silent humanitarian crisis of chronic food insecurity and malnutrition in the Sahel

- Ensure the adequate funding for plans by credible governments to reduce malnutrition, address chronic food insecurity, intensify food production of small scale households through agro-ecology, promote DRR, and provide appropriate forms of social protection.
- Undertake joint initiatives to make child nutrition and DRR regional and national political priorities, as well as indicators of good governance.
- The EU, as the largest donor in the Sahel, urgently needs to develop a common voice on DRR, (guided by a strategic framework and policy). The EU needs to effectively engage in political dialogue with CILSS or individual Sahelian countries, in order to promote the integration of DRR into national policies including relevant sector policies and strategies.
- The EU should scale-up funding for DRR and nutrition using the full range of funding instruments within the existing financial framework for 2007-2013, and within the context of the EU target of raising ODA to 0.56% of GNP.
- Invest in mechanisms to further expand the evidence base on strategies to tackle MAM, chronic food insecurity, and DRR.

19 Continue to reform the existing paradigm and architecture shaping aid flows in the Sahel

- Donors need to modify the current aid architecture to better address both immediate needs and the structural causes of chronic food insecurity, with flexible and predictable long-term funding. Important areas of intervention such as social protection, provision of essential services, nutrition and risk reduction, are often underfunded.
- The EU should significantly strengthen the funding, conception and operation of the LRRD policy framework. While useful, it does not adequately address chronic food insecurity and malnutrition. By seeking to create a link across the continuing divide between humanitarian relief and development, it tends to impede change (i.e. integrating funding of DRR and nutrition) into the mainstream operations of both relief and development work, including within government.
- Donors, particularly the World Bank and US-AID must recognize the need for Sahelian governments to strengthen public intervention and regulation of the food and agriculture sector as reflected in ECOWAP (i.e. food sovereignty, support of small-scale, sustainable agriculture, controlling price volatility).
- Donors must support reform of the Food Aid Convention. So that it shifts from being resource-based (i.e. driven by aid budgets and food surpluses) to being needs-based (i.e. driven by the level of humanitarian need). The focus should not be on the amount of food given, but on the number of people it needs to reach.

20 Strengthen the capacity, resources required for donor and UN agencies to work more effectively in fragile States within the Sahel to overcome chronic food and nutrition insecurity

A number of countries in the Sahel (such as Chad) are fragile states. Such countries face protracted security, governance and chronic emergency issues, which require donors and UN agencies to have strong leadership, institutional capacity, and long-term coordinated strategies for effective aid.

- Apply the 10 principles for *Good International Engagement In Fragile States & Situations* to fragile states in the Sahel such as Chad.
- Monitor the humanitarian situation across the entire country, particularly in highly vulnerable zones where there is severe chronic malnutrition.
- Ensure sufficient capacity for coverage and future intervention in neglected geographical zones by attracting qualified international and national NGOs with appropriate long-term funding.

21 Address Market Failures and Price Volatility

Safety nets and food aid are hardly sufficient to cope with increase in food prices in situations such as in 2007-2008. Measures to prevent price volatility in domestic markets, including food reserves, are critical to protect livelihoods and prevent hunger and malnutrition.

- Recognise the government obligation to take public action to realize the right to food, including appropriate regulation of markets, if food security is thereby enhanced.
- Lead efforts to establish a regional commission on food reserves, (led by CILSS, perhaps including the FAO and WFP). Its mandate is to make recommendations on a) the establishment of a coordinated regional food reserve system, and b) the suitability of increasing stocks in existing national food reserves.

- Amend international and regional agricultural trade rules to acknowledge the inherent weaknesses of the private sector in the Sahel, and to enable mechanisms for public food reserves designed for market regulation
- Assist member states to define a regulatory framework for the development of a regional system of buffer stocks or food security stocks as provided for in the Regional Compact for Implementation of ECOWAP/CAADP.
- The EU, through its facility for rapid responses to food price volatility, should consider financing the establishment of food reserves (both physical and virtual) at regional level to balance out situations where surpluses and shortages co-exist within the same region, and to act when the market fails, or a fragile state does not respond.
- Renegotiate the food aid convention, to ensure contributions towards food security reserves in the Sahel are eligible to be counted towards meeting commitments under the convention.
- Support the expansion of existing mechanisms for food security stocks at the village or local level, particularly in geographical areas prone to chronic food insecurity.

Strengthen the capacity of regional and national institutions

22 Develop a strong institutional basis for integration of DRR and nutrition across line ministries through: capacity building of state institutions at the national and decentralised levels; good governance, promotion of appropriate policies and legislation; ensuring adequate resources and technical support.

It is a fundamental rule of both humanitarian and development assistance that every intervention must have an exit strategy. This is a particular challenge in many countries of the Sahel. Supporting institutions is crucial to addressing chronic food insecurity and nutrition crisis. Local institutions at the decentralised level, in particular, are essential for sustainability but are often ignored by external actors.

- Assess institutional capacity needs in order to identify the modalities and strategies for integrating of DRR, social protection, nutrition or other priority interventions into mainstream government and community actions to enable their sustainability and effectiveness.
- Strengthening the technical, management and financial capacity at the appropriate administrative levels.

Strengthen the capacity of civil society, local NGOs, local government and communities for action at their level to reduce risk, and strengthen resilience.

23 Strengthen the capacity and resources at the local and community level for early warning, contingency planning, emergency local response, and implementation of DRR programs.

- Decentralise capacities, resources and responsibilities for early warning and response systems to the local government level.
- Build on the lessons learned in building disaster resilient communities, DRR work, community based EWS, and the commune level Observatories for Monitoring Vulnerability, and the use of HEA and SMART tools.
- Ensure a strong linkages between community based and national systems of early warning and response, including two-way communication that provides communities with relevant early warning information.

24 Support civil society organizations and associations of different marginalised groups directly affected by hunger, food insecurity and price volatility to engage in advocacy at the national, and regional levels to change policies to be more supportive of DRR, agro-ecology, livelihood support for the poorest households, and social protection.

In the absence of strong pressure by local NGOs and civil society organisations representing marginalised groups, efforts to create the political will for change, will have limited effect. Effective advocacy is required to push for faster, evidence-based action. Civil society organisations and local associations must engage in collective national and regional campaigns to eradicate hunger and malnutrition and to hold governments to account. International NGOs and donors must fund this work where needed.

- NGOs and wider civil society must increase the capacity of women's associations, pastoral associations, small-scale farmer organizations and other local organisations to engage in wider movements for change and advocacy.
- Raise awareness about the right to food, and government policies and programs for ensuring food security, in order to strengthen accountability down to the community level.
- Create systematic mechanisms for communities to provide feedback on humanitarian and development initiatives, ensuring that the voices of women and the poorest households are heard.

Annexes

Annex A Evolution of the food crisis in Niger, Chad, Mali and Burkina Faso

Annex A1 Niger

On July 31, 2009, the Prime Minister announced a « pre-alert » based on data showing that in certain zones, 85% of the arable land had not been planted, and that in other zones, cereal crops were very late in their development. In the pastoral areas, the pre-alert cited a lack of pasture, unusual patterns of migration, increases in the sale and slaughter of animals, and reduced weight of animals. The Niger government undertook some sales of subsidized grain, but little other action. However, it was clear that the Nigerien authorities were aware of the imminence of a food crisis.

In December FEWS NET, a USAID sponsored Early Warning agency, declared an alert (and once again in March 2010). In December 2009, sooner than usual, the government undertook a simplified food security vulnerability assessment. The results, published in January 2010 indicate that 58% of the population (7.8 million people) are judged to be either severely (2.7 million) or moderately vulnerable (5.5 million) to food insecurity.

In January 2010, donors like USAID/OFDA and UN agencies began to have their first meetings with the government to address the looming food crisis. It is reported that in planning, the Niger government proposed extremely low targets for a humanitarian response. Plans were made to treat only 37,000 severely malnourished children in the hunger season of 2010. This figure was far below the number considered, unfortunately as normal in Niger in an ordinary year. A similarly low figure was proposed in terms of providing feed for 10% of all pregnant animals. For a mix of reasons, the government of Niger seemed, by its actions, to deny there is an imminent food crisis, and reluctant to publicise its own data that over 7 million people were at risk.

The planning never resulted in an agreement. On the 18th of February 2010 a coup d'état ended the reign of the President Tandja and his regime. In March, the new government, in a dramatic change of policy, launched an international appeal for assistance. This was followed in early April by a UN flash Appeal.

In April, the UN requested the government to re-do the vulnerability assessment, and also undertake a nutritional survey. Completed in June 2010, the new vulnerability study revised the total number of people at risk to food insecurity downwards to 46% of the population (7.1 million people). This assessment showed high levels of vulnerability in urban areas, particularly among new migrants from the rural areas, as well as a higher rate of severe food insecurity among women. The nutritional study indicated a GAM of 16.7%. In light of these shocking nutrition results, the overall strategy is abruptly shifted from household food security to a nutrition focus.

Based on these new figures, on July 16, 2010, the UN made a renewed flash appeal. In mid July, close to the peak of the crisis, the UN revised Emergency Humanitarian Action Plan for Niger, budgeted at \$381 million, was still only 38% funded. By the end of December, it was 73% funded. In August, floods affecting over 200,000 people greatly exacerbated the food security and humanitarian crisis.

The poor rains of 2009 led to a 30% decline in cereal production in Niger compared with 2008. Forage production was 62% below requirements. In June 2009, an estimated 2.4 million Nigeriens were affected by severe food shortages, compared to 7.1 million in June 2010.

In 2010, despite a larger food deficit, food was available in many markets because a good regional food production facilitated imports, although food prices remain high, (despite a decline from their peaks in 2008.)

Annex A2 Chad

Hampered by regional instability and internal conflicts, Chad is one of the world's least developed countries. 54% of Chad's ten million inhabitants live below the poverty line of a dollar a day. When the 2009-10 drought affected the western Sahelian regions of Chad, the response was complicated by long term existence of emergency programs meeting needs of 253,479 refugees from Sudan's Darfur region, 67,709 refugees from the Central African Republic (CAR), and 168,467 displaced Chadians.¹²⁹ Many humanitarian agencies had less awareness of what was happening in other parts of Chad, particularly in the western Sahel regions.

As early as September 2009, however, FEWS NET signalled the likelihood of a major food crisis in the western Sahelian belt. A few months later, in December, FEWS NET issued a food security alert stating 'The traditional social safety net, usually activated in July, will not be sufficient to mitigate high food insecurity, which is likely to occur as early as April'.¹³⁰ From the 9th to 20th of December, the government of Chad undertook a joint mission with its technical partners (FAO/CILSS and FEWS NET)^d to identify the geographical zones and populations at risk of food insecurity. The initial findings of this pre-assessment of the 2009/10 agricultural season showed a decline in gross production of grain by 34% compared to the five-year average and a net cereal deficit of 637,000 tons.¹³¹ The Red Cross indicated yield reductions of between 45% and 60%. The assessment indicated that two million people, mostly in the country's Sahelian belt, would become food-insecure between January and September of 2010.

As noted in the assessment, the severity of the food crisis in the Sahelian regions of Chad was driven not only by a below-average 2009 cereal harvest, but also a second consecutive year of poor rains in the pastoral areas of Chad. This led to reduced pasture and water availability for animals as well as poor crop harvests. According to government field technicians, in some pastoral areas,¹³³ poor conditions the previous year led to livestock losses of approximately 30% by May/June 2009.¹³⁴

To protect their remaining livestock, pastoralists responded aggressively to the drought of 2009, starting transhumance as early as October, instead of March, moving with more animals than normal and farther south than normal. The concentrated number of livestock in the south remaining much longer than usual contributed to overgrazing. Poor conditions caused declining animal body conditions, above-normal animal mortality, reduced animal births, and poor milk availability, resulting in lower household income.

Poor and middle-income pastoralists and sedentary agro-pastoralists who were unable to migrate south with livestock were most affected by the poor local pastoral conditions and the high prices for cereals and animal feed. The forage deficit and high cost of maintaining animals led to above-normal sales of livestock holdings. This led to a dramatic drop in livestock prices, particularly for small ruminants, and unfavourable livestock-to-cereal terms of trade. In June 2010, the cereal equivalent of the average goat sold in one major district market (Am Dam) was only one quarter of the price in compared to the same period the previous year. The price of cows fell to half the level of recent years, whereas prices for millet were approximately 30% – 50% above the five-year average in most of the western Sahel zone¹³⁵. Prices of livestock declined also because exchange rates were unfavourable for traders from Nigeria.

The deterioration in the physical condition of sedentary animals remaining in the western Sahel regions became acutely severe, especially in the case of cattle. In the north of Guéra, the cadavers


^dThis assessment was financed by the European Commission, la Cooperation Française and the WFP.

of large animals could be seen all along grazing corridors¹³⁶. The FAO reported a death rate of about 31% of cattle in the western and central areas of Chad.

In addition to the increase in labour migration, there was an unusual level of migration to the city by entire households¹³⁷. Depending on the village, anywhere from 30% to 60% of destitute households left their food-short agro-pastoral villages (in northern agro-pastoral areas as well as pastoral areas) for the cities such as Mongo, N'Djaména, and Am-Timan in search of work. The labour surplus in urban areas is estimated to have cut wages by roughly 30% which dramatically weakened food security conditions in both rural and urban areas in face of persistent high prices for food¹³⁸.

Other coping strategies of very poor households wanting to buy the high-priced grain included: selling of jewellery, pots and pans, furniture, and borrowing at usurious interest rates¹³⁹. Women turned to digging for wild grain in ant hills, which became a widespread practice in affected areas.^e

Rising prices were another factor aggravating the severe food crisis in Chad. Because poor households relied on purchased foods earlier than usual, there was an abnormal rise in cereal prices that started after March 2010. In spite of selling grain at subsidized prices by the government of Chad in these areas, prices for pearl millet and sorghum on the Abéché market, the main grain market in an affected area visited by FEWS NET in May of 2010, were 58% and 61%, respectively, above the nominal five-year average.¹⁴⁰



This severe food crisis occurred in context where malnutrition rates for children under 5 have been persistent in remaining at an appalling level, even in better production years. A national study undertaken by the government of Chad on the structural factors influencing food security and vulnerability in 2009 indicated that the Sahelian strip was most affected by GAM. The levels of GAM, collected in April-June, during the peak of the hunger season, were: Batha (25.3%), Kanem (23.8%), Guéra (22.4%), Ouaddai (20.4%), and Lac (19.9%).¹⁴¹

In light of growing evidence of a crisis, on February 25th, 2010, the Chadian government, prodded by several donors, finally made a low key appeal for assistance, and authorized emergency interventions within the framework of the Action Committee for Food Security and Disaster

^e As time progressed, women's radius of exploration for ant hills increased to several kilometres from the villages, at a time of acute water shortage. A FEWS NET team interview with a local authority indicated that during the second half of April, in the north-eastern part of the Guéra region, six women who had become lost while looking for wild seeds were found dead of thirst. Source: FEWS NET (May 2010) Food Security Outlook Update p.3

Management (CASAGC) for the mobilization of food aid for distribution to close to 18% of the population facing extremely serious food shortages.

The appeal for food aid mobilized the government and its donors. However, the level of preparedness was very low. Much had to be done to assemble the required volume of aid. National food reserves were at a very low level. The government and its partners faced the task of building food reserves required for the social safety net, mainly through imports. At the end of February, only a third of its initial target level (approximately 10,000 metric tons) was available, not nearly large enough to slow the deterioration in food security conditions.¹⁴² Given logistical difficulties, subsidized sales by the government were slow to start. ONASA (National Office for Food Security) did not have logistical means or budget to transport food from storage facilities in major towns and undertake distribution in rural villages where most of the people with acute food insecurity lived.¹⁴³

The WFP undertook a Vulnerability Analysis Mapping (VAM) in March 2010 to confirm the food security areas most at risk identified in the joint assessment undertaken in December, and to assist in targeting its support (see Figure 14). WFP's emergency operations to aid some 750,000 people in the Sahelian strip encountered difficulties delivering and transporting food in a timely manner, even though half the necessary funds had been raised. Emergency needs were met by borrowing the eastern zone's pipeline for refugees and internally displaced persons, and by diverting ships with food for other destinations to Chad.¹⁴⁴ As the food crisis grew, needs assessments of food aid were adjusted upwards by the Chadian government, rising to more than 80,000 and 100,000 metric tons.¹⁴⁵

Annex A3 Mali

Parts of Mali were experiencing severe food shortages in 2008, even before the drought of 2009. In Bamba, a rural commune of about 30,000 people in the Bourem district of the Gao region of Mali, the deputy mayor said in 2008 '80% of the families can't eat twice a day. No grains are available, or very scarce, and average families cannot buy imported food'¹⁴⁶. Although the government had provided grain at low prices, many of the poorest households could still not afford to buy. The reality was that this situation was considered normal, part of everyday life in Bamba. It was not deemed a 'crisis' situation.

In the drought of 2009, the Bourem area received only half of its normal rainfall. This combined with increasing prices for imported food, created a crisis throughout the north, most acutely in Menaka, the district neighbouring with Niger. Rains in 2009 in this part of Mali were bad for a second consecutive season. Despite Mali's overall national cereal production surplus, the hunger season started early for poor and very poor pastoral and agropastoral households in these areas, who became highly food insecure starting in February 2010.

Agropastoral households suffered crop losses of up to 75% in 2009, particularly in Ansongo district, the breadbasket of the region.¹⁴⁷ Livestock, the mainstay of many people's income in northern Mali, died in great numbers. The value of individual animals plummeted as households rushed to get rid of livestock they were unable to feed. At the same time, the price of basic grains skyrocketed. In remote areas of Gao region, the cost of a 50kg bag of millet increased to up to almost 40,000 CFA (over \$100 US).¹⁴⁸ As a result, terms of trade (amount of grain for one animal) dropped by 56% from February to the end of March.¹⁴⁹

This constituted a huge shock for the very poor and poor groups of the pastoralist and agropastoralist communities of Gao region, who struggle in a normal year. They depend on the market for 70% of their food supplies. Since the wealthier households also suffered from asset depletion, this put the poorest socio-economic groups into a very difficult food security situation because they depended on richer households for employment.

This acute crisis in northern Mali was identified early. Mali's early warning system (Système d'Alerte Précoce or SAP) provided information about crisis level food insecurity for highly vulnerable population groups.¹⁵⁰ Despite this timely information about the impact of poor rains on grazing lands and water availability, particularly in the northern pastoral regions of Gao, Kidal, and Timbuktu, the early warning did not generate swift and effective action by the government or the international community.¹⁵¹

For a number of political reasons, Mali was reluctant to recognise the crisis. It did not launch an appeal for the northern regions.¹⁵² The final assessment by the Malian government of the food situation was perceived as flawed by NGOs because of highly improbable production numbers. The governor of the region informed NGOs that the Malian government did not want to declare a food crisis in Northern Mali particularly in Gao region because it had sufficient capacity to respond to communes identified to be in food difficulties.¹⁵³

The lack of a declaration of an emergency led to significant delays in food aid. There were also major gaps in coordination and response in the pastoral areas. In Gao, because of the security situation, there were only a handful INGOs, CICR, the WFP and decentralised state services working in the region.¹⁵⁴ Oxfam^f, ACF, Catholic Relief Services and Save the Children US all undertook emergency assistance programs with the onset of the crisis.

The Malian government eventually did launch a response to help the populations in the north. For example the Gao region received 5,078 tons of millet and sorghum for subsidised distributions. However, this was not easily accessible by the very poor and poor who were barely able to afford the cost to go to the sale areas, much less buy the grain. Overall, the message sent by the Malian government to humanitarian agencies and the media did not create a sense of alarm. Although 258,000 people were estimated to be affected by food insecurity¹⁵⁵, the donors did not respond quickly or on an adequate scale. Most donors, while aware of the situation, followed the government line.

This created a situation in which on one side of the border, the government of Niger and its partners were undertaking a full scale humanitarian effort, while just a few kilometres away, in Mali, where highly vulnerable pastoralists and agro-pastoralist communities faced the same severe livelihood problems, there was only a limited response. Significantly, in April of 2010, at the CILSS regional meeting held in Lomé, CILSS rejected Mali's data for the food security situation. This gives further credence to the perspective that political factors influenced decision making about addressing needs that were clearly reflected in the technical data.

According to OCHA, the emergency appeal for 2010 for Mali consisted of \$6,120,037. Of this, 68% or \$4,182,493 was eventually contributed. WFP and UNICEF used most of this for food aid and nutrition interventions, although some funds were also used for animal feed, seeds, and destocking sick animals. ECHO would have liked to scale-up their aid projects in northern Mali in the context of their Sahel Plan, but had difficulties due to limited number of effective partners in the north. In contrast, in Niger, the humanitarian assistance in the same general area was far larger and included much greater support for animal feed, and the protection of livelihoods.

ACF estimated that towards the end of 2010, 40% of households in the river valley in Ansongo, in Gao region, were in debt and had no means to pay back creditors.¹⁵⁶ However, in 2011, there was no official appeal for aid to assist the most vulnerable groups in the north with longer term recovery, rebuilding livelihoods, and strengthening long term resiliency.

Annex A4 Burkina Faso

A FEWS NET report in April 2010 indicated that all parts of Burkina Faso are generally food-secure,


^f Most NGO international staff relocated in November 2009 and for except Oxfam-GB, local capacity was not in place

with the exception of the eastern agro-pastoral and northern pastoral areas (livelihood areas seven and eight respectively in Figure 15). Poor temporal distribution of rainfall in these areas created significant shortfalls in crop and pasture production. The FEWS NET report stated that poor and very poor households in these areas were at risk for food insecurity between April and September.

In livelihood zone eight, predominantly pastoral, pasture production was down by roughly 40% from the previous year, and 20% below-normal. Related problems faced by households were the drying up of most small and medium-size surface water sources, the high price of millet, and the high price of animal feed. The physical condition of livestock deteriorated sharply. Milk production was reduced by an estimated 30% to 40%. With 10% to 15% of the income earned by poor and very poor households in an average year paid in the form of milk, the smaller quantities of milk received as payment for tending the animals of average and wealthy households was a serious reduction of income. Sales of (small) animals by certain poor and very poor households began in March and had already started to include female and, in some cases, pregnant female animals. Poor households started to cut back their number of daily meals and the quantity of food prepared.

For the agro-pastoralists in livelihood zone seven, crop production shortfalls and problems obtaining forage and water for their animals, led many households to sell more animals than usual as a coping mechanism. The poor physical condition of the livestock and increased market supply drove prices down further than usual, while grain prices remained high. As a result, terms of trade for small animals in kilograms of grain were below normal.

In both livelihood zones, poor and very poor households normally rely on the market for the purchasing of 50% to 70% of their food between February and August. Normal sources of income for such households at this time of year include gold washing, the selling of wood, labour



migration/migrant remittances, and the selling of chickens and small animals.

In March 2010, several months earlier than usual, the Burkina government took emergency measures setting up a safety net program mostly in its northern and eastern agro-pastoral areas. This consisted of selling locally grown grain at subsidized prices, support for off-season farming, and speeding up efforts to reconstitute the food security reserves administered by the National Society of Food Security Stocks (SONAGESS). The budget for these measures was 16 billion CFA

francs. Prices in Burkina during this time remained stable, but above the five-year average and higher from the same period in 2009.¹⁵⁷

FEWS NET predicted that vulnerable households would not be unable to meet their food needs unless the scale of the humanitarian assistance was increased. However, aside the activities by the WFP and local NGOs, the Burkina government did not undertake any large-scale programs (beyond the sale of subsidised grain and provision of feed for livestock). A spike in animal sales, emergency slaughtering and higher than usual animal mortality rates (particularly for cattle and sheep) occurred in May and July. FEWS NET estimated that 5% to 10% of sedentary animals (the equivalent of two to 5% of the national herd) was lost, representing a significant loss of assets for the households in the Sahel zones.¹⁵⁸ According to FEWS NET, the effort to reduce mortality of animals 'seems to be less taken into account in regard to the low level of resources allocated by the state'.¹⁵⁹

Annex B Improved methods for analysis of food and nutrition insecurity

Annex B1 Relevance of Household Economy Analysis in the Sahel

HEA were originally developed within SCUUK in the mid-1990s in response to the need to improve early warning and the geographical targeting of emergency aid. Although the focus since shifted, HEA still offers a strong, livelihoods-based approach to judging which people are vulnerable in what degree to shocks - especially to the long-onset event of drought. From 1995 to 2005, the HEA method was applied progressively in south Sudan, Somalia, Malawi and Ethiopia. In 2000, FEWS NET integrated HEA into its basic methodology for assessing vulnerability.

In the Sahel, however, HEA was introduced only in 2007. Over 19 HEA studies have been undertaken. The objectives for these HEA surveys included:

- To obtain detailed information on the household economy of the selected zones, in order to get baseline information on food security, and to understand the key elements of risk for different population groups as a contribution to early warning systems.
- Contribute to the development of a poverty reduction strategy and to inform the policy debate at national level
- Explore local opportunities and constraints, notably for the most vulnerable households.
- Analyse the essential needs of vulnerable households, including the risks they are exposed to.

The relevance of the HEA studies to design better programs of humanitarian and development assistance in the Sahel has been strongly articulated by Jan Eijkenaar, ECHO's Adviser for the Sahel region of West Africa:

Quote

'The 2005 food crisis in Niger came as a surprise to many. Warning signs were often incomplete and given late, full of contradictions. The classic food security beliefs that dominated the information missed the point that rural livelihoods have been changing. This important study [on HEA] will help all concerned understand who is most at risk of food insecurity and malnutrition in Niger today, and why. It will help decision-makers to avoid a repeat of what happened in 2005, and to respond faster and more effectively in times of crisis.'

Source: Jan Eijkenaar, ECHO's Adviser for the Sahel region of West Africa


The HEA is relevant to assessing food security because it offers a more detailed understanding of the household economy and livelihoods. Its analytical framework¹⁶⁰ is based on three pillars:¹⁶¹

- Where and how households obtain their food.
- The sources and amounts of household cash income.
- The proportion of household expenditure on different items.

This wider base of economic analysis is also relevant to issues beyond food security. HEA offers a clear picture of the scope, constraints and internal differentials of poverty as well as the detail of the many different things poorer people must do to survive. HEA does not just look at the livelihoods of poorer households in different agro-ecological zones. It also assesses the livelihoods of wealthier households (those classed as 'middle-income' or 'better-off'), because it is often impossible to understand what makes poor households poor without understanding what makes wealthier households wealthy. HEA provides a disaggregated analysis of the different socio-economic groups, as well as a complete image of the social and economic interactions, often quite strong, between wealthier and poorer households.

It is important to note that HEA identifies groups by wealth, not by vulnerability. The analysis of vulnerability is often considered more relevant for disasters. However, Julius Holt notes that this 'does not fit comfortably with the main intention behind the present HEA surveys' which is to contribute to a post crisis, long term hunger reduction strategy for SCUK. Holt goes on to question the usefulness of weighted indicators in many vulnerability assessments, which he describes as a disappointingly 'black box' approach, lacking a proper explanatory or analytical model. While recognizing that the vulnerability concept has become fundamental to livelihood analysis in the Sahel, Holt notes its drawbacks and suggests a poverty analysis of the HEA offers better insight for developing long term development strategies.¹⁶²

FIGURE 16
Sources and amounts of cash income for typical households



Source: Holt, J et al (2009). Understanding Household Economy in Rural Niger SCUK p.31

The HEA has helped shift the focus from food availability (and food aid), towards household access, through livelihoods analysis. HEA data has a direct bearing on the short term, seasonal concerns, particularly for EWSs. The HEA provides insights in judging how shocks such as a harvest failure, or an increase in food prices, may affect a given population: what will be the difference in response and resilience between poorer and wealthier people? How many are in either group? How many people may need assistance? What type of support would best support livelihoods of the poorest households? Current vulnerability assessments and other data instruments used by EWS do not provide adequate answers to these questions.

One of the main insights generated by HEA is the great gap in assets between richer and poorer households, as indicated in Figure 16. Because of the accumulation of productive assets, wealthier families are already very resilient to shocks, and indeed, may benefit from crises when poor households are obliged to turn to them for loans. Local mechanisms of social solidarity between the rich and poor do exist, particularly in pastoral areas, but are relatively limited, and not adequate to prevent major asset loss.

Poorer households depend on the market for food. As a result, external events which affect food prices can have a greater negative impact on their food security than localised food deficits caused by poor rains. Because poor households already produce so little of their own food, a poor local harvest does not generally produce a major food crisis. Understanding the characteristics of the labour market, migration, and the dynamics of market prices are much more fundamental to assessing the food security situation of the poorest households¹⁶³. A very useful tool is Emergency Market Mapping Analysis (EMMA): http://emma-toolkit.info/?page_id=380, produces a relevant analysis for understanding how a crisis has interrupted/ disturbed a key market commodity or service, e.g. local labor or rice, if the target population depends a lot on daily wage labor.

HEA highlights important differences within the poorer half of the population. The poor households are shown to have a stake in primary production, both crop cultivation and their own livestock, where the very poor hardly have any stakes in production. Government and agencies still have a tendency to assume that the solution to food insecurity must be in increasing people's food production for direct consumption.

As noted by Julius Holt, a major proponent of HEA, the growing necessity of cash earnings for poorer households in the Sahel to access sufficient food means that there is little difference between food security analysis and overall livelihoods security analysis. Unfortunately, HEA is not yet used by the majority of the practitioners, and is mostly limited to SC-UK and Oxfam. It requires an advanced training. Most formal training in food security in the Sahel or even Europe does not include a proper Household Economy Analysis.¹⁶⁴

Annex B2 The rational and potential benefits of IPC in the Sahel

IPC is a global effort to develop a common approach for food security analysis and response. This initiative is led by a seven-agency multi-agency partnership.¹⁶⁵ The IPC development has been financially supported by several programs and donors including the EC/FAO Food Security Information for Action Program, ECHO, CIDA and DFID. The IPC project is a 'work in progress' in many countries and is under constant review and development.

The second phase of IPC was evaluated in early 2011.¹⁶⁶ This indicated that most of the outcome indicators were trailing indicators with little predictive power. Indicators for determining current phase (the outcome indicators) and for early warning (the process indicators) were mixed together but typically related to two separate timeframes (e.g. malnutrition indicates the consequence of a past hazard/livelihood interaction; crop production is a potential hazard that will lead to a future consequence). Version 2.0 of IPC is due to be released for testing with significant improvements.

These include separating the analysis of current food security phase from early warning of future phase by providing an additional analysis template for early warning. Version 2.0 will also split the acute and chronic food insecurity situation analysis and classification and demonstrate how they are linked.¹⁶⁷

The Livelihood Zone is the IPC's core unit for spatial analysis. An analysis of each zone provides an understanding of how people within a given livelihood system typically source their food, income and what their expenditure patterns and coping strategies are. The HEA is especially pertinent for this analysis within the IPC.

IPC uses 5 phases that links food security levels to a strategic humanitarian response:

1. Generally food secure.
2. Chronically food insecure.
3. Acute Food and livelihood crisis.
4. Humanitarian Emergency.
5. Famine/ Humanitarian catastrophe.

Each phase is based upon a wide range of indicators of the impact of an event on human health and welfare. These include: crude mortality rate, acute malnutrition, stunting, food access/availability, dietary diversity, water availability/access, destitution/displacement, civil security, coping strategies, livelihood assets, structural factors. These are cited as current or imminent outcomes on live and livelihoods, which directly measure the impact of a hazard event. For each outcome, cut-offs are proposed to define the phase.

The IPC also presents, for each phase category, a specific set of strategic responses to mitigate immediate outcomes, support livelihoods and address underlying causes. Phases one and two of the IPC reference table presented in Figure 17 for illustration.¹⁶⁸

FIGURE 17

Integrated food security and Humanitarian phase classification reference table

Phase classification		Key reference outcomes (current or imminent outcomes on lives and livelihoods, based on convergence of evidence)	Strategic response framework (mitigate immediate outcomes, support livelihoods, and address underlying/structural causes)
1	Generally food secure	<p>Crude mortality rate: <0.5/10,000/day</p> <p>Acute malnutrition: <3% (w/h <-2 z-scores)</p> <p>Stunting: <20% (h/age <-2 z-scores)</p> <p>Food access/availability: usually adequate (>2,100 kcal ppp day), stable</p> <p>Dietary diversity: consistent quality and quantity of diversity</p> <p>Water access/availability: usually adequate (>15 litres ppp day), stable</p> <p>Hazards: moderate to low probability and vulnerability</p> <p>Civil security: prevailing and structural peace</p> <p>Livelihoods assets: generally sustainable utilisation (of 5 capitals)</p>	<p>Strategic assistance to pockets of food insecure groups.</p> <p>Investment in food and economic production systems</p> <p>Enable development of livelihood systems based on principles of sustainability, justice and equity.</p> <p>Prevent emergence of structural hindrances to food security</p> <p>Advocacy</p>
2	Chronically food insecure	<p>Crude mortality rate: <0.5/10,000/day; U5MR<1/10,000/day</p> <p>Acute malnutrition: >3% but <10% (w/h <-2 z-scores), usual range, stable</p> <p>Stunting: >20% (w/age <-2 z-scores)</p> <p>Food access/availability: borderline adequate (2,100 kcal ppp day), unstable</p> <p>Dietary diversity: chronic dietary diversity deficit</p> <p>Water access/availability: borderline adequate (15 litres ppp day), unstable</p> <p>Hazards: recurrent, with high livelihood vulnerability</p> <p>Civil security: unstable, disruptive tension</p> <p>Coping: 'insurance strategies'</p> <p>Livelihoods assets: stressed and unsustainable utilisation (of 5 capitals)</p> <p>Structural: pronounced underlying hindrances to food security</p>	<p>Design and implement strategies to increase stability, resistance and resilience of livelihood systems, thus reducing risk.</p> <p>Provision of 'safety nets' to high risk groups.</p> <p>Interventions for optimal and sustainable use of livelihood assets.</p> <p>Create contingency plan.</p> <p>Redress structural hindrances to food security.</p> <p>Close monitoring of relevant outcome and process indicators.</p> <p>Advocacy.</p>

The two main elements of the IPC consist of a situation analysis and a response analysis:

Situation analysis is a critical yet often overlooked stage of the food security analysis response continuum. Situational analysis is the basis for identifying fundamental aspects of a situation (severity, causes, magnitude, etc.). Ideally, the analysis is backed by a broad-based consensus among key stakeholders including governments, UN and NGO agencies, donors, the media and target communities

Response analysis explicitly links situation analysis to the design of appropriate strategic food security interventions that address both immediate needs, and a medium and longer term response. The response analysis seeks to meet three objectives: Mitigate immediate outcomes, support livelihoods and address underlying and structural causes of food insecurity.

The response framework embraces the twin track approach of broader based, long term efforts to promote resilience while also providing direct access to food for the most needy. In Phase 3, Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis, IPC explicitly proposes to use 'crisis as opportunity' to redress underlying structural causes, and undertake advocacy.

In the Sahel, according to the IPC World Map, only a few countries have entered into the introduction stage. These are countries where significant awareness raising as well as institutional set-up activities are being led, but without yet subsequent adoption of the IPC process. Although progress is slow, the adaptation of IPC to the Sahel started after 2007.

The proponents of the IPC framework believe that its effective application has significant potential benefits for the prevention and management of food and other types of crises in the Sahel, as the box below outlines:

Definition: What are its potential benefits of IPC for the Sahel?

Linking analysis to Strategic Response: The IPC supports more effective response strategies by linking information with a strategic response framework. The IPC not only references criteria for defining the severity of a given crisis, but also explicitly links a statement to appropriate responses for addressing both immediate priorities and medium to longer term requirements. This allows for a consideration of what responses are most appropriate and feasible in different scenarios in the light of, for example, local capacity and ongoing interventions. The response options are a departure from deficit driven modes of assessment, where 'humanitarian needs' are seen as deficits requiring immediate goods and services, which may potentially undermine the resilience of the food economy.

A clearer definition of a crisis and a common currency for reporting which has many advantages:

- Makes meaningful comparisons possible between countries and over time. The same phase should always mean the same severity of crisis.
- Facilitates technical consensus between analysts, implementing agencies and donors.
- Harmonises the way a crisis situation is classified which generates consistency not only in the form of response, but also the source and scale of funding, the planning timeframe and the organisational roles of different stakeholders.
- Promotes accountability among implementing agencies, which must then show that their responses are appropriate given the prevailing phase.

The explicit inclusion of an 'acute food and livelihoods crisis' phase. At this level the problem may not be one of acute hunger, but one of livelihoods crisis characterised by the unsustainable use of local livelihoods assets and unacceptable coping strategies. The aim of having such a definition of this phase will encourage earlier intervention to protect livelihoods and not just lives.

A more rigorous and transparent analysis process, making clear the evidence upon which the analysis is based. This makes analysts more accountable for their conclusions. The quality of individual data sources is evaluated and reflected in an overall level of confidence in the analysis.

Improved early warning, resulting from a combination of the strengths outlined above. The framework promotes timely and meaningful analysis to ensure that early warning information influences decision making and does not go unheeded. Hazard and vulnerability are accounted for and incorporated into risk statements. Three levels of risk are operationalised i.e. alert, moderate and high.

Adds value to existing information systems, by promoting better use of available data and analysis. The IPC is methodologically neutral, i.e. it does not specify the methods that should be used to analyse data. Rather it seeks to establish minimum standards for the analytical process and for the reporting of results.

A collaborative analysis. The IPC has been successful in bringing together analysts from different sectors (food security, nutrition, health, etc.) and getting them to integrate their data to reach shared conclusions about the situation and the priorities for action. It provides a common platform for discussion among analysts with diverse expertise and agency backgrounds.

Better communication of results, through standard mapping protocols to illustrate severity and population tables to provide information on magnitude of the problem.

Sources:

FAO (June 2006) Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC) Framework Policy Brief Issue 3.
RHVP (May 2007) The Integrated Food Security and Phase Classification (IPC): A review version 1

Achieving these potential benefits, however, still require donors, national governments, international agencies to overcome significant political and institutional issues.

Annex B3 What is SMART and why is it relevant to the Sahel?

SMART provides the basis for understanding the magnitude and severity of a humanitarian crisis through a basic, integrated method for assessing nutritional status and mortality rate. It draws from core elements of several existing methods and current best practices to assess Crude Death Rate (CDR) and Nutritional Status of Children Under-Five. These are the most vital, basic public health indicators of the severity of a humanitarian crisis. They monitor the extent to which the relief system is meeting the needs of the population and the overall impact and performance of the humanitarian response.

An optional food security component, which uses a simplified version of HEA, provides the context for nutrition and mortality data analysis. The Household Economy Approach (Livelihood Method) has worked well in predicting quantitatively how an event, such as crop failure or price change, is likely to affect people's ability to get food. It gives an estimate of who will be affected, how severely they will be affected, and when they will be affected. Other methods do not give this quality of information.¹⁶⁹

The SMART Methodology Version 1, with a Windows-based analytical software program and standardized reporting format, was developed and pilot-tested by partners in the Sahel¹⁷⁰:

- Chad (Action Against Hunger USA – nutrition/mortality/software)
- Mali (Action Against Hunger Spain – nutrition/mortality/software)
- Niger (Action Against Hunger Spain – nutrition/mortality/software)

What is SMART and why is it relevant?

Why is SMART needed?

- The use of various methodologies and measures for determining nutritional status, mortality rates and food security does not enable comparisons or coherent understanding of needs.
- Poor quality data is often used for making decisions or reporting.
- Implementing partners and host countries lack technical capacity to collect reliable data.

- The lack of comprehensive technical support does not facilitate the strategic and sustained capacity building needed at all levels to ensure quick access to reliable, standardized data.
- SMART addresses the question: how do we accurately determine needs or report on performance with various methodologies and unreliable data?

What does SMART seek to provide?

- A standardized methodology for assessing needs that will provide comparable data between countries and emergencies to prioritize resource allocations.
- Technical support to build capacity for real time, standardized and reliable data for decision making. This will facilitate timely, appropriate assistance to those in need.
- Reliable data for performance and results reporting, and trend analysis of humanitarian situations using mortality rate and nutritional status. This will improve understanding of the effects of our assistance.
- A basis to institutionalize evidence-based policy making and reporting on humanitarian crises.

Source: SMART: (April 2006) Measuring Mortality, Nutritional Status, and Food Security in Crisis Situations: SMART METHODOLOGY Version 1

Annex B4 Cost of Diet data from Niger


The Cost of the Diet is a method developed to calculate the minimum amount of money a family will have to spend to meet their energy, protein, fat and micronutrient requirements using locally available foods¹⁷¹.

This is an innovative tool that can:

- Calculate the minimum cost of a diet for an individual child and the whole family.
- Take into account seasonal variations in food price and availability when costing the diet.
- Provide region-specific data on dietary costs and food availability.

Study by Save the Children: Conclusions of “Cost of the Diet” study in Niger

- Local availability of food in Tessaoua district does allow the consumption of a healthy diet at all times of the year – if people can afford it. A balanced diet is possible using foods available locally.
- In Tessaoua district, two-thirds of all households – representing about half of the population – cannot afford a balanced diet, even when sufficient food is available locally. This is one of the main reasons why more than half of all children in these two livelihood zones are chronically malnourished. The situation is particularly extreme in the south-central zone, where the poorest households’ total income (cash + in kind) would need to at least double to enable them to afford a healthy diet.
- Access to free milk through livestock ownership significantly contributes to a healthy diet and reduces the risk of child malnutrition.




Source: Holt, J et al (2009). Understanding the Household Economy in Rural Niger. Save the Children UK. p95

Annex B5 Model of causal pathways leading to under-nutrition in the Sahel

There are many causes of malnutrition in the Sahel which can be disaggregated into immediate, underlying and basic as shown in Figure 18. Immediate causes include inadequate sanitation, poor public health and hygiene, and poor childcare practices, such as delaying breastfeeding, the early introduction of water and semi-solid foods, weaning with a nutritionally poor millet-based gruel, and lack of health services. These factors affect children from better-off families as well as the poorest families. However, underlying causes are more directly related to income poverty. There is much data indicating that malnutrition is not evenly spread across all wealth groups. Data from the *Survey on the Causes of Malnutrition, North Tessaoua*, where Save the Children ran community therapeutic care (CTC) programs, highlighted that 85% of children admitted to treatment centres were from poor or very poor households. 50% were from the very poor households. Income of households most affected by malnutrition was much lower than in the control group where there was no malnutrition.¹⁷²

While the perspectives and priorities may vary across agencies, in light of such findings, there is a growing consensus that no one agency (i.e. the Ministry of Health) can succeed in preventing and treating MAM. Some agencies have focused their efforts on treatment only. They have been testing and evaluating supplementary versions of RUTF.¹⁷³



In Mali, UNICEF and aid agencies are examining the efficacy of several products and strategies in randomized, community-based studies. One product being evaluated in Mali is CSB++, a more nutrient-rich version of the corn-soya blend long used by WFP for children with moderate acute malnutrition. The Mali study, supported also by the University of Bamako and University of California-Davis, and funded by Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), is also evaluating Supplementary Plumpy (a nutrient-rich peanut paste), Misola and local foods plus a nutrient powder.¹⁷⁴

However, some donors are also starting to recognize that progress for managing, and especially preventing MAM requires a strategic approach that addresses a combination of the immediate causes (i.e. disease and inadequate diet), the underlying causes (i.e. poor access to potable water, and health care services), and the basic causes related to livelihoods/ resilience affected by wider forces such as prices of food, population, trade. It follows that raising the political priority of addressing under-nutrition is essential for changes across many sectors.

This growing vision of an integrated and coordinated inter-agency approach has, in practice, been a challenge to operationalise in the Sahel. There has been some progress in integrating nutrition indicators into early warning systems, ending health user fees, and revising national level policies and structures for nutrition, but there is much more to be achieved. Many international NGOs, (including CONCERN Worldwide, ACF¹⁷⁵ and SCUK) are undertaking vigorous advocacy for this vision, and finding ways to enable better inter-sectoral work in their own programs. However, there is still much more to be done to bridge the divide, in principles and objectives between humanitarian and development action.

Annex B6 Analysis of competing models for agricultural development in the Sahel

Governments in the Sahel have all signed the Maputo accord which commits them to significantly increase their investments in agriculture. For example, Niger is in the process of implementing the CAADP agenda and the Common Agricultural Policy of ECOWAS, which increases investment in agricultural development to 10% of the national budget, as a way to increase overall economic growth to 6% a year. The aim is to eliminate hunger and reduce poverty. This is taking place in the context of Niger's Rural Development Strategy and its National program for agricultural investment which is under development.

There is still controversy, however, about the model of agricultural development to follow for this increased aid and investment in agriculture.

In the Sahel, economic restructuring and liberalization in the 1980s drastically decreased government support for small scale agriculture, and reoriented limited investments to export commodities in favourable production areas. Many analysts and even the World Bank's own Independent Evaluation Group, now link the growing food crisis in the Sahel partially to the dismantling of government controls and support mechanisms for small scale farmers.¹⁷⁶

Despite the lessons learned from the impact of these policies, through its current lending and investments in the Sahel, the World Bank continues to give priority to larger scale, commercial, export-oriented agriculture,¹⁷⁷ for example, large scale irrigation schemes. The influential proponents of Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA)¹⁷⁸ are also funding a conventional, high external input model for improving agriculture, based mostly on increased fertiliser use, high tech seeds, and use of pesticides in highly favoured agricultural areas.

The vision of the World Bank, and implicitly of AGRA, for small-scale agriculture in the Sahel is reflected in an early draft the *World Development Report on Agriculture* (2008): '...the priority is to secure [economic] growth through a focus on the favourable regions and the most entrepreneurial

smallholders, and spread the benefits via employment generation and lower food prices' and that 'those with poor assets or remoteness...cannot connect to the growth process [through farming their land]'.¹⁷⁹ The World Bank paradigm for African agriculture implicitly favours larger scale contract and corporate farming. One manifestation of this is the large scale 'land grabbing' by foreign governments of productive agricultural land, as has occurred in Mali. One advocate of this approach has bluntly suggested to critics of this approach to stop romanticising peasant agriculture, because it is largely non competitive.¹⁸⁰

Another equally direct expression of this paradigm is the 2009 policy document of the British government which calls for a necessary adjustment of small-farmers: 'if the agricultural sector doesn't adjust, and if marginal farmers do not leave the agricultural sector sufficiently quickly then it is more difficult for more successful farmers to expand and for new entrants to get into farming'.¹⁸¹

Small holder farmers, who often live on less than \$1 or \$2 per day, cannot afford industrial inputs like hybrid or genetically engineered seeds, fertilizer, pesticides, or irrigation. Because of much higher risks, and declining soil fertility, distance from markets, small scale farmers in more marginal areas are largely seen as incapable of improving production. If a food crisis occurs, the neo-liberal paradigm solution is to provide occasional emergency food aid until they earn a sufficient income from off-farm economic activities or employment on more successful small farms or large commercial farming enterprises, or in towns and cities.¹⁸²

What the 2009-10 food crisis in the Sahel made very clear however, is that the number of people in the rural areas affected by severe food insecurity are far too large (almost half the population in the case of Niger) to be supported indefinitely through imperfect safety net interventions. Each new crisis increases the number of poor rural households pushed deeper into chronic poverty. Only a very few could realistically obtain employment from agricultural growth in high-potential areas.¹⁸³ Massive migration to other countries such as Nigeria or Libya is the alternative. This coping mechanism generates substantial remittances, but rural migrants with low literacy levels and limited skills, have very few opportunities.

Agro-ecology is an alternative, people centred multi-functional model for agricultural development. The proponents of agro-ecological agriculture¹⁸⁴ advocate it as a way to empower vulnerable small-scale farmers, offering them both greater control over their lives and an accessible means of improving their food security, while decreasing their risk of crop failure or livestock death due to climate shocks. Agro-ecological practices can help build resilient farms¹⁸⁵ that improve livelihoods, and achieving multiple benefits at once: increase productivity, reduce rural poverty, improve food security; adapt to a changing climate, and contribute to improved nutrition. Achieving farm resilience for sustainable food production, while also regenerating the natural resource base, requires enabling small scale farmers to develop their skills, expertise and voice, while supporting their use of agro-ecological farming practices.

Study Results: Scientific evidence supporting the agro-ecological agriculture model

'Today's scientific evidence demonstrates that agro-ecological methods outperform the use of chemical fertilizers in boosting food production where the hungry live -- especially in unfavourable environments... Recent projects conducted in 20 African countries demonstrated a doubling of crop yields over a period of 3-10 years... We won't solve hunger and stop climate change with industrial farming on large plantations. The solution lies in supporting small-scale farmers' knowledge and experimentation, and in raising incomes of smallholders so as to contribute to rural development...If key stakeholders support the measures identified in the report, we can see a doubling of food production within 5 to 10 years in some regions where the hungry live'. The Report recognizes that 'Food availability is, first and foremost, an issue at the household level, and hunger today is mostly attributable not to stocks that are too low or to global supplies unable to meet demand, but to poverty; increasing the incomes of the poorest is the best way to combat it.'

Source: de Schutter, Olivier (Dec 2010) Report submitted by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food.

International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), concluded that improving access of the rural low-income groups, namely landless labourers and smallholders, to food, land, water, seeds and improved technologies was essential to ensuring sustainable food security. The report also found that investments in agricultural knowledge, science and technology were needed to maintain productivity in ways that protect the natural resource base and ecological provisioning of agricultural systems. These two conclusions both point towards the need for increased investment in small-scale agriculture, small-scale irrigation, food processing and other strategies that empower poor subsistence farmers and encourage environmental stewardship.

Source: (IAASTD, 2009)

Proponents of agro-ecological agriculture also note the potential benefits for improving nutrition. For example, in Niger, World Vision Australia highlights the great potential for the seeds of Australian acacia and leaves of moringa trees to transform agricultural systems, build resilience and combat child malnutrition.¹⁸⁶ Research is being conducted on how to improve the nutrition in local diets at the village level by consumption of leaves or seeds of locally produced, drought resistant tree crops, and also by sale nutritional supplement products.¹⁸⁷ Here as well, if the aim is to reduce acute malnutrition, it would also be important to monitor if the poorest 30% of the households, where the risk is greatest, either adopt these new tree growing and nutritional practices or would have the purchasing power to buy the nutritional supplement packets.


Agro-ecology is clearly an appropriate model for agricultural production in Niger and for the Sahel because of its proven record in increasing farm production among small holder farmers while regenerating the natural resource base. However, more analysis is required to determine if agro-ecology can generate significant benefits, particularly in terms of income and production, for the poorest and most vulnerable households, and its role in preventing a future food crisis.

Analysis of HEA in Maradi region of Niger (as shown in Figure 5), indicates that the poorest rural households are able to produce only about 17% of their food needs from their own production. So even if agro-ecology enabled them to more than double their food production for their own consumption, they would still have to purchase at least 40% of their food from the market, from labour earnings. This implies that other measures are required by governments and international development agencies to increase purchasing power of poorer households, and reduce their exposure to volatile market prices in the lean season.

According to Julius Holt, and Sonya LeJeune (consultants to Save the Children who analysed the HEA data in Maradi), the focus on food self sufficiency through agricultural production as the main approach to reduce vulnerability needs to be challenged. On the basis of current average land-holdings of the very poor, which are less than 1 hectare in Maradi, and which are likely to reduce per capita in the medium term with continued population growth, they argue that no investment in agriculture is likely to help the poorest households become self-sufficient in food.

The magnitude of the gap between better off and poorer households in Maradi, Niger may be unusual compared to other parts of the Sahel. However, HEA studies across the Sahel show the same trends. See Figure 19 for similar findings in the HEA from Kaya, Burkina Faso¹⁸⁸. In Kaya, the very poor households, who are the majority, have far less income than the better off households, and produce less than 40% of their annual food requirements.

In conclusion, while there is much evidence that the agro-ecological agriculture model has great potential for sustainable intensification of food production by small holder farm households in less favoured areas, it is not sufficient by itself to overcome chronic food insecurity.



Annex B7 Revision of Niger's pastoral code

The original code of 1993 sets a northern limit above which farming is not allowed, recognition of priority use rights for pastoralists and water points, and recognition of customary tenure. This text was prepared after a long participatory process involving all the pastoralist associations through a process of hundreds of workshops.

The legislation passed with Ordonnance 2010-029 on May 20, 2010. Fundamental points marking significant progress for pastoralists include:

Article 3: Mobility is a fundamental right of pastoralists, guaranteed by the State. Mobility is recognized as a rational and sustainable use of resources.

Article 5: The appropriation of property for private use within communal pastoral territory is forbidden if it restricts the mobility of pastoralists and their herds as well as their access to pasture and water resources.

Articles 17, 55 and 59: Gives authority to local elected government (communes) for the management of public wells and water sources used for animals, salt sites, and other local natural resources

Article 60: Regulates the previously uncontrolled commercial harvesting of hay, to the local government through its Land Commission. Export of hay is forbidden.

Article 25: Ensures access of animals to surface water (ponds, "mares") in cropping areas. Access paths become public property and obstructing them (i.e. with crops) is illegal.

Article 30: Ensures the right of free movement of animals in pasture areas and passage corridors during the rainy season

Article 34: Institutes a regulated decision making system for opening or closing agricultural fields, in order to enable integration of agriculture and livestock keeping through local consultation with farmers and land commission

Article 52: Provides pastoralists rights over their fixed settlement sites (terroirs d'attache"), and establishes due process for compensation if expropriated for public use (i.e. mining)

Source: Réseau National des Chambres d'Agriculture du Niger (RECA) Bulletin No 9, September 2010

Annex B8 Cost benefit analysis of DRR and field guides

Tearfund commissioned a cost benefit analysis of its DFID funded DRR program (in an area with a high incidence of food insecurity and drought in Malawi) to analyse the benefits of resilience-building activities, and estimate the value of integrating a resilience-strengthening approach into development and humanitarian programs.

This study indicated that for every US\$1 invested, the project activities delivered US\$24 of net benefits for the communities to help them overcome food insecurity, while building their resilience to drought and erratic weather.¹⁸⁹

Field guides for DRR work

Based on such program work, Tearfund developed a practical guideline for its DRR approach, which is described in its publication *Prepare to Live*.

FIGURE 20

Prepare to Live: Summary document. Possible interventions in the food insecurity cycle



Adapted for the Sahel from *The Drought Cycle* (IIR, Cordaid and Acacia Consultants)
Source: Kelly C, Khinmaung J., (2007) *Prepare to Live*, page 3

Tearfund and Christian Aid were also part of the DFID DRR inter-agency coordination group which developed *Characteristics of a Disaster Resilient Community - a resource guide*¹⁹⁰. This guide identifies what successful implementation of the Hyogo Framework of Action would look like at the community level, and developed key characteristics to enable tracking changes in the level of community resilience.

Figure 20 shows examples of activities to:

- Mitigate against food insecurity by reinforcing capacities, assets and livelihoods
- Prepare people for drought or flood with reserves, assets and coping mechanisms
- Ensure that people survive a food crisis without losing too many assets
- Ensure that people recover sufficiently from the food crisis so that they are less vulnerable to future hazards.

Annex B9 Evolution of cash transfer programming in the Sahel with case studies

Since 2004, the perception of cash-based transfers in humanitarian relief shifted dramatically – from ‘radical and risky’ to a mainstream programming approach.¹⁹¹ Cash-based programming was not new. However, despite longstanding theory and positive field evidence, its application was limited for many years. A convergence of factors caused the potential role of cash based programming to become freshly articulated within the framework of humanitarian assistance. One factor was the longstanding and widespread dissatisfaction and critique of the large-scale distribution of food – and in-kind goods in general – as a default response during humanitarian crises. While it doubtless saves many lives, it is also perceived to have been over-used, irrespective of need and context.¹⁹² In the Sahel, after 2005, another factor was the growing awareness that food insecurity was caused not so much by inadequate food supply but by inadequate purchasing power.

BACKGROUND NOTE

Why did cash based programming take so long to become mainstream practice?

- Pilot experiences had not been documented extensively before 2004-05, and NGOs or other agencies were then reluctant to implement something unfamiliar to them.
- Cash has long been believed to be associated with higher risks than in-kind distributions.
- Victims of shocks or vulnerable households were considered unable to spend cash wisely. Agencies feared the loss of control implied by distributing cash rather than in-kind items.
- Cash interventions have not always been supported by donors or by governments. In-kind distributions were also a way to dispose of the Western food surpluses, which are now much less sizeable.
- Food insecurity has long been associated with a lack of availability of food rather than accessibility (inadequate purchasing power).
- Giving food and/or other items is the normal reaction to a sudden-onset disaster and such ways of thinking and working have been carried over into other situations (e.g. protracted crises).

Source: ACF 2007 Implementing Cash-based Interventions A guideline for aid workers p.18

Cash transfers quickly became one of the more thoroughly researched forms of humanitarian and development intervention. There is now a well developed base of evidence indicates that individuals and households can be trusted and empowered to make effective use of cash transfers to enable them to improve their livelihoods.¹⁹³ Modest, but regular and reliable flows of income from cash transfers have been shown to help households sustain spending on food in lean periods, without the need to sell assets or take on debt.

The information needed to decide whether cash transfer or in-kind assistance is the best approach is increasingly included in standard needs assessments for humanitarian assistance. According to Paul Harvey, two broad sets of information are needed in order to determine the appropriateness of cash or vouchers compared to in-kind alternatives. The first relates to the need to understand people’s livelihoods and how local economies and markets work. This includes the question of whether goods and services that people need are available locally, and if markets are able to respond to an increased demand for commodities. The second set relates to whether a cash or voucher response can be practically implemented. This includes questions about delivery mechanisms, security, agency capacity, beneficiary preferences, host government policies and the gender specific risks associated with different transfer modalities.¹⁹⁴

The field of cash transfers encompasses a diversity of transfer types (e.g. conditional and unconditional cash transfers); development objectives; design and implementation choices; and financing options. In addition to the international NGOs, several UN agencies are also expanding

cash based programming as an option in their work. By including cash based programming in its strategic plan for 2008–2011, WFP noted that it was making ‘a historical shift from WFP as a food aid agency to WFP as a food assistance agency’.¹⁹⁵

In June 2010, UNICEF launched its first ever emergency cash transfer activity in Niger, to protect its blanket feeding program.¹⁹⁶

Case study 1: To support its emergency response in Niger in 2010, Concern Worldwide decided to pilot the use of mobile phones to transfer cash. This built on its earlier experience in Kenya, when Concern Worldwide used mobile phones to provide emergency support to all affected households in Eldoret, Kenya, during the post election violence.¹⁹⁷

Case study: Experience of Concern Worldwide with mobile technologies for cash distribution in Niger

In response to the 2009/2010 food crisis in Niger, Concern Worldwide set up a program for over 9,000 households in the Tahoua region to reduce rates of malnutrition and asset decapitalization during the hungry period, the 3-4 months prior to the 2010 harvest. With the costs and challenges associated in providing cash transfers in countries such as Niger – with poor quality roads and few financial institutions – Concern decided to pilot a new type of cash transfer mechanism via the mobile phone, based upon a similar pilot in Kenya. Overall, 2,500 women in 30 villages received their cash transfer via the mobile phone, whereas the remaining beneficiaries received the cash transfer via the normal distribution mechanism. The new approach involved several challenges, including ensuring beneficiaries’ access to mobile phones and the mobile money transfer technology (Zap), teaching beneficiaries how to use the technology and ensuring that agents were available to pay out the cash.

Concern collaborated with Tufts University to measure the impact of the program by conducting household-level surveys in all cash transfer villages in April and December 2010 (before and after the program), and Concern collected nutritional data from cash and non-cash villages in July, September and December 2010.

Overall, nutrition z-scores (using weight-for-height, weight-for-age and height-for-age) were higher in the cash distribution villages as compared with non-cash villages, which suggesting that the cash transfer could have prevented worsening rates of malnutrition during the hungry period. Household diet diversity was 10% higher after the program, with households consuming more grains, cowpeas and fats. However, as the survey was conducted during the harvest period, it is unclear if these improvements were due to the cash transfer or the period of year. Household durable and non-durable asset ownership decreased by 25% between April and December. While it is not possible to know what happened in non-cash villages during the same period, this suggests that the program could have prevented complete asset depletion to cope with the crisis.

Sources: Aker, Jenny C., Rachid Boumnijel, Amanda McCelleland and Niall Tierney. 2011. Zap it To Me: The Short-Term Impacts of a Mobile Money Transfer Program in Niger.

Aker, Jenny C. and Concern Worldwide. 2011. Cash Transfers and Emergency Response in Niger: The Impact of Mobile Cash Transfers on Household Well-Being. Report prepared by Jenny C. Aker for Concern Worldwide.

Case study

Experience of SCUK with a nutrition oriented cash transfer program in Niger

In 2008, global food price rises and economic problems in neighbouring northern Nigeria (leading to price rises of staple foods) put great pressure on the purchasing power of the poorest households in southern Niger. The price of millet was about 20% higher than the average for the last five years. SCUK was concerned this was contributing to the rising number of malnourished children in the area.

In response, SCUK, together with local partners, undertook a pilot project to give cash transfers to 1,500 of the poorest households in Tessaoua district, Maradi region, Niger, a region declared as highly vulnerable by the government. (The project was funded ECHO). A total of 60,000 CFA francs (about \$120), split into three distributions, was given to women in each of the targeted households during the 'hunger gap'. Households benefiting from the project were required to take part in awareness sessions on malnutrition and other public health activities. To assess the impact, 100 households were monitored using the HEA methodology at three key points: before the project started (baseline), a month after the first cash distribution (at the peak of the hunger gap), and a month after the third distribution (evaluation). Monitoring included assessing nutritional status of children under five, before the project and after each distribution.

Results: Generally, the cash was spent on buying food: millet (the staple), and also other products available locally. During the hunger gap, nutritious food items (mainly milk, cowpeas, groundnut oil, cowpeas and meat) were the second biggest item of expenditure for beneficiary households. After receiving the cash transfer, many beneficiary households gave up or reduced their reliance on certain sources of income. These tended to be sources of income obtained from coping mechanisms – such as credit, migration, or sale of animals, hiring themselves out to wealthier families. Households also chose to spend more time in their own fields. This, combined with good rainfall, resulted in a significant increase in their agricultural production (as declared by the participating households themselves). Compared with what they would produce in a typical year, participating households produced the equivalent of two more months' worth of millet – i.e. 50% more than they produced before.

The cash transfers considerably decreased, and even removed, the need for households to resort to these damaging distress strategies. For instance, 10% of households had to mortgage their land, and 7% had to sell their land in the three months prior to the project. Only 1% of households mortgaged their land, and none had to sell land, during the timeframe of the cash transfer program. Similarly, households' levels of debt decreased. The cash transfer also enabled 21% of beneficiary households to restart income-generating activities such as small-scale trade, selling cooked meals, butchery, and making and selling oil. These were activities beneficiary households did before, but stopped because of a lack of capital.

Since benefiting households were less desperate to earn money – and worked their own fields, there was a drop in competition for paid work. This pushed up the local wage rate. As a result, other poor people in the community, who did not receive cash transfers, benefited from higher daily wages, which sometimes rose from 650 to 1,000 CFA francs a day. Although the diet and initial nutritional status improved, during the rainy season, their health deteriorated as the prevalence of malaria and diarrhoeal diseases increased. These data suggest that the cash transfers led to a decrease in the number of children who were acutely malnourished, but only to a certain extent. The evidence suggests that in this context, cash transfers need to be complemented by interventions such as disease prevention and micronutrient supplements, to achieve better protection of children's nutritional status.

This pilot project provided further evidence that targeted cash transfers can be an efficient response to food insecurity by preventing a deterioration of their livelihoods status in the event of price rises and a food crisis, as long as food is available at local markets. Their ability to use the cash transfer to diversify the family diet, and intensify their own livelihoods was a major advantage of cash over food aid, and over cash for work, which provides some employment and income, but might actually prevent poorer households from investing in rebuilding their own livelihoods. The pilot program further suggests that lack of income may be the major bottleneck to economic development for the poorest groups, in the same way that lack of cash restricts access to a more diverse diet.

However, all these gains could be reversed when the next food crisis occurs.

Source: Save the Children UK (2009) How cash transfers can improve the nutrition of the poorest children Evaluation of a pilot safety net project in southern Niger

Despite the positive outcomes demonstrated by these two case studies, research by the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) indicates there are major challenges to institutionalise cash transfer programs. These include issues such as affordability, sustainability of funding, administrative capacity, targeting, conditionality, preconditions and sequences, and political will by governments to adapt their systems and capacity for cash transfers.¹⁹⁸

Annex B10 Rationale and evidence base for social protection programs in Africa

Social protection has moved rapidly up the policy agenda in Africa in recent years, driven by a combination of deepening food insecurity and vulnerability. The main driving force is the recognition that a growing proportion of households are chronically food insecure, for structural reasons. Such households are unable to get out of a vicious downward spiral of debt and loss of assets. Interest has developed because of a growing sense that conventional 'development' interventions are not succeeding in reducing poverty.

A broad concept of social protection includes a range of measures (not just cash, but insurance) that can be taken to protect people and their livelihoods. It has been seen primarily as a way in which individuals' or households' resilience to adverse events can be strengthened by reducing vulnerability. On the other hand, pro-poor economic growth is considered the long term, sustainable approach to reducing poverty.

There is growing evidence that social protection measures can do both: be livelihood promoting / poverty reducing, and help reduce risk and vulnerability. Given the very close linkages between structural and transitory food insecurity in the Sahel, there is increasing interest in exploring public interventions that can achieve positive synergy between social protection and pro-poor economic growth, by supporting people through short term crises while also reducing their long term vulnerability in a comprehensive and systematic way.¹⁹⁹

Some donors and governments have also become impatient with decades of recurrent humanitarian crises and appeals for aid which have not reduced levels of food and nutrition insecurity. This has helped foster a growing shift away from 'emergency food aid' towards 'predictable cash transfers', which has become the main instrument of the rising social protection agenda.

Social protection can also be an effective tool to enable vulnerable households to recover from shocks, and increase resilience. The effort required to help poor people recover from a food crisis, or another shock, has often been underestimated. Poor people have great difficulty in recovering, largely through their own efforts, especially when shocks occur with increasing frequency. There is often a presumption that risk prevention, mitigation and coping strategies will be enough to enable poor households to 'bounce back' quickly, to where they were before, or even a better place.²⁰⁰

In the Sahel, the recent work of the HEA²⁰¹ indicates that process of recovery needs to be carefully scrutinized for the poorest households, rather than assumed to have been achieved by returning rains and conventional development activities that may not be accessible. There is a substantial risk of non-recovery of key assets for the poorest households. An important role for social protection measures, therefore, is to enable a more complete recovery by extending and systematising humanitarian approaches to recovery, and by linking protection with risk reduction and livelihood promotion, so that assets can be more safely accumulated over time and vulnerability reduced.²⁰²

Social protection is also perceived as having the potential to help vulnerable households adapt to climate change. Vulnerable households do not have sufficient capacities and resources in order to adapt to or cope with climate change on their own. Droughts in the Sahel frequently force

poor families to sell off productive assets such as livestock. Such considerations are increasingly being included in the design of more climate resilient forms⁹ of social protection, for example cash transfers, crop insurance and crop diversification.

Members of the African Union have taken note of rapidly accumulating evidence of these positive potential impacts of social protection, in the form of cash transfers. Evaluations in Ethiopia, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, South Africa and Zambia all confirmed that cash transfers are used mainly for meeting basic needs (food, groceries, health) but also for investment (education, agriculture, business), as well as asset protection and, to a limited extent, asset accumulation. In contrast to food aid, cash transfers stimulate production, trade and markets. In March 2006, the Government of the Republic of Zambia co-hosted with African Union an intergovernmental conference on social protection from 21–23rd March 2006 in Livingstone.²⁰³ The event brought together ministers and senior representatives from 13 African countries together with Brazil, development partners, UN agencies and NGOs. The conference discussed measures for protecting the poorest in Africa, in line with the social policy of the African Union.

BACKGROUND NOTE

Social protection: A Transformative Agenda - The Livingstone Call for Action

The conference delegates noted that 'Considerable evidence exists that social transfers have played a key role in reducing poverty and promoting growth... when complemented with other social services... Addressing generalised insecurity and inequality through social protection is proven to be an integral part of the growth agenda...The provision of cash directly to poor people enhances economic growth. Transfers are used for both investment and consumption...The provision of transfers increases human capital by helping people to keep healthy, to educate their children, and supports HIV/AIDS affected families...Transfers can stimulate local markets, benefiting the whole communities.'

The World Bank, for its own reasons, has also been a strong promoter of social protection approach. It has developed its Social Risk Management (SRM) framework, which focuses on preventing, mitigating and coping with risks and shocks, but which also aspires to provide pathways out of poverty.²⁰⁴ The world food price crisis of 2007-2008 convinced the World Bank that social protection belongs to a broader reform agenda. The World Bank favours safety nets, and in particular cash transfers, as the priority option to respond to high food prices because it minimizes market distortion and other methods of public intervention.²⁰⁵

The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has done extensive modelling to demonstrate that social protection and social security schemes do not retard economic growth but are actually associated with higher rates of growth over time in Africa, and help promote access to education, health care, and even enhanced gender equality.²⁰⁶ However, a more recent report by Oxfam GB and CONCERN Worldwide, *Walking the Talk: Cash Transfers and Gender Dynamics* indicates that shorter term cash transfers have not had a significant impact on gender. A case study on a program in Latin America by Maxime Molyneux, published by IDS, had a similar conclusion.

In light of this mounting evidence, a growing number of African countries have undertaken social transfer pilot projects to provide social assistance to poor and vulnerable families. Most of these projects are financed by bilateral or multilateral donor agencies, and are implemented by international NGOs, sometimes with government involvement, but often 'off budget' – outside of government structures and programs. Social protection in Africa is strongly characterised by 'social cash transfers', delivered unconditionally but sometimes with a labour requirement (cash-for-work).²⁰⁷

⁹ Researchers at the Institute of Development Studies have developed an 'adaptive social protection' framework to help identify opportunities for social protection to enhance adaptation, and for social protection programmes to be made more climate-resilient.

Annex B11 Multi-stakeholder overview of lessons learned/positive changes since 2005

Most of the main changes and lessons learned since 2005 selected for in-depth analysis in this report emerged from numerous interviews, as well as the perspectives obtained at workshops held in Niamey and N'Djaména. The participants at these workshops represented a cross section of actors from international and national NGOs, University, UN agencies and the government. The tables below summarise the discussions in each country.

General: All informants agreed there had been progress since 2005. The key points included:

- Existence of an EWS which identified the crisis in time
- The joint evaluation of food security needs, coordinated by a national structure (supported by the FAO).
- Distribution of this joint evaluation of food security needs to all partners in the framework of the national organisational framework for coordination (Cluster).
- Involvement of international humanitarian agencies in the national agency responsible for food security.
- Coordination of government, UN, donor and NGO actors in the by the Coordination committee, the Food Security and Nutrition clusters, and through the inter-cluster meetings
- Improvement in the overcall organisational capacity for response (in 2005, the response was largely limited to de-stocking of the national animal herd.

Tables with specific points generated by the participants, by theme, are presented below:

Lessons learned/positive changes since 2005		
ISSUES	Niger	Chad
Better integration of humanitarian assistance with social protection and with long term development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Strengthening of staff capacity in humanitarian norms and procedures. • Pilot projects on cash based social protection; Inclusion of a cash based social protection capacity in the National Agency for Prevention and Management of Food Crises (DNP/GCA). • Establishment of community based Early Warning and Emergency response structures (SCAP-RU) linked with national system. • Establishment of Commune (district) level structures Observatories for Monitoring Vulnerability, with capacity to identify villages and groups at highest risk of food insecurity. • Improvements in the national Early Warning System (livelihoods, nutrition). • Improved targeting of vulnerable groups of food and cash. • Greater emphasis on DRR <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. Establishment of a National Contingency Plan ii. National Strategy for Cereal Banks iii. Work of DRR Consortium of NGOs 	Not directly addressed by Chad workshop participants, but agreement there has been only very modest and recent progress, particularly in follow up to the 2010 humanitarian efforts with vulnerable populations.

Lessons learned/positive changes since 2005

ISSUES	Niger	Chad
Reducing the Vulnerability of Pastoralists	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Approval of the new Pastoral Code. • Information system for assessing vulnerability for Early Warning for pastoral areas improved. • Community based Early Warning and Disaster Response (SCAP-RU) operational in certain pastoral areas. • RBM (Réseau Billital Maroobé a Network of Herders and Pastoralists in Africa functions and does good advocacy work for their members). • Positive experimentation with methods of de-stocking (drying meat). • Major growth in awareness by pastoralists about need for adaptation to reduce risk and safeguard their way of life. • Establishment of Cereal Banks in pastoral areas has reduced risk. • Certain techniques to improve water retention and other land improvements in pastoral areas show how pastoral communities can reduce risk. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Beginning of an increase in awareness of the importance and need to address the issues facing the well being of pastoral communities by humanitarian agencies. • RBM (Réseau Billital Maroobé a Network of Herders and Pastoralists in Africa functions and does good advocacy work for their members). • Positive experimentation with methods of de-stocking (drying meat). • Major growth in awareness by pastoralists about need for adaptation to reduce risk and safeguard their way of life. • Establishment of Cereal Banks in pastoral areas has reduced risk. • Certain techniques to improve water retention and other land improvements in pastoral areas show how pastoral communities can reduce risk.
Reducing vulnerability of children under 5 years by treating and preventing moderate acute malnutrition	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • National Directorate for Nutrition created • National Protocol for Treatment of Malnutrition and P.E.C has been established • National system for monitoring nutrition: Surveys conducted twice a year. • Nutrition Cluster organised by OCHA: permanent working group established and effective. • Process of integration launched by the Nutrition Cluster and the Ministry of Health • During lean season, general Blanket Feeding undertaken. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consensus on the diagnostic procedure. • Use of Community based Therapeutic Care (CTC) for treating SAM, as well as Community Management of Acute Malnutrition (CMAM). • Better integration of health and nutrition. • Increase in preventive activities • Development and Extension of monitoring and treatment of acute malnutrition through training staff. • Update of the Nutritional Protocole for treatment.
Contribution of action research and learning initiatives to create an evidence base of innovative models for humanitarian or development work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Cash Transfer Pilot impact on food security and malnutrition by Save the Children UK in 2008 was widely disseminated and highly influential. • Use of various forms of Cash Transfers increased greatly by NGOs in 2010. • Re-greening of the Sahel at an extensive scale; a campaign of communication and advocacy has contributed to this. • Action Research on Pastoral Wells (CARE-EU); the model has been accepted by the responsible Ministry (MEELCD). • CESAO; a study centre piloted techniques for drying meat and hygiene for de-stocking programs in 2010. • Use of Climate Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment method (CVCA). 	<p>Not addressed directly at the Chad workshop. However there is much less being done in Chad in terms of operational research, joint learning initiatives, developing and adapting innovative approaches, compared to Niger.</p>

Lessons learned/positive changes since 2005

ISSUES	Niger	Chad
Contribution of action research and learning initiatives to create an evidence base of innovative models for humanitarian or development work.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CARE-Niger's APCAN program piloted and developed an effective model of Community based EWS (SCAP-RU and the commune level Observatory for Monitoring Vulnerability (OSV) that engaged the government EWS (SAP), the University, and AGRYMET • HEA supported mostly by Save the Children, throughout the Sahel involved ECHO, Universities, government EWS • CARE/UNDP/PANA initiated pilot projects to develop climate change adaptation models • Supplementary RUTF: Studies by MSF on the use, acceptability and impact of the (Ready to Use Supplementary Food) on nutritional level of children to treat MAM • Use of SMART/SQUEAC nutritional surveys 	Not addressed directly at the Chad workshop.
Contribution of the Early Warning System (EWS) and response to address vulnerability (by preventing and managing a food crisis and other disasters).	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Harmonisation of different indicators for vulnerability (EWS of Niger, FEWS NET, CILSS). • Surveys conducted to assess vulnerability • Development of Community based EWS and Response (SCAP-RU) which enables communities to take direct action and responsibility. • Identification of geographic zones and groups of vulnerability by the OSV (Observatories for Monitoring Vulnerability) at the village and commune level. • APCAN project has strengthened local structures for early warning (SCAP-RU and OSV) and produced a methodological guide for doing this. • Improved system of monitoring market prices. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improvement in the information about vulnerability both transitory and structural. • Development and use of improved methodological tools (i.e. continuous monitoring of market prices). • Growing awareness of the EWS agents of the wider global nature of food security (beyond food availability, to livelihoods, accessibility, and nutrition). • Joint evaluation mission of government and partners conducted to assess and target most vulnerable in 2010. • Existence of a Food Security and Nutrition cluster. • Creation of a Restricted Committee to strengthen coordination between CASAGC and partners. • Capacity for response increased because more actors in the field compared to 2005. • Existence of coordinated, multi-sectoral responses with wide coverage.

Lessons learned/positive changes since 2005

ISSUES	Niger	Chad
Contribution of DRR and Climate Change Adaptation and Water/Sanitation/Hygiene programs to reduce vulnerability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a growing awareness among politicians and government about the issues such as climate, DRR • Niger has participated effectively in international fora on Climate Change, and has signed the Hyogo DRR Common Framework for Action • Niger government has organised meeting to reflect on how to establish a DRR platform • Niger has developed a coherent institutional framework to address various major risks (i.e. PANA –Program of action National Adaptation to Climate change; CNEDD = National Committee for the Environment and Sustainable Development etc. • In 2010, Niger obtained a \$50million grant and \$60 million in concessional loans from the PPCR (Pilot Program for Climate Resilience) for climate adaptation • A national strategy for water exists. The Niger agency responsible (PANGIRE) is preparing to implement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sectoral policies related to water, food security, livestock development, have been developed • There has been some improvement of infrastructure such as roads and markets in Chad, which affect risk
Inter-agency collaboration and coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Niger DRR Consortium was created after 2005 as a working/learning and advocacy group. • Within Niger, there have been major improvements in the attitude of organisations towards the need for coordination and harmonisation of program interventions (hearing different points of view, working on a joint plan of support). • The operationalisation of the UN/OCHA system of clusters (nutrition, food security, logistics, communications and Humanitarian Action Plan, despite faults, is progress. • NGOs are working much closer together in advocacy through media and other means to influence Ministries to change policies. • NGOs have been admitted to participate at meetings of the CRC (Comité Restreint de Concertation), a high level decision making body presided over by the Prime Minister. • Establishment of a framework of operational coordination between NGOs, the UN agencies and the Red Cross. • Existence of an Emergency Capacity Building (ECB) network in Niger, which conducted a joint review of the humanitarian response • Creation of HASA (Haute Autorité à la Sécurité Alimentaire, with the mandate to for new orientations in food and nutrition security 	

Annex C Challenges, risks and lessons learned

Annex C1 Lessons learned on how aid can promote good governance

There are many different breakdowns of the concept of governance, but succinctly, it relates to ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development’,²⁰⁸ and to ensure delivery of core functions to the majority of its people. The governance agenda also includes the fight against corruption and the corresponding need to enhance accountability and strengthen transparency in public policy-making.²⁰⁹

Another key dimension is facilitating effective participation in public policy making. Participation, particularly the involvement of civil society, helps to build coalitions supporting policy reforms and improve responsiveness to the needs of the poor. Finally another major thread of promoting good governance is support for the devolution of power, resources and capacity to lower levels of government through decentralization.²¹⁰

Quotes: The Importance of good governance

‘Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development.’ *UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, 1998*

‘The issue of good governance and capacity-building is what we believe lies at the core of all of Africa’s problems.’ *Commission for Africa, 2005*

Without progress in governance, all other reforms will have limited impact.’ *Commission for Africa, 2005*

Source: ODI, March 2006. Governance, Development and Aid Effectiveness: A quick guide to complex relationships. Briefing Paper

While many donors recognise the fundamental importance to strengthening good governance, particularly in order to prevent humanitarian crises, there is not yet a strong consensus about how aid can more effectively bring about needed changes.

A cynical analyst, after reviewing the 2005 crisis in Niger, wrote that donors and international aid agencies, if they were honest, would admit that the ‘good-governance debate’ is sometimes used just a way of not having to confront the lack of sustained engagement in overcoming poverty and severe malnutrition in the Sahel by the outside world. The aim appears limited to removing the symptoms of the crisis from the television screens, not addressing the causes, including poor governance.²¹² Whether or not this observation has merit, the reality is that the media spotlight, once applied to a crisis, can have a tremendous impact in galvanising institutional and financial resources and public support in the West. However, when media coverage wanes, the commitment to a long term, sustained and strategic aid effort to promote good governance, as outlined above, tends to diminish, particularly in fragile states.

More generally, the EU has developed a new discourse on good governance combines that includes some forms of conditionality (rather than selectivity) but with a strong emphasis on ownership²¹³. It prescribes that donors and recipient countries negotiate aid and reforms by engaging in policy dialogue, jointly agreeing on actions and targets. This is a more ‘collaborative approach’, based on persuasion rather than coercion. Decisions are to be made on a country-specific basis and be based on dialogue and capacity building. This includes underlining the multidimensionality and holistic nature of governance and the principles of ownership, shared analyse, joint assessment tools, harmonised dialogues and common programming frameworks. Specifically for Africa, another strand of EC governance policy is the support to the Africa Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

An initial review of the effectiveness in practice of these tools and principles to improve governance indicates disappointing results.²¹⁴ Some key lessons of how donors can do this are presented below.

Study Results: Lessons Learned on how aid can contribute to good governance

Aid conditionality has not proven an appropriate approach to strengthen good governance when used as an incentive by donors for sustained policy reforms. Conditionality cannot substitute or circumvent domestic ownership of and commitment to reform. The use of financial leverage is not a substitute for weak domestic institutions or feeble political will¹.

A cohesive framework for analysing and addressing governance must recognise the inherent political character of activities in the governance realm². It is not effective to separate public policy-making and technical issues from the politics. Technical solutions (including evidence from pilot projects) cannot easily overcome political problems. A fundamental lesson is that 'if donors wish to make a real difference, they will need to focus more explicitly and more rigorously on issues of power, politics and interest groups, [than] they have tried to do in the past – messy and difficult though these things often are'.³

Sustaining development requires reforming not only the policies but also strengthening the institutional framework⁴ in which policies are formulated and implemented. Effective reform of policies requires building the institutional capacity to apply it at the national but also decentralised levels. Aid efforts to improve governance have often disregarded the analysis of institutions and failed to assess how state institutions can be reformed effectively to make public policies more responsive to people's needs.

Donors need to be realistic about the length time that it takes for governance constraints to be overcome. Recent arguments to increase aid dramatically seem to assume that governance can be improved quickly enabling effective use of a dramatic boost in the quantity of aid. However, there is usually no shortcut to building sound institutions in the Sahelian countries.

Shifting from conditionality to selectivity is not the answer⁵. Selecting states that already have a strong level of governance is difficult to implement in practice, as high levels of poverty and food insecurity are often associated with weak governance. Selecting to work in Sahelian countries that already have relatively better governance performance to ensure the effectiveness of aid means that the needs of many highly food insecure households in more fragile states will be neglected. Appropriate long term approaches to strengthening governance in fragile states is essential in the Sahel to prevent recurrent humanitarian crises.

Governance can only have limited impact unless the country's society and particularly its leaders have a genuine political commitment to democracy. While democracy tends to refer to the legitimacy of government, good governance refers to the effectiveness of government. Neither democracy nor good governance is sustainable without the other.⁶

Sources:

¹ Santiso, C. 2001 *Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality*. Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Johns Hopkins University The Georgetown Public Policy Review Volume 7 Number 1 Fall 2001, p8

² ODI, March 2006. Governance, Development and Aid Effectiveness: A quick guide to complex relationships Briefing Paper

³ Riddell 1999, 333, cited in Santiso, op. cit. p.19

⁴ Santiso, op. cit. p15

⁵ Carbone M, (2009) The European Union, good governance and aid effectiveness: in search of a role in international development p4

⁶ Santiso, op.cit

Annex C2 Chad: An analysis of state fragility and the challenges for effective aid

The definition of a fragile state by OECD emphasizes the 'lack of political commitment and insufficient capacity to develop and implement pro-poor policies'.²¹⁵ Violence, conflict, corruption, exclusion or discrimination of certain groups, and gender inequalities are also common characteristics.²¹⁶

Within the donor community, there is growing consensus that principles of effective aid need to be complemented by others to guide good international engagement in fragile states.²¹⁷ This was the impetus for the development of the 10 principles for ‘Good International Engagement in Fragile States & Situations’²¹⁸ and various declarations relating to aid effectiveness²¹⁹ in fragile states.

In 2005, the EU in particular declared that it would improve its response to fragile states through support for governance reforms, rule of law, anti-corruption measures and the building of viable state institutions that are effective in meeting basic needs, in accordance to the principles for engaging with fragile states.

BACKGROUND NOTE

Selected International guidelines for effective aid in fragile states

Drawn from the 10 principles:

- Support state-building and delivery of basic services in contexts of weak governance and capacity
- Undertake a whole of government approach involving those responsible for security, political and economic affairs, development aid and humanitarian assistance to ensure policy coherence and joined-up strategies
- Align with local priorities in different ways in different contexts
- Take context as the starting point; undertake sound political analysis; avoid blueprints
- Identify national reformers and functioning systems within existing local institutions, and strengthen their effectiveness, legitimacy and resilience
- Provide longer-duration assistance of at least ten years to enable capacity development in core institutions, given low capacity and the extent of the challenges
- Avoid pockets of exclusion: aid orphans – in states where only a few international actors are engaged, or aid volumes are low, or where geographical regions or groups are neglected within a country

To illustrate the challenges of doing so in the Sahel, the particular context of governance in Chad is analysed in detail below.

Manifestations of state fragility

Lack of political stability: A major feature of Chadian politics is factionalism. The political process is dominated by constantly shifting alliances. The President – Idris Deby – is from the Zagawa ethnic group from the east of the country, which comprises only 2% of the population.²²⁰ Governance requires maintaining a broader coalition of support which is often achieved by bringing leaders of armed groups into government and political structures^h. When supporters of different armed groups change sides, which occur quite frequently, new coalitions are required.

This repeated process has been described as ‘rebellion, reintegration and defection’.²²¹ Constant ministerial takeover (due to political volatility) has contributed to a lack of continuity in government policy. High level Chadian politicians gain office often not because of their capacity for good administration, but as a result of patronage in this system.

Corruption

The government’s own National Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy baldly states that ‘corruption remains a major problem of governance in Chad’.²²² This is confirmed by Transparency International which ranks Chad 171 out of 178 in its international corruption ranking. Corruption is exacerbated by Chad’s oil boom. The country became an oil-producing nation in 2003 and is estimated to have reserves of up to one billion barrels. Changes to rules governing how revenues can be spent have been controversial. The agreement to allocate a higher proportion of the revenues on anti-poverty projects has still not met by the government.

^h A most serious event indicating the fragility of state is described in the governance section of the current Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy. In February 2008, an armed rebel group fought their way into the capital of N’Djaména, and were repulsed after heavy fighting. This event provoked significant economic damage, and shook the confidence in the ability of the state to ensure stability and peace.

Minimal state presence in the western Sahel belt

BACKGROUND NOTE

Evidence of fragility: The Situation of the western Sahel belt of Chad

Evidence of the minimal development presence of the state is evident in the western Sahel regions. In the region of Kanem, for example, there are no paved roads. This impacts heavily on food prices and creates market barriers, which limit alternative earning opportunities. The lack of a functioning electrical grid anywhere in the region inhibits economic growth. Water availability, which directly impacts nutrition, health and production, is not reliable, with over 50% of the pumps installed not operational. Education opportunities are rare, offering young people few alternatives to migration or agriculture. This is particularly pronounced for women, who face social barriers in addition to the sheer lack of educational opportunities.

All these factors feed into weak state capacity. A lack of technical staff and poor financing means that government is often unable to fully manage relief and development initiatives. For nutrition, for example, this means that the quantity, quality (or in many cases, functionality) of health centres cannot be sustained without donor support. This capacity weakness is likewise visible in agriculture. In the Bahr el Ghazal region, for example, four part-time extension workers are responsible for supporting an agricultural population of over 200,000.

Source: ACF (Nov 2010) Briefing Paper: Chad A call to end Decades of Hunger

Poorly developed systems for food security and crisis management: The enormous challenge in developing an effective aid approach in a fragile state like Chad is illustrated by an evaluation of the national structure responsible for food security, published in February 2010,²²³ just as a new food crisis was emerging.

This was the situation of national food security system that the UN and international agencies worked with during the food crisis. The evaluation also concluded that the underlying conception of food security within the higher levels of government was focused strongly on food availability, and a sole response to address a crisis being food aid. Other key concepts of food security (accessibility, utilisation and stability) and the need for information on livelihoods, nutrition, accessibility, was not fully recognised.

Study: Conclusions from an Evaluation of the operation of Chad's national structure for Food Security from 2005 - 2009:

- Structures for collecting food security related data at the regional, district and local levels were unable to perform their functions due to an almost complete lack of financial support.
- Data that was collected often took months to pass up through the multiple departmental and ministerial hierarchies to reach CASAGC, because of a low priority given to this function.
- The reliability and completeness of the food security data was highly questionable, leading food security decisions to assist the most vulnerable to be generally poorly informed.
- ONASA, the sole organ within the national food security apparatus to implement decisions (i.e. distribution of cereals from the national food reserve) did not have a budget to transport or distribution of food to the most vulnerable households in remote rural areas.
- The main beneficiaries of subsidized food were often salaried government workers based in the towns.
- Interest groups at the regional or local levels biased decisions about targeting and distribution, not respecting analyses of need. Political interference in decision making was very strong.
- There was an absence of a capacity within the institutional structure to move from emergency to rehabilitation work, grounded on a sound information base.

Failure to Institutionalise an EWS: A later evaluation in August 2010, focused only on the Early

Study: Evolution of Chad's EWS from 1986 - 2011

A first food security EWS was established in Chad in 1986 with the support of AEDES (European agency for development and health). At this time, one of the indicators included nutritional surveillance in almost 200 districts. This revealed alarmingly high malnutrition rates already in the 1980s. From 1988 to 1999, the EWS continued within the CILSS framework. In 1999, the EC stopped funding the EWS because of a lack of national counterparts. Activities were discontinued although the annual costs of operating the EWS were relatively modest.

In 2000, a new EWS was launched with support of the UNDP, FAO, and French Cooperation. The new EWS had difficulties ensuring the collection of information at the decentralised levels. The information in monthly bulletins was not considered reliable. Most activities ceased once more when external funding ended in 2004. Re-launched in 2007 with funding from the EU, the new SISA-SAP was to have been part of PNSA (National Programme for Food Security, a structure reporting to the Presidency).

However it was perceived from the outset as a project of the FAO, its technical partner. Based on many interviews, the evaluation noted that within government, there was no sense of ownership. One informant even stated 'Do not encumber us with your information and warning system'. The government did not meet its commitment for budgetary support or to attach SISA-SAP to the PNSA.

At the end of the funding cycle in 2010, the evaluation recommended that the international community should desist from naively insisting on a national EWS, until there was a shift in attitude within government about the role of EWS within the strategy for the prevention and management of food crises. This would depend on identifying a charismatic, highly placed champion within government to ensure budgetary support to promote and sustain this function, and could strengthen the capacity at the regional and local levels for regularly collecting reliable information across multiple sectors.

The EU accordingly decided to end its funding. After almost 25 years of efforts and funding, Chad currently lacks an effective, reliable EWS in Chad, an indispensable function to prevent and mitigate food crises and other disasters.

Sources:

Boulangier, P. De Jaegher C., Michiels D. (2004) *Systèmes d'information pour la sécurité alimentaire: L'expérience AEDES en Afrique*, L'Harmattan

Morinière, Lezlie C. (Août 2010) *Rapport d'Évaluation Finale, externe et indépendante, du projet SISA—SAP*

Warning System (SISA-SAP) financed by the European Union²²⁴, concluded that the government of Chad did not consider establishing its own EWS a priority.

In light of this record, the EU has decided to adapt its strategy for developing Chad's capacity for early warning in several ways. The EU is financing a pilot program to develop, with the support of NGOs, an effective model for decentralised EWS data collection and analysis at the local and regional level.²²⁵ Another is to increase support to the regional EWS activities of CILSS. Finally, the EU is taking progressive steps to shift attitudes and priorities, and generate a true sense of ownership by the Chad government. Initiatives are being considered such as sending Chadian officials to learn from the experiences of other countries in the Sahel.

Neglected nutrition and food insecurity crisis in the western Sahel: Long-term trends have contributed to a structural food and nutrition crisis related to changes in livelihoods of people living in the western Sahel zones. Traditional pastoral lifestyles have been in decline for several decades leading to sedentarisation, the selling off of livestock and resulting reliance on cereals (mostly millet). This trend has in part been blamed on more extended periods of drought related to long-term climate change. However, lack of infrastructure and employment opportunities have also led to massive migration from the region. Remittance payments from migrants now form a crucial element in the economy. The lack of healthcare is also a key factor. Healthcare facilities appear to be getting worse – or people have less capacity to pay for them.²²⁶ One result has been a persistent and largely ignored rate of acute malnutrition above the WHO emergency threshold.

BACKGROUND NOTE**The neglected chronic crisis of under-nutrition in the western Sahel zones of Chad**

In western Chad, (Kanem and Bar el Ghazal regions) in August 2010, the prevalence of Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) was 25.9% and Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) reached nearly 5% (ACF 2010). This figures are appalling, double the WHO threshold of alert. However, these crisis levels did not appear only in 2010. ACF assembled nutritional surveys dating back to 1994 indicating that both global and severe acute malnutrition rates have consistently been above the WHO emergency threshold levels (Figure 6) .

This demonstrates that in the fragile state of Chad, not only was crisis level of under-nutrition predictable, but it is chronic and has been allowed to persist for decades. This alarming situation is reflected in other health indicators. For instance, in western Chad, under-five mortality rates are at a staggering 200 per 1,000 live births. These rates, having remained relatively stagnant since the 1980s, are well in excess of the WHO African regional average of 167 and much higher than the Millennium Development Goal of 75 per 1,000 live births.

Source: ACF (Nov 2010) Briefing Paper: Chad A call to end Decades of Hunger

Assessing the effectiveness of aid in the context of the fragile state of Chad

In light of the context outlined above, what special provisions is the donor and aid community making to apply the principles of working in a fragile state?

In 2008, the UN mandated the Comprehensive Framework for Action, a high-level policy guidebook for food security, which requires that immediate needs be handled while also building long-term resilience against hunger.²²⁷ This is a 'twin track' approach, in which relief efforts are to be integrated with long-term development goals. There is very little evidence of this approach in Chad.

ACF, one of the few international organisations working in the western Sahel, criticises the superficial 'band-aid' response, which they suggest is largely how the crisis in Western Chad has been tackled. Spending on food aid in 2010 greatly increased, but this has not been matched by increases in funding for long-term nutrition and health. Whilst food aid was effective in keeping people alive in the short-term, it has not addressed the structural problems which combined to form the acute food and nutrition crisis of 2010, which peaked from the chronic crisis.

ACF notes that the UN and donor community have not been effective in enabling the Chadian state to improve its governance, particularly in terms of an effective strategy to tackle structural food insecurity. Echoing perspectives of other key informants consulted for this report, ACF notes that the food security is simply not yet a priority of the Chadian government. Any plans that do develop are often lost in the political process. Although the Chadian state does have the resources to put in place livelihood support, disaster risk management and CCA programs with its large oil revenues, little has been done. One informant within the UN system stated that the government of Chad considers that emergency response to food crises 'is the work of the international humanitarian agencies'.²²⁸

This more detailed analysis highlights the enormous challenge of increasing aid, and using it effectively, in a fragile state such as Chad.

Annex C3 Analysis of the risks to poor households of unregulated market forces

The vulnerability of poor households to high prices is affected by the regional integration of sixteen West African countries through the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Since 1975, as members of ECOWAS, countries in the Sahel abandoned the idea of national food self-sufficiency. Instead, they opened up their borders and markets to international trade, assuming market forces would ensure an adequate food supply. ECOWAS is working toward the creation of a common market, by eliminating all trade barriers between member states, adoption of a common external tariff, and a common trade policy vis-à-vis other countries. The rationale was that it would be more logical and cost-effective to develop North-South trade between Sahelian and coastal countries, rather than create centralized structures to manage agricultural trade within each nation. Market integration has progressed significantly. Sahelian countries can no longer be considered distinct national markets.²²⁹

This has had a direct impact on food availability in any given country, as supply is no longer determined by domestic production but rather by the regional food situation and by trade flows. However, these two elements are subject to high fluctuations due to volatility in regional harvests, exchange rates, government policies, international commodity prices, and regional conflicts. The removal of state intervention has also resulted in a trend of food trade being dominated by groups of large traders, whose interest is profit, not the needs of households in remote, food insecure areas that lack purchasing power.²³⁰ All these factors make cereal markets and prices in the Sahel unstable. ECOWAS has not yet developed a regulatory mechanism that would ensure the stability of food prices and adequate distribution of food in the region.

As Frederick Mousseau points out, there is actually no reason for regional trade to ensure an adequate supply in a country like Niger. If there are imbalances in the regional market, Niger, as the poorest country in the region, may not be able to compete with coastal countries that have higher purchasing power. Niger is a very large, landlocked country. As in Chad, there would be limited incentive for food traders to import food if most people can't afford to pay for it, especially given the higher price due to transport costs.

Another factor undermining food security is that certain countries in the Sahel have increased specialisation in certain agricultural products and use exports earnings to import the food they need. Burkina Faso and Mali, for example, have specialized in cotton and other non food cash crops. This affects the regional cereal market by reducing land availability for cereals and increasing their cereal import needs of these countries. Cash crop specialization also reduces cereal-trading opportunities between neighbours, and result in an increased dependence on the international market for imports to meet domestic needs.²³¹

This dependence on the international markets exacerbates the risk of price volatility. For example, the international prices of maize and wheat have almost doubled between June 2010 and mid-March 2011. Global prices of dairy products have also risen. In a recent report, IPRFI projects that recent rising oil prices, the expansion of biofuel production, particularly maize ethanol, and other factors will significant increase the risk of even higher global food prices.²³²

During the High-level Conference on World Food Security in 2008, then again in 2009 at the G-8 Summit in L'Aquila, Italy and at the World Food Summit in Rome, governments recognized the potential of food reserves to deal with humanitarian food emergencies and to limit price volatility. They called for a review of this issue as part of coordinated response to the global food crisis.²³³ Unfortunately, identifying potential models, as well as allocating appropriate resources and setting a firm deadline for implementation, has yet to occur. Much of what needs to be done is quite controversial. It involves Sahelian governments thinking again about a more public role in managing food stocks and grain reserves.

BACKGROUND NOTE**Why were food reserves abandoned in the Sahel?**

Over the past 20 years, Sahelian governments, under pressure from western donors, have abandoned food reserve programs, except for emergency response. The main challenges to address in current reflection of the potential role of food reserves are:

1. Economic orthodoxy is against market inter-ventions. The profound shift in global economic policy starting in the early 1980s emphasizes keeping government intervention in markets to an absolute minimum. A public grain reserve falls squarely in the territory of bad ideas for those who do not trust the government to get economic management right.
2. Building a resilient and effective grain reserve is not easy. Reserves, storage facilities, vehicles, staff all cost money. They also (by definition) distort markets and involve guesswork that does not self-correct, as a market might. If a reserve is poorly managed, it can exacerbate food security problems.
3. Reserves have to operate in varied social, political, geographical and economic contexts. The condition of the country's transportation and storage infrastructure, as well as how a country is connected to its neighbours and world markets, are all directly relevant to how best to structure a reserve and in determining where it might be most effective. There is no simple blueprint for a generic food reserve.
4. Reserves depend on transparent and account-able governance. A reserve needs to be both well designed and well governed, and not subject to political manipulation. Well trained and paid staff, strong oversight, clear rules and a well-func-tioning independent review system are essential. It takes time and money to establish this oversight.

Source: Adapted from Sampson, Kristin (October 2010) *Stabilizing Agriculture Markets Why We Need Food Reserves*. Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP)

Annex C4 Analysis of progress and challenges of LRRD²³⁴

Background: While the concept of linking relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD) is attractive, it has remained elusive in practice. The EC has been at the forefront of attempting to articulate innovative aid instruments to bridge the humanitarian and development divide. The EC first developed its policy on the linkage between relief, rehabilitation and development in 2001.²³⁵

Rationale for LRRD within the architecture of aid:

The basic underlying rationale of LRRD is to optimise the linkages which strengthen the progression from relief to development and from livelihood protection to livelihood promotion. The absence or failure of a transition from humanitarian aid to other aid instruments has high costs. In particular, with no clear transition process, humanitarian aid risks remaining beyond its core mandate. This can create dependency. It also raises serious ownership and local capacity issues, since many beneficiary governments see humanitarian aid as extra assistance.

Key Problems achieving LRRD in Practice:

The key problem with LRRD is who and how to fund the second 'R' - rehabilitation:

- A major unresolved problem in situating rehabilitation in relief and/or development paradigms is how sustainability should be addressed and how this relates to essential humanitarian principles. Research on weakly integrated areas has shown that there is often no 'sustainable' solution on the horizon for chronically vulnerable people
- Government agreement to the selection of the sectors of concentration of long-term program aid does not fit easily with the project approach of short and medium-term instruments. Because of restricted EC programming reasons or the lack of available budgets, there are many instances in which internal LRRD aid transition is not possible. In these cases, desks may seek to achieve 'external' LRRD linking in with the resources and programs of other aid donors such as EU Member States or the World Bank.

- Complex protracted crises and fragile states offer fewer opportunities for an orderly linear transition as unstable situations and risk of re-occurrence of crises impede the planning and mobilisation of longer term instruments which require stability and state structures to operate successfully.

Examples of progress in moving toward effective LRRD in the Sahel

Despite these challenges, there are a few examples where an orderly transition to other aid instruments or a combination of aid strategies has been achieved, or creative thinking applied:

- Mali: DG ECHO provided technical advice to the European delegation in the context of the Calls for Proposals for the Water Facility and more recently for the Food Facility. The 10th EDF Country Strategy Papers and National Indication Programs for a large number of ACP states now cover issues of humanitarian concern either as sectors of concentration or as strategic objectives within sectors of concentrations (Burkina Faso, Niger, etc.).
- Burkina Faso: ECHO is developing an active alliance with the World Bank to articulate short-term humanitarian action to respond to needs and raise nutrition up the public policy agenda with a large World Bank follow-up on nutrition security policy and the funding of government nutrition programs to anchor progress in a permanent and sustainable way.
- Sahel: An ad-hoc Inter-Service Sahel Task Force was established after the 2005 crisis to define a road-map for articulated action to respond to the crisis in particular in Niger and to reduce the risk of a repetition. This road-map was instrumental in ensuring an adequate and coherent Commission response in 2007 covering the short-term needs (implemented by ECHO through the Sahel Global Plan), with EC delegations delivering on medium-term needs for nutrition.
- The European Commission (Relex) is engaged with the World Bank and UN agencies to refine and roll-out the post disasters/conflict needs assessment methodology, which has already been used in many countries over the last years. The end product of this process is a transitional result framework developed with the government, which is the basis for a transitional programming supported internationally.
- Other work is going on the transition issue at international level. It is high on the agenda of the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) –as part of the follow-up to the Accra agenda for action. A new working group on conflicts and fragility (INCAF) has been formed. A subgroup is looking at the financing architecture for transition.

The way forward for achieving LRRD:

- Humanitarian aid must be better planned to allow for the quick phasing in or resumption of more appropriate aid instruments once the post-crisis recovery phase has started. Specifically phasing in of other aid instruments where possible requires a clear exit strategy to be designed into the initial intervention. This needs to be negotiated in advance with other aid providers (including local authorities and Non-State Actors).
- Where humanitarian agencies are obliged to stay beyond their mandate because of a lack of transition process, examine mechanisms to recover the additional costs of this to their budgets. For example, with the EC, transfers from the geographic development aid budget lines (i.e. EDF) could reimburse humanitarian budgets for the funds allocated for LRRD activities while waiting for development aid operations to kick in. This would provide more incentive for development aid services to engage in LRRD.
- Recent work highlights that a key assumption of LRRD (i.e. that rehabilitation/recovery leads to a rapid re-turn to a former, supposedly stable and desirable state of affairs) is unrealistic. 'Linking' need not necessarily imply smooth or linear transition. Instead, a more appropriate concept is

greater integration and coherence so that relief and development can ‘mutually reinforce’ each other. The process of ‘rehabilitation’ may be short-, medium- or indeed long-term according to context. Simultaneous relief, rehabilitation and development interventions may be necessary, including social protection. In light of this experience, further development of a common transition analysis framework for LRRD including its extension to address conflict, instability, and fragile states issues, is essential.

Annex C5 Controversy about the effect of high population growth

Some analysts reject the neo Malthusian hypothesis that rapid population growth will inexorably deepen poverty and food insecurity. They support the position of Ester Boserup who argued that population pressure is a general pre-condition for agricultural progress, and a useful economic stimulus to technical innovation. Her theory was that population concentration makes it financially feasible to invest in infrastructure, (water, irrigation, energy, transport) and improved production technologies. Such investment would be uneconomical for a less dense population. As population pressure increases, progressively more intensive systems of land use are adopted. Boserup’s model focuses on improvements in land and labour productivity, raising the intensity of utilisation of resources, and improved market access.

This model needs to be countered, in the Sahel, with observations showing the impact of increased population on food security. First, rapid population growth increases the number of dependents per average household. A second aspect of population growth is the excessive fragmentation of landholdings through partition among heirs, and a progressive decline in average farm size to the point of non viability. A third effect is the growing pool of surplus labour in rural areas which cannot be absorbed into large scale farming or industrial employment in the fast growing urban centres, which increases competition and reduces wages for the poor.

The recent HEA livelihood studies throughout the Sahel provide solid evidence supporting these effects of rapid population growth. In Maradi, Niger, in particular, a long term trend of subdivision has decreased the average size of landholdings. Many of the poorest households cannot put land into fallow, and cannot afford fertiliser. The very low average yields of millet and sorghum attest that many farmers are struggling with soil infertility. There are few opportunities to diversify. The option of moving to marginal land is rapidly diminishing, particularly because climate change has effectively reduced the cultivable area available to a growing population. Reliable crop production is limited to regions in the south where average annual rainfall exceeds 300–400mm. The 350mm Isohyet has been shifting southwards.²³⁶

Annex C6 Multi-stakeholder perspectives: challenges to overcome

In the same workshops organised in Niamey and N’Djaména, a cross section of actors from international and national NGOs, University, UN agencies and the government identified the failures of aid and the major challenges to overcome to ensure food and nutrition security. The themes selected for deeper analysis above emerged from these workshops and responses of interviews with over 70 people. The tables below summarize the key points for each major issue:

Failures of aid and major challenges to overcome

ISSUES	Niger	Chad
Integration of humanitarian assistance, with social protection and with long term development	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Donor agencies and funders' policies still do not facilitate effective integration of humanitarian response and long term development. • There is still too much of a sectoral approach rather than a integrated approach to overcoming the challenges of ensuring food security and preventing food crises • Inadequate synergy and coherence of actions and policies among actors • Lack of a national policy for social protection in the rural areas • National policy of Food Security focused too much on emergency (food aid) and not enough on prevention, and risk reduction • Targeting of emergency assistance based on social groups (i.e. all children under 5 and pregnant mothers) of UNICEF is not economical 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Low number of donors present in Chad (EU, AFD-France, US-AID, World Bank, Bank of African Development Bank, IFAD, Banque Islamique de Developpement, UN agencies). • Lack of a policy and strategy for social protection. • Volume of aid is not adequate considering huge need in Chad. • Aid instruments and protocols are not sufficiently flexible to address livelihood security and long term reduction of risk as well as emergency response • Lack of long term, continuous funding available for DRR and longer term development • Insufficient coordination between the different funding strategies (emergency and longer term recovery/development)
Reducing the Vulnerability of Pastoralists	<p>Reducing the Vulnerability of Pastoralists</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is no livestock policy in the strategy for Rural Development (SDR) in Niger to address: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. Ways to create positive synergy between agriculture/livestock systems of production. ii. Marketing system for animals and animal products. iii. Application of land tenure code in pastoral areas. • Lack of sufficient action research and studies to better understand pastoral systems, the structural causes of vulnerability, and how poorer households are affected, in the pastoral areas. • The relevance and effectiveness of many existing programs is poor. • Insufficient systems to reduce risk and help make livestock production system sustainable; production and conservation of fodder; fodder banks. • Program work with pastoralists is not sufficiently integrated (inter-sectoral) and does not sufficiently consider gender issues. • Inadequate financial services (savings and credit) available to pastoralists. • More work required to change attitudes and behaviours for livestock management (i.e. destocking). • Improve basic social services (health and education) in pastoral areas. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poor integration of the data of vulnerability of pastoralists households into information systems; Vulnerability surveys are weak. • Lack of effective livelihood analytical tools to determine underlying problems. • Strengthen analytical tools for targeting in restocking program • Lack of a strategy to strengthen marketing of livestock in regional markets. • Need to improve the awareness of major actors on the problematic of pastoralism; way of life, effective intervention strategies, prioritisation of needs. • Need to strengthen advocacy capacity of pastoralists to raise awareness and influence decisions relating to problems. • Insufficient consideration to address basic needs (health and education). • Insufficient measures to reinforce the mobility of pastoral communities as a way to reduce risk in public policies (also as a way to address population pressure, conflicts, management of material resources). • Increase length and amount of program financing (beyond 5 years). • Accept a learning process, rather than rigid blueprint approach to project design for initiatives such as re-stocking of herds. • Need to strengthen the tools for quick prevention and humanitarian response.

Failures of aid and major challenges to overcome

ISSUES	Niger	Chad
Contribution of the Early Warning System (EWS) and response to address vulnerability (by preventing and managing a food crisis and other disasters)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Influence of politics affects correct application of technical EWS data. • SCAP-RU and OSV are not yet established across all of Niger. • The articulation between SCAP-RU/OSV with the national level EWS is weak. • Continued need to improve capacity to improve reliability of statistics and analysis for EWS. • Niger EWS has key gaps in its approach to identifying vulnerability: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. Livelihoods in pastoral zones; mobility of transhumance ii. Urban and peri-urban areas iii. Nutritional dimension • Integrate access, not availability to food. • Need to harmonise targeting criteria. • EWS data is still not early enough, and does not generate an early response and support plan. • Inadequate communication of EWS data and support to communities to take local action (i.e. related to cereal banks). • Inadequate food stocks and reserves at national and community level to address food crises. • Inadequate food security data base, reference to a baseline year, to enable scientific targeting. • Information produced by the EWS does not respond to the specific needs of major actors. • EWS still has difficulty articulating its agricultural deficit (availability) information with vulnerability which more affected by purchasing power. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lack of medium and long term financing for agencies working with vulnerable populations as the immediate crisis ends. • Lack of consensus on a systematic methodology to undertake targeting of assistance (except for nutrition, developed by UNICEF). • Lack of diversity of the response interventions (type- i.e. beyond food aid) and modality of intervention. • Problems with administrative boundaries; there are both old and new cantons, which overlap. • Lack of food security and early warning mechanisms at the local and commune levels. • Lack of a strategy for DRR. • Lack of a national contingency strategy which guides and strengthens mechanisms for collaboration between partners. • Poor coordination to achieve synergy and complementarity of interventions of government and partners.
Contribution of action research and learning initiatives, to create an evidence base for advocacy to promote innovations for humanitarian or development work	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Many initiatives remain at the pilot stage and do not have sufficient funding and supportive policies to be scaled up • There is a need to give more emphasis on an academic or scientific approach in order to make pilot programs more relevant to policy persuasive and useful for advocacy • It is difficult to harmonise the needs for research with the need for practical operation of programs, and managing the risks to the population 	Weak overall activity and support for action research and joint learning activities in the context of Chad

Failures of aid and major challenges to overcome

ISSUES	Niger	Chad
Contribution of DRR and Climate Change Adaptation and Water/Sanitation/Hygiene programs to reduce vulnerability	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • DRR has not yet become a national priority. The DRR platform is not functional and there is no DRR national strategy or funding in place • Lack of a federal structure responsible for managing all types of risk, not only food security • Niger government is waiting for funding before taking action on DRR and climate change • The Ministry of Environment and Forestry is not the appropriate institution to address the many aspects of climate change adaptation • There is a lack of experience and knowledge of how to systematically integrate DRR into existing policies, programs of development across sectors • Achieving institutional coordination across ministries and with sectors for DRR and Climate Change adaptation is a major challenge • Long term funding (10 years) required to achieve optimal resilience against disasters at the national and household levels is very difficult to mobilise. • More operational research is required to develop the evidence base for how to effectively strengthen resilience and do effective DRR (for advocacy) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Great difficulty in implementing existing sectoral priorities related to DRR, and Climate change • Lack of a national strategy on DRR. • Water Hygiene and Sanitation sector does not sufficiently address the needs of most vulnerable zone where food and nutrition insecurity is high.
Inter-agency collaboration and coordination	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There was insufficient official communication during the crisis. The responsible structure, the CIC was not effective. • There was insufficient coordination between: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> i. The various actors using cash. ii. Members within the Emergency Capacity building network. iii. The government SAP (Early Warning System) and the CCA (Coordination de Crise Alimentaire, the decision making body for managing the food crisis. iv. National and regional/local levels. v. The CCA/SAP and the Direction for Nutrition and Ministry of Health (lack of health/nutrition expertise. • NGOs did not all give information to the CCA for coordination and targeting. • Continued tendency for parallel systems and confused roles between the government and the UN agencies, instead of complementarity. • Tension/misunderstanding between the WFP and the CCA. • Internal tensions within the UN agencies contributed to problems. • There are too many tools and methods used sectorally and without clear strategic direction; there is not often a holistic analysis of problems (i.e. with pastoralism). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • High level of turnover in Ministries • Low level of government infrastructure • Low level of transparency in government in elaborating and implementing policies • Decentralisation and devolution of services to regions and districts, and local level capacity often very inadequate to permit coordination at local level

Annex D Assessing resilience at the household and community level

The concept of resilience is already used within the humanitarian, DRR, climate change adaptation and development literature. Most often, resilience is expressed as the opposite side of the coin to vulnerability. Increasing resilience indicates people have become less vulnerable to shocks. Resilience serves as an umbrella concept for those factors that mediate between changing climatic, environmental, political or economic conditions, on the one hand, and human capabilities and assets to cope with, take advantage of, or adapt to, those conditions, on the other hand.²³⁷ In this sense, resilience is a composite concept. It incorporates environmental, social, economic, political, demographic, cultural, and gender factors, in describing the capacity to recover, adapt and grow in the wake of periodic shocks.²³⁸

Both analytically and pragmatically, resilience is becoming a more useful focus than vulnerability. Vulnerability refers to the inability of people to avoid, cope with or recover from the harmful impacts of hazards that disrupt their lives and that are beyond their immediate control. Vulnerability is a deficit concept.²³⁹ Analysis is focused on what is not working. It arises from a hazards/risk paradigm which tends to focus on the outcomes of extreme events. Vulnerability is understood as a function of exposure and susceptibility to a hazard.

Hazards are short term events, such as a flood, a locust invasion, or a drought. In the Sahel, hazards are primarily a trigger that accelerates an existing structural shift. They reveal (and exacerbate) inherent chronic vulnerability, but tend to obscure the long-term structural changes (i.e. economy, trade, environment, population, the market, and governance) that cause it. The hazards paradigm, to which vulnerability is closely linked, subtly tends to strengthen the public perception that human suffering is caused by the hazard itself, rather than by complex underlying social and political conditions.

Resilience, on the other hand here, is conducive to the entitlements approach, based on the work of Amartya Sen,²⁴⁰ which focuses on the different resources that humans can command in a society, using all the rights and opportunities they have to improve their livelihoods. According to Sen, entitlements are composed of what a person or household owns, and that which can be obtained by exchanging some of what is owned, for other commodities or services. Linking the concept of resilience with Sen's entitlements approach at the household level is particularly pertinent in the analysis of food security.

Adopting a resilience-based approach to the management of food systems requires developing a framework for analysing resilience. It requires enabling people to discover how their livelihood/food access system might be made more resilient to shocks, and how to renew or reorganize their system, should such shocks occur. This requires developing an understanding of where resilience resides in the system, and when and how it can be lost or gained, which means identifying the points in the household food system where interventions can increase the resilience to future hazards²⁴¹.

The analysis of resilience would focus at the household level because this is where most risk management and coping strategies are implemented, especially the informal strategies that are most readily available to poor households. Measuring household resilience to food insecurity would require data on household assets (physical, human and social capital) and on formal safety nets, the functioning of markets, seasonality, and economic policies that determine a household's opportunities and the range of activities it can pursue to manage risk.

Much of this information could be obtained through HEA data. Such a framework would combine both short and long term actions to increase resilience. Short term actions would be aimed at supporting households' own coping strategies during the acute phase of the crisis through cash

transfers or social protection measures. Longer term actions would consist of investment in health and education, and DRR actions, which build resilience over time.

Assessment of resilience takes a systems approach. This is relevant because the resilience of poorer households cannot be analysed without understanding how they interact with better off households within the local social system. Also, at the local level, while the focus must be on the poorest households, who are most vulnerable, strengthening resilience often requires community collective action, sharing of risks, pooling of resources, and advocacy for the right to food, and essential public services (i.e. social transfers, provision of health and education).

Researchers at the FAO who have applied the concept of resilience to food security have combined and weighted such factors into an index, that provides an overall quantitative resilience score. The score indicates where investments need to be made to further build resilience.²⁴²

Endnotes

- ¹ Harragin, S (2006) *The Cost of being Poor: Markets, Mistrust and malnutrition in southern Niger 2005-2006*. Save the Children (UK) p.6
- ² In some regions, even in normal years, the rate of child malnutrition is consistently higher than emergency threshold of 15% specified by the World Health Organisation
- ³ Personal communication Jan Eijkenaar, ECHO Dakar
- ⁴ Source: <http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?ReportID=90347>
- ⁵ Holt, J et al (2009). *Understanding Household Economy in Rural Niger*. Save the Children UK p.103
- ⁶ IRIN (Dec 2010) Child nutrition situation in Niger remains alarming, UN-backed survey warns. Available at <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37169&Cr=+niger+&Cr1=>
- ⁷ RPCA (Dec 2009) *Interview with Prof. Alhousseini Bretaudeau, CILSS Secretary-General* Bamako, 11 December 2009 available at http://www.oecd.org/document/38/0,3746,en_38233741_38242551_44516882_1_1_1_1,00.html
- ⁸ Mark Hathaway, *The Tao of Liberation: Exploring the Ecology of Transformation*
- ⁹ The Marshall Plan (officially the European Recovery Program, ERP) was the large-scale American program to aid Europe where the United States gave monetary support to help rebuild European economies after the end of World War II. The initiative was named after Secretary of State George Marshall.
- ¹⁰ ALNAP outlines these four components as main dimensions of innovation. The position of an organisation and its work in relation to key stakeholders can be explained as a change in an organisation's public profile or by changing attitudes to an area of work such as food aid. A change in paradigm relates to change in combined attitudes and beliefs determining the fundamental approach (i.e. shifts in towards beneficiary participation, local ownership and capacity development).
- ¹¹ Pippa Trench, P., et al. (June 2007) *Beyond Any Drought Root Causes of Chronic Vulnerability in the Sahel*, SWG p.37
- ¹² The countries included Mauritania, Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. A brief summary of the HEA methodology applied in Niger is presented In Holt, J et al (2009). *Understanding Household Economy in Rural Niger*. Save the Children UK p.9-12
- ¹³ Save the Children UK (Juin 2010) *Compte rendu de l'atelier Faim de Changement : Atelier sur la Gestion et Prévention des crises alimentaires et la lutte contre la malnutrition : Enseignements tirés des études HEA réalisées au Sahel* Dakar, Sénégal. p.3
- ¹⁴ Seidou, B, Hélène Berton, H et Delphine Valette, D (Juin 2010) *Les nouveaux enjeux de la sécurité alimentaire au Sahel Note de Synthèse* Save the Children UK
- ¹⁵ Holt, J., LeJeune, S (Sept 2007) *Report on the Household Economy Survey of Two Livelihood Zones of Tessaoua District*, SCUUK
- ¹⁶ Personal communication, Jan Eijkenaar, ECHO
- ¹⁷ SMART is a voluntary, collaborative network of organizations and humanitarian practitioners that includes donors, policymakers, and leading experts in emergency epidemiology and nutrition, food security, early warning systems, and demography. It includes all humanitarian organizations: donors, international and UN agencies, NGOs, universities, research institutes and governments.
- ¹⁸ Undernutrition is defined by UNICEF as the outcome of insufficient food intake and repeated infectious diseases. Undernutrition describes a range of conditions: it includes being underweight for one's age, too short for one's age (stunted), dangerously thin (wasted), and deficient in vitamins and/or minerals (micronutrient malnutrition) 'Malnutrition' encompasses both undernutrition and over-nutrition (obesity), but in this report is equivalent to undernutrition
- ¹⁹ Cited in : ECHO (2009) *Humanitarian Aid from the budget of the European Communities for vulnerable populations at risk in the Sahel Region of West Africa* GLOBAL PLAN
- ²⁰ RUTF was a major humanitarian innovation. The treatment of severe acute malnutrition (SAM) in emergencies traditionally took place through specially constructed therapeutic feeding centres (TFCs), built 'in the field' by agencies. The treatment offered by TFCs was good but the centres were expensive, difficult to establish, required extensive and sustained external support. The highly medicalised and self-contained structure of TFCs offered little scope for patient involvement and sometimes disrupted fragile local health structures. Sparsely dispersed, the TFC's offered poor coverage with mothers or whole families often having to walk long distances to receive treatment for one child, which for many was not feasible.
- ²¹ The main specific objective of ECHO's Sahel strategy is to contribute to the reduction of acute malnutrition and mortality of the most vulnerable population and in particular of children under 5 years and lactating and pregnant women. ECHO 2007 p.15
- ²² IRIN (2010) *SAHEL: After 30 years, nutrition strategy revamp at hand* <http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthID=81&ReportID=90440>
- ²³ Cited in Mousseau, F. *Sahel: A Prisoner of Starvation? A Case Study of the 2005 Food Crisis in Niger* p13. A slightly different version in Save the Children UK (2009) *Hungry For Change an Eight-Step, Costed Plan of Action to Tackle Global Child Hunger*, p.23
- ²⁴ Within the EU a "road map" for inter-service cooperation in Niger and Mali was drawn up in February 2006 between the Commission aid services. This laid out the role and scope of short-term humanitarian aid (12 M allocated in 2006 for Niger, medium-term (an extra 12 M was allocated to "B" envelope food security operations) and long-term (commitment to include food security as a sector of concentration in the 10th EDF. See ECHO (2009).

- ²⁵ ECHO. *Vers la réduction de la malnutrition au Burkina Faso. Des acteurs humanitaires engagés témoignent*, p. 10-11
- ²⁶ République du Niger (2009) : *Protocole National de Prise en Charge de la Malnutrition*. Ministère de la Santé Publique
- ²⁷ ECHO (2010) *L'Exemption du Paiement: Un Pas vers l'Accès Universel aux Soins de Santé*. Expériences Pilotes au Burkina Faso.
- ²⁸ Ibid.
- ²⁹ Poulsen, L., Fabre D., (March 2011) UNICEF Emergency Project Niger. Cash Transfer for Protection of Blanket Feeding. Maradi and Tahoua regions of Niger.
- ³⁰ Mousseau, F. (2010). *The High Food Price Challenge: A Review of Responses to Combat Hunger*. Oakland, CA: The Oakland Institute. p.22
- ³¹ David Rizzi, UNICEF (personal communication)
- ³² EuropeAid (Jan 2011) *Addressing Undernutrition in External Assistance Reference Document DRAFT 0 An integrated approach through sectors and aid modalities*
- ³³ This refers to the global food price crisis which also affected the Sahel
- ³⁴ Haglund E. Ndjeunga J., Snook, L., Pasternak, D. (2009) *Assessing the Impacts of Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration in the Sahel: A Case Study of Maradi Region, Niger* (draft) p.1
- ³⁵ There were major protests in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, and in the capital of Mauritania.
- ³⁶ For example, Niger is in the process of implementing the *Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme* (CAADP) agenda and the Common Agricultural Policy of (ECOWAS), to promote agricultural development and economic growth to six % a year, based on a national budget expenditure of 10% a year. The aim is to eliminate hunger and reduce poverty. This is taking place in the context of the implementation of the Rural Development Strategy and the National programme for agricultural investment is under development.
- ³⁷ In April 2008, by 58 governments in Johannesburg approved the *Summary for Decision Makers of the Global Report* by The International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD), which advocated support of small scale farmers and agroecological approaches, as the best way to improve the resilience and sustainability of food systems. It was approved. The United States refused to ratify it.
- ³⁸ OXFAM GB, Christian Aid, World Vision, ACF are among the many international agencies that have all published documents advocating agroecology.
- ³⁹ Rinaudo, T., Yaou, S. (2009) *Agricultural Task Force Report: World Vision Niger Agricultural Development* World Vision p.4; See also Holt J, et al. (2009) *Understanding Household Economy in Rural Niger* Save the Children
- ⁴⁰ Rinaudo, T and Yaou, S. World Vision op.cit. p.4
- ⁴¹ There is considerable evidence, particularly in Burkina Faso, that small scale farmers supported by long term development programs are able to regenerate degraded land through use of simple soil and water conservation techniques, such as stone bunds along the contour, zaïs (small pits dug by farmers for planting that improve water and nutrient retention), "half-moons" and other small-scale anti-erosion techniques.
- ⁴² Adapted from Annex 5 of Rinaudo T. and Yaou, S 2009 op. cit. p23-24
- ⁴³ Rinaudo, T and Yaou,S. World Vision op.cit. p.4
- ⁴⁴ In addition to the sources such as the World Bank, and independent researchers cited in the endnotes, see also United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Environment Programme, World Bank, World Resources Institute. (2008). *Turning back the desert. How farmers have transformed Niger's landscapes and livelihoods*. (In World resources 2008: Roots of resilience - growing the wealth of the poor (pp. 142-150). Washington DC: World Resources Institute.) Retrieved September 25, 2008, from <http://www.wri.org/publication/world-resources-2008-roots-of-resilience>; and Chris Reij, Gray Tappan, and Melinda Smale. *Millions Fed. Proven successes in agricultural development*. Chapter 7 - Re-Greening the Sahel: Farmer-led innovation Burkina Faso and Niger <http://www.ifpri.org/publication/millions-fed>
- ⁴⁵ Trees in the Sahelian context are critical for a) enhancing soil fertility while combating soil erosion b) reducing damaging winds c) providing for the fodder requirements of livestock d) income generation through sale of wood and non wood products, and d) human food, medicines, honey and other tree products
- ⁴⁶ Cited in Rinaudo, T and Yaou,S. World Vision op.cit p.9
- ⁴⁷ Rinaudo,T and Yaou,S World Vision op cit. p10
- ⁴⁸ World Bank (Oct 2010) *Niger Strategic Program For Climate Resilience* p11-12. See also Botoni, E. et Reij, C. (2009) *Silent transformation of environment and production systems in the Sahel: impacts of public and private investments in natural resource management*. (CILSS et Université libre d'Amsterdam)
- ⁴⁹ Haglund E. Ndjeunga J., Snook, L., Pasternak, D. (2009) *Assessing the Impacts of Farmer Managed Natural Regeneration in the Sahel: A Case Study of Maradi Region, Niger* (draft) p.27
- ⁵⁰ Rinaudo,T and Yaou,S World Vision op cit. p.10
- ⁵¹ Haglund E et al. Op cit. piii
- ⁵² Ibid p.26
- ⁵³ Ibid p 27
- ⁵⁴ In response to the 2008 food price crisis, Rein Paulsen the Humanitarian Emergency Assistance Director of Strategy and

Humanitarian Policy at World Vision commissioned the Agricultural Task Force (ATF) to work with review and improve the agricultural component of their food security work of selected national offices, including Niger. The aims included to identify the root causes of hunger, refine the approach to addressing the problems, and progressively main stream the key findings.

- ⁵⁵ UNICEF Report « *Scaling Up « Suivi des admissions 6 à 59 mois dans les centres de prise en charge de la malnutrition aigüe sévère*. Date from January to December 2010 by Region.
- ⁵⁶ Linking agriculture with nutrition involves not only addressing land fertility issues and yields, but assessing what crops are grown. There is much evidence that shows that increased agricultural growth and reduced malnutrition as not always positively correlated. The type of growth can strongly impact nutritional outcomes. Growth that focuses on export led large scale farming tends not to reduce malnutrition of poorer households. Delphine Valette, Save the Children UK (personal communication)
- ⁵⁷ Réseau Billital Maroobé (2011) *La crise pastorale de 2009/2010 au Sahel. Témoignages de pasteurs et d'acteurs confrontés à la crise au Niger, au Tchad, au Mali et au Burkina Faso* (financed by OXFAM International and IRAM)
- ⁵⁸ ACF (Nov 2010) *Chad: A Call to End Decades of Hunger. Briefing Paper* p.7
- ⁵⁹ Grahn, R. (2008) *The Paradox of Pastoral Vulnerability*: OXFAM (From Poverty to Power Background Paper) www.fp2p.org
- ⁶⁰ Ibid.
- ⁶¹ Transhumance can be defined as “a system of animal production characterised by seasonal and cyclical migration of varying degrees between complementary ecological areas and supervised by a few people, with most of the group remaining sedentary”. Transhumant herds usually move from areas that are difficult, unbalanced and changeable, such as the Sahel and agro-ecologically vulnerable zones. ranshumance is a way of adapting to these conditions and making use of ecological complementarities between the Sahel and Sudan regions. SWAC/OECD “*The Future of Livestock in the Sahel and West Africa: Potentials and Challenges for Strengthening the Regional Market*”, available on www.oecd.org/sah
- ⁶² Grahn, R. (2008) op cit
- ⁶³ Personal communication, CARE Diffa head of project responsible for GRN-PAIX..Also see Project document *Problématique Générale de la Gestion des Ressources Naturelles en Région de Diffa et Justification de la Composante GRN/PAIX*
- ⁶⁴ Grahn, R, 2008. Op cit. p3
- ⁶⁵ Rass, N. (2006) *Policies and Strategies to Address the Vulnerability of Pastoralists in Sub-Saharan Africa* p.56 Table 11
- ⁶⁶ DDR Niger Consortium (2010) FINAL REPORT Coordinated Disaster Risk Reduction Responses in Niger (July 2007 to March 2010 p.10
- ⁶⁷ In 2005, Tearfund developed a practical tool to help development organisations mainstream disaster risk reduction into their humanitarian and development planning and programming. See La Trobe, S., Davis, I., (2005) *Mainstreaming disaster risk reduction a tool for development organisations*. Tear Fund
- ⁶⁸ Kelly C, Khinmaung J (2007) *Prepare to Live: strengthening the resilience of communities to manage food insecurity in the Sahel region*. London: Tearfund
- ⁶⁹ Christian Aid (2009) *Christian Aid's Approach To Building Disaster- Resilient Communities*
- ⁷⁰ Synthesized from (Tearfund's 2005-08 response in Niger, reports of Christian Aid's BDRC programme in Mali and Burkina from 2005 to 2010, and the Niger DRR Consortium programme reports for 2007-10)
- ⁷¹ DRR Consortium Niger (2010) *Niger Disaster Risk Reduction Programme Phase II Interim Report On DRR Programme (May 2010 To October 2010)*
- ⁷² DRR Niger Consortium (2007) *Coordinated Disaster Risk Reduction Responses in Niger* Submitted to DFID Africa Conflict & Humanitarian Unit p30-31
- ⁷³ CARE-Niger (Oct. 2009) *Système Communautaire d'Alerte Précoce et de Réponse aux Urgences (SCAP-RU) Mode Operatoire, Version 1*
- ⁷⁴ Baoua, I., Abdourahamane, B., Alhassane, A. (Oct 2009) *Observatoire de Suivi de la Vulnérabilité. Capitalisation de Quatre Années de Recherche Action*. APCAN
- ⁷⁵ Personal communication. Coordinator of SAP Niger, H. Harouna
- ⁷⁶ See Harvey, Paul, Katherine Haver, K., Hoffmann, J., Brenda Murphy, B., (2010) *Delivering Money Cash Transfer Mechanisms in Emergencies*. Save the Children UK; Paul Harvey is also completing an extensively researched ‘*Good Practice Review: Cash Transfer Programming in Emergencies* which should be published in 2011 (personal communication); See also ACF (2007) *Implementing Cash-based Interventions A guideline for aid workers*
- ⁷⁷ This concept of social protection is taken from Norton, Conway and Foster 2002:543)
- ⁷⁸ Shepherd, A., Marcus R., Barrientos, A., (Sept 2004) *Policy Paper on Social Protection* ODI DFID paper on social protection p 12
- ⁷⁹ Devereaux, S.,Cipryk,R., (July 2009) *Social Protection in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Regional Review* Institute of Development Studies Prepared as part of a Social Protection Scoping Study funded by the Ford Foundation p 24; McCord, A., 2009 op cit
- ⁸⁰ Devereaux, S., Ciprky (2009), op cit p 20

- ⁸¹ Shepherd et al. (2004) op cit p.2
- ⁸² République du Niger (2010) *Projet pilote des filets sociaux par le cash transfert (PPFS-CT) Note conceptuelle du projet*
- ⁸³ Jessica Petitprez, Save the Children UK (personal communication)
- ⁸⁴ Sen's entitlement framework, designed in part to prevent famine, identifies four sources of food: production, employment, trade and transfers. All four sources, including cash transfers, can be supported under the rubric of social protection
- ⁸⁵ de Sardan, Jean-Pierre Olivier (Jan 2011), Au Niger, le cycle des crises alimentaires <http://blog.mondediplo.net/2011-01-07-Au-Niger-le-cycle-des-crisis-alimentaires>
- ⁸⁶ Cited in Harragin, S (June 2006) *The Cost of being Poor: Markets, mistrust and malnutrition in southern Niger 2005-2006*. Save the Children (UK)
- ⁸⁷ Ibid.
- ⁸⁸ Since 1986, Niger has been a party to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which enshrines the right to food and the right to be free from hunger in Article 11. This means that the Nigerien government committed itself to respect, protect, and fulfill the right to food for its population; including a commitment to call for the necessary assistance to fight hunger and malnutrition.
- ⁸⁹ OECD DAC (Feb 2010) *Ensuring Fragile States are not left Behind: Summary Report*
- ⁹⁰ DFID, *Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States* (London: UK Department for International Development, 2005).
- ⁹¹ Poulsen, L., Michael, M, Pearson, N.(Feb 2007) *Drought and Vulnerability. A Review of Context, Capacity and Appropriate Interventions with respect to drought and acute malnutrition in the Sahel Region of West Africa. Concept Paper* p55. In September 2006, the number of registered and active NGOs in Chad was 69 international and 74 national. In the same month, the active number of national NGOs in Niger was 286 and in Burkina 290
- ⁹² See the European Consensus of December 2005; cited in Poulsen, L. Op. Cit. p.10-11
- ⁹³ Mousseau, F., Mittal, A.,(October 2006) *Sahel: A Prisoner of Starvation? A Case Study of the 2005 Food Crisis in Niger*. The Oakland Institute, www.oaklandinstitute.org p.24
- ⁹⁴ Cited in Mousseau, F., Mittal, A.,(October 2006) *Sahel: A Prisoner of Starvation? A Case Study of the 2005 Food Crisis in Niger*. The Oakland Institute, www.oaklandinstitute.org, p.18
- ⁹⁵ Tchad, (2009) Enquête sur la Vulnérabilité Structurelle à l'insécurité alimentaire au Tchad.
- ⁹⁶ Action Contre la Faim, Food and Agriculture Organisation (2010) *Economie des ménages et sécurité alimentaire Départements de Kanem et de Wadi Bissam*. Juillet-Août.
- ⁹⁷ Bauer, J., Foye, M., Ibrahim, L., Tessandier, C., *Marchés et Sécurité alimentaire au Tchad* Published jointly by FAO, FEWS NET, FAO
- ⁹⁸ Ibid
- ⁹⁹ Ibid p.47
- ¹⁰⁰ Ibid
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- ¹⁰² PAM (2010) *Rapport Mission Achats Locaux*. Novembre
- ¹⁰³ Bauer, J., Foye, M., Ibrahim, L., Tessandier, C, op cit. p. 48
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- ¹⁰⁶ Flament, J., (June 2010) *Food reserves as a means of stabilising markets, increasing producers' market power and guaranteeing food security* Report of the international agricultural seminar organised by the Collectif Stratégies Alimentaires (CSA), the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP) and Oxfam-Solidarity p4.
- ¹⁰⁷ Sampson, Kristin (October 2010) *Stabilizing Agriculture Markets What Next On Food Reserves?* Institute For Agriculture And Trade Policy IATP
- ¹⁰⁸ Flament, J (June 2010) op cit.
- ¹⁰⁹ Murphy, S., (October 2010) *Stabilizing Agriculture Markets WTO Rules And Food Reserves* Institute For Agriculture And Trade Policy IATP. Murphy analyses the WTO rules and determines that there are specific exemptions in the Agreement on Agriculture that would give room to manoeuvre for Sahelian governments to use food reserves as a way to affect prices. According to Murphy, "World Trade Organization (WTO) rules governing agriculture do not actually make the operation of a grain reserve impos-sible, but they do create uncertainties".
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- ¹¹² IRIN (December 2010) *Child nutrition situation in Niger remains alarming, UN-backed survey warns* <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37169&Cr=niger+&Cr1=>
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- ¹¹⁵Brian O'Neill, personal communication
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- ¹¹⁹République de Niger : Stratégie de Développement accéléré et de réduction de la Pauvreté 2008 – 2012
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- ¹²¹OXFAM (November 2009). *People-Centred Resilience Working with vulnerable farmers towards climate change adaptation and food security*. Oxfam Briefing Paper 135 – Summary p.4
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- ¹⁵⁰IRIN September 2010 <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=90845>; see also *Action Contre la Faim Espagne au Mali (Mars 2010) Analyse de la situation pastorale dans les régions Nord du Mali*
- ¹⁵¹IRIN September 2010 <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportID=90845>
- ¹⁵²IRIN October 2010: <http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthID=81&ReportID=90522>; also personal communication from several NGO sources interviewed from within Mali
- ¹⁵³Oxfam International (April 2010) *Concept Note Food Security Emergency Response (Mali, 2010) – Gao Region*, p.3
- ¹⁵⁴Ibid The security situation in northern Mali was likely also a factor inhibiting action. .
- ¹⁵⁵FEWS NET (Feb 2010) op. cit
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- ¹⁵⁷This was in contrast to what occurred in 2005, when similar size production deficits in this same area caused grain prices to rise sharply from February to April. In 2010, market competition was not as strong and grain prices behaved differently. Good early rains in May in the south of Burkina led traders and farmers to sell off their stocks quicker than usual, thereby preventing the expected price increases in the lean season.
- ¹⁵⁸FEWS NET *BURKINA FASO Food Security Outlook Update May 2010*
- ¹⁵⁹FEWS NET *Burkina Faso Food Security Outlook Update March 2010*
- ¹⁶⁰The household economy approach is primarily an *analytical framework*, i.e. it defines the data to be collected (for a specified purpose) and sets out how that data will be analysed and used. It is *not a particular method of data collection*
- ¹⁶¹Holt, J et al (2009). *Understanding Household Economy in Rural Niger*. Save the Children UK p.3
- ¹⁶²Holt, J., LeJeune, S (Sept 2007) *Report on the Household Economy Survey of Two Livelihood Zones of Tessaoua District*, Save the Children
- ¹⁶³Ibid p. 98
- ¹⁶⁴Camilla Knox Peebles, OXFAM (personal communication)
- ¹⁶⁵The agencies are: CARE International, European Commission Joint Research Centre, FAO, FEWS NET, Oxfam GB, Save the Children UK/US, United Nations World Food Programme (WFP)
- ¹⁶⁶Frankenberger, T, Verduijn. (April 2011) *Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC)* End of Project Evaluation
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- ¹⁶⁸FAO (June 2006) *Integrated Food Security and Humanitarian Phase Classification (IPC)* Framework Policy Brief Issue 3. This document contains version 1.1 of the full IPC table. A new version, 2.0 is being developed, and is scheduled for release in July 2011.
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- ¹⁷⁰Funding for SMART pilot testing was provided by the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Action Against Hunger, MSF, and FAO provided their own funds for pilot-testing.
- ¹⁷¹For an overview of this tool see, http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/en/docs/Cost_of_the_Diet_overview.pdf
- ¹⁷²Holt J et al. 2009 op cit. p.93
- ¹⁷³Isanaka S, Nombela N, Djibo A, Poupard M, Van Beckhoven D, Gaboulaud V, Guerin PJ, Grais RF. (2009) *Effect of preventive supplementation with ready-to-use therapeutic food on the nutritional status, mortality, and morbidity of children aged 6 to 60 months in Niger: a cluster randomized trial*. JAMA 2009 Jan 21;301(3):277-85.
- ¹⁷⁴IRIN (2010) SAHEL: *After 30 years, nutrition strategy revamp at hand* <http://www.irinnews.org/InDepthMain.aspx?InDepthID=81&ReportID=90440>
- ¹⁷⁵ACF (November 2010) *A Call to End Decades of Hunger*, Briefing Paper
- ¹⁷⁶See the chapter "Destroying African Agriculture" in Bello, W. (2009) *The Food Wars* for a cogent analysis. Also Mousseau, F. with Anuradha Mittal (2009) *Sahel: A Prisoner of Starvation? A Case Study of the 2005 Food Crisis in Niger*. In its 2008 "World Development Report", the World Bank admits that "structural adjustment in the 1980's disbanded the elaborate system of public agencies that provided farmers with access to credit, insurance inputs, and cooperative organisation. The expectation was....the market for private actors to take over these functions....too often, this did not happen.... the private sector emerged only slowly and partially, serving commercial farmers but leaving smallholders exposed to extensive market failures, high transaction costs and risks, and service gaps" Cited in Bello op cit p.82
- ¹⁷⁷Mousseau, F. With Anuradha Mittal (2009) *Sahel: A Prisoner of Starvation? A Case Study of the 2005 Food Crisis in Niger* p,30
- ¹⁷⁸This include the Bill and Melinda Gates, and the Rockefeller Foundations
- ¹⁷⁹Cited in Christian Aid (June 2007) *Farmers left behind. How markets, governments and donors have failed Africa's greatest resource*. This quotation, which appeared in the first draft was subsequently been removed, but remains implicit in the document
- ¹⁸⁰Bello, W. (2009) op. cit. p82
- ¹⁸¹Mousseau, F. (2010). *The High Food Price Challenge: A Review of Responses to Combat Hunger*. Oakland, CA: The Oakland Institute, p.34
- ¹⁸²Christian Aid (June 2007) op.cit. p.7; See also Bello, W (2009) p.83
- ¹⁸³Christian Aid (June 2007) op.cit. p.7
- ¹⁸⁴See also Wardle, C. (Nov 2008) *Community Area Based Development Approach (CABDA) Programme: An alternative way to address the current African food crisis?* ODI Natural Resources Perspective 119, for experiences similar to the World Vision case study in Ethiopia Uganda and Malawi
- ¹⁸⁵OXFAM (2009) *People-Centred Resilience Working with vulnerable farmers towards climate change adaptation and food security* Briefing Paper 135 p.2
- ¹⁸⁶World Vision Australia, Yates, P. (Oct 2010) *Acacias The potential to combat child malnutrition, build agricultural resilience and support adaptation*
- ¹⁸⁷Ibid. p5 The potential for commercial production of nutrition supplements from acacia and moringa, including emergency food aid products is also being explored.

- ¹⁸⁸Cited in ECHO (Feb 2011) *L'insécurité alimentaire et la malnutrition au Sahel: le défi du ciblage* Powerpoint presentation. Data found in Analyse de l'économie des ménages (HEA) et zones de moyens d'existence: <http://www.feg-consulting.com/hea>
- ¹⁸⁹Kelly C, Khinmaung J (2007) *Prepare to live: strengthening the resilience of communities to manage food insecurity in the Sahel region*. London: Tearfund p.24
- ¹⁹⁰Twigg, J. (2007) *Characteristics of a Disaster-resilient Community: A Guidance Note Version 1 (for field testing)* or the DFID Disaster Risk Reduction Interagency Coordination Group <http://tilz.tearfund.org/NR/exeres/90D0D297-5800-46B9-8113-6456AB60FA88.htm>
- ¹⁹¹Ramalingam, B., Scriven K., Foley, C., *Innovations in international humanitarian action, Chapter 3* ALNAP Review of Humanitarian Action. p.49-50
- ¹⁹²Ibid.
- ¹⁹³DFID (April 2011) *Cash Transfers Evidence Paper*
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- ¹⁹⁵World Food Programme (WFP) (2008) *WFP Strategic Plan (2009–2011)*. Rome: p.3 Available at: www.wfp.org/policies/Strategies/index.asp?section=6&sub_section=2
- ¹⁹⁶Poulsen, L., Fabre, D., (March 2011) *Final Report UNICEF Emergency Project Niger Cash Transfer for Protection of Blanket Feeding. Maradi and Tahoua Regions. Implementation* Sept 2010 to Jan 2011
- ¹⁹⁷Concern realised that carrying and distributing food in this remote area would have been both costly and insecure. Local markets were still functioning. So Concern decided to establish a program using mobile phone technology to transfer cash to recipients together with a private-sector partner, M-PESA which is a nationwide electronic cash service in Kenya.
- ¹⁹⁸McCord, Anna (2009) *Cash transfers: affordability and sustainability*. ODI Briefing Paper 30; see also McCord, Anna (Nov 2009) *Cash transfers and political economy in sub-Saharan Africa* ODI Briefing Paper 31
- ¹⁹⁹Devereux, S., (Sept 2003) *Policy Options for Increasing the Contribution of Social Protection to Food Security*. Institute of Development Studies, University of Sussex; also John Farrington, J., Slater, R., Holmes, R., (April 2004) *The Search for Synergies between Social Protection and Livelihood Promotion: The Agriculture Case*. ODI Working Paper 232
- ²⁰⁰Shepherd et al. (2004) op cit
- ²⁰¹See the work HEA Save the Children in this report
- ²⁰²Shepherd et al. (2004) op cit
- ²⁰³African Union (March 2006) Intergovernmental Regional Conference *A transformative agenda for the 21st Century: Examining the case for basic social protection in Africa*
- ²⁰⁴World Bank (2001) *Dynamic risk management and the poor: developing a social protection strategy for Africa*, Washington, DC: World Bank. Cited in Andrew Shepherd, A., with Rachel Marcus, R., Barrientos A., (September 2004) *Policy Paper on Social Protection*. A paper produced for DFID
- ²⁰⁵Mousseau, F (2010) op cit. p.18
- ²⁰⁶Devereaux S, Cipryk (2009) op cit, p 24
- ²⁰⁷Ibid
- ²⁰⁸(World Bank 1992, 1). Devesh cited in Santiso, C. 2001 *Good Governance and Aid Effectiveness: The World Bank and Conditionality*. Paul H Nitze School of Advanced International Studies Johns Hopkins University The Georgetown Public Policy Review Volume 7 Number 1 Fall 2001, pp.1-22
- ²⁰⁹Daniel Kauffman, D. (February 2009) *Aid Effectiveness and Governance The Good, the Bad and the Ugly*. Development Outreach, World Bank Institute.
- ²¹⁰Santiso 2001, op cit. p.18
- ²¹¹In the past decade, there has been a major shift away from conditionality to “selectivity” (i.e. targeting aid to poor countries with sound policies and effective institutions). The aim is to increase aid effectiveness by concentrating it in countries showing genuine commitment to improving governance. This involves a shift from inducing governments to promote good governance into requiring good governance as a condition for receiving aid, and therefore does not confront governance directly. This approach still influences the approach of the US and the World Bank.
- ²¹²Harragin, S (June 2006) op.cit. p.64
- ²¹³Carbone M, (2009?) *The European Union, good governance and aid effectiveness*: pp.9-13
- ²¹⁴Ibid pp. 10-11
- ²¹⁵The African Capacity Building Foundation (2011) *Capacity Development in Fragile States , Africa Capacity Indicators* 2011 p.42
- ²¹⁶OECD, *Service Delivery in Fragile Situations* (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2008)
- ²¹⁷States are fragile when their structures lack political will and/or capacity to provide the basic functions needed for poverty reduction, development and to safeguard the security and human rights of their populations. Many fragile states confront particularly severe development challenges such as weak governance, limited administrative capacity, chronic

humanitarian crisis, persistent social tensions, and armed conflict. Both Chad and Niger are considered fragile states by OECD and other classification systems.

²¹⁸OECD (April 2007) *Principles For Good International Engagement In Fragile States & Situations*

²¹⁹References and statements about fragile states are made in all of the following:

United Nations (September 2008) Accra Agenda for Action: 3rd High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness;

European Union (2005) Brussels: The European Consensus on Development;

OECD (2005) Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership, Harmonisation, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability

²²⁰ACF report *Chad: a call to end decades of hunger*

²²¹Ibid

²²²République de Tchad (Mars 2008) Document de Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté au Tchad

²²³FAO, Coopération Française, Délégation de la Union Européenne (Février 2010): *Rapport de l'Étude sur Le Dispositif National de Sécurité Alimentaire*

²²⁴Morinière, Lezlie C. (Août 2010) *Rapport d'Évaluation Finale, externe et indépendante, du projet SISA—SAP : Relance du Système d'alerte précoce pour la sécurité alimentaire* » (Draft) (GCP/CHD/028/EC) orchestré par la FAO et le Gouvernement du Tchad

²²⁵Personal communication EC in N'Djaména; Intermon OXFAM staff in Guéra

²²⁶ACF (Nov 2010) Briefing Paper: *Chad A call to end Decades of Hunger*

²²⁷HLTF (2008) Comprehensive Framework for Action, United Nations High Level Task Force on Hunger, New York

²²⁸Personal communication; from an interview with the FAO

²²⁹Mousseau, F. Et al. (October 2006) op cit.19

²³⁰Ibid .p21

²³¹Ibid

²³²Shenggen Fan, Maximo Torero, and Derek Headey (March 2011) *Urgent Actions Needed to Prevent Recurring Food Crises* IFPRI Policy Brief 16

²³³Sampson, Kristin (October 2010) *Stabilizing Agriculture Markets What Next On Food Reserves?* Institute For Agriculture And Trade Policy IATP

²³⁴This section is largely based on an edited note of 2009 of DG ECHO's experience in the articulation of Commission aid instruments to achieve a link between relief, rehabilitation and development (LRRD).

²³⁵Communication from the Commission to the Council and EP

on the Linkage between Relief, Rehabilitation and Development (LRRD), COM 153 of 24 April 2001

²³⁶Trench, P., Rowley, J., Diarra, M., Sano, F., Keita B., (June 2007) *Beyond Any Drought Root causes of chronic vulnerability in the Sahel* The Sahel Working Group p.11

²³⁷Ibid p.12

²³⁸EL Malone (Aug 2009) *Vulnerability and Resilience in the Face of Climate Change: Current Research and Needs for Population Information*. Battelle. Washington. Prepared for Population Action International p.12

²³⁹Ibid p.6

²⁴⁰Sen, Amartya. (1981) *Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation*. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

²⁴¹Alinovi, L., Mane, E., (January 2009) *Measuring Household Resilience To Food Insecurity: Application To Palestinian Households* (Working Paper) EC-FAO Food Security Programme p.5

²⁴²Ibid p.8-18

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